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PREFACE

Writing in 1961, Bryce Wood penned what has become the standard interpretation of that elusive historical phenomenon known as the Good Neighbor Policy. Between 1933 and 1939 United States policy toward the rest of
the hemisphere was based on the "anticipation of reciprocity"; that is, in
response to the policies of nonintervention and noninterference, the United
States expected the Latin American governments to make friendly compromises with the policy concerns of the United States. With the outbreak of
war in Europe in 1939, Washington moved beyond the anticipation to the
"evocation" of reciprocity. In an attempt to construct an inter-American
collective-security organization capable of defending the hemisphere from
Axis subversion and aggression, the United States made specific economic
and political concessions to various Latin American nations. The Good
Neighbor Policy was more than a system of reciprocity; it comprised, according to Wood, a series of relationships built up during the 1930s between
the other American republics and the United States. While each was
unique, all of these bilateral dialogues were characterized by trust and
mutual respect.1
Wood maintained that the durability of the Good Neighbor Policy
depended on three things: "continuity in the policy of the United States;
moderation in the policy of the Latin American states toward United States
investors; and mutual resistance to certain types of incursion from outside."2
In The Containment of Latin America, David Green argues that existing
inter-American ties were altered during World War II because United States
policy-makers were convinced that the trend toward "revolutionary nationalism" in Latin America posed a threat to North American markets and inix

vestments. With a view toward preventing the emergence of state-controlled
economies, the United States worked assiduously from 1941 through 1947 to
expand its power and presence in Latin America.8 Undoubtedly, Washington's desire to maintain an economic open door in Latin America played a
significant role in the deliberations of United States officials and did affect the
continuity of the Good Neighbor Policy. Even more important to the special
relationships built up between the United States and the American republics
during the 1930s, however, were the two other factors envisioned by Wood:
disruption of the diplomatic community that had formulated and implemented the Good Neighbor Policy, and the refusal of one republic to join
with the United States in combating extrahemispheric intervention.
From 1939 through 1944 various Argentine governments rejected North
America's insistent demand for hemispheric solidarity and collective security.
Instead of severing relations with the Axis, they attempted to form a neutralist bloc in southern South America and permitted German agents to use
Argentina as a base for Axis espionage and subversion in the Western
Hemisphere. Argentine neutrality, if not tolerance of foreign intelligence
activities, was a natural outgrowth of the republic's physical location, economic situation, and diplomatic tradition and was not, as so many North
Americans believed, a sudden anti-United States aberration. Though German espionage activities did pose a threat to the Allied war effort until late
1943, it may be argued that Argentine nonalignment represented no greater
menace to United States interests than the neutralist policies of Ireland,
Switzerland, and Spain. Yet, Washington's posture toward those nations
differed widely from its hard-line stance toward Buenos Aires. Despite the
fact that Argentina was a major supplier of meat, wheat, hides, tungsten,
and other vital raw materials to the Allies throughout the war, the American foreign-affairs establishment, from 1942 through 1944, used virtually
every tactic known to the international community short of military assault
to destabilize three Argentine governments and to force the nation to accept
unconditionally North American leadership in extrahemispheric affairs. To
say the least, the Roosevelt administration's coercive tactics ran counter to
the principles of nonintervention and noninterference that underlay the
Good Neighbor Policy.
Washington's reaction to the Argentine problem, seen by latinos everywhere as a major test of the Good Neighbor Policy, was not determined
solely or even primarily by strategic considerations, as E. 0. Guerrant and
X

other historians of the "traditional" school argue, 4 or by a desire to preserve
an economic open door in Latin America, as David Green and the revisionists maintain. Washington's response was shaped, above all, by the everchanging balance of power within the United States foreign-policy establishment. As Wood points out, inter-American relations during the period from
1933 to 1941 never left the hands of a few dedicated, well-informed State
Department officials. As they built and serviced each of the unique relationships that emerged during the era of the Good Neighbor, they suffered nosignificant challenge to their control over policy. With the outbreak of
World War II, however, this situation changed dramatically. To deal with
the immense problems caused by American participation in the struggle
against the Axis, President Roosevelt called into being a score of new
agencies and brought into the policy-making process organizations and
bureaucrats that had virtually no experience in foreign affairs.5 Further
complicating the diplomatic equation was Roosevelt's tendency to let decisions emerge from bureaucratic conflict and organizational proliferation.
This administrative characteristic, so apparent in the president's attempts to
deal with the Depression, carried over into foreign policy after 1941.6 As a
result, Argentine-American relations were dramatically affected by the
struggle between groups within the State Department and by struggles
between the State Department, the Treasury Deparment, the Caribbean
Defense Command, and other agencies.
The rapid wartime expansion of the foreign-policy establishment, when
coupled with application of the competitive principle, meant that hemispheric
affairs and, especially, Argentine-American relations were influenced by men
and organizations that not only differed over interpretation of the Good
Neighbor Policy but that were responding to needs and drives wholly
unrelated to any concept of hemispheric community. In turn, the diplomats
who were traditionally charged with responsibility for hemispheric affairs devoted increasingly more effort to protecting their policy-making prerogatives
and less to cultivating the bilateral bonds engendered by the Good Neighbor
Policy. In making recommendations to the State Department, for example,
the American embassy in Buenos Aires acted to prevent encroachment upon
its authority by agents of the Board of Economic Warfare, the Foreign Economic Administration, and other agencies operating in Buenos Aires, as well
as to further a particular concept of the national interest. The substance of
Cordell Hull's policy toward Argentina, the timing of his decisions, and the

xi

manner in which he framed options for the White House were determined
as much by his rivalry with Sumner Welles, Henry Morgenthau, and Henry
Wallace as with his perception of where America's long-range interest lay
south of the Rio Grande. Rapprochement with Argentina in 1944-45 came
about in part because, as World War II neared its close and the Roosevelt
administration prepared for the coming peace, the struggle for control of
hemispheric policy momentarily came to a halt and two new bureaucratic
coalitions-one concerned primarily with the resurrection of the principles
of nonintervention and noninterference in hemispheric affairs and the other
preoccupied with international cooperation within the context of a world
organization-decided to cooperate in the restoration of hemispheric solidarity.7
In brief, the contention of this book will be that during World War II
the Good Neighbor Policy was undermined by, first, Argentina's refusal to
make an all-out commitment to the war against the Axis and, second, bureaucratic proliferation and competition within the Roosevelt foreign-policy
establishment and their dramatic effect on the way Washington responded
to Argentine neutrality. By 1944 various governments of Central and South
America were in open rebellion against Washington's response to Argentine
neutrality, seeing in it a threat to the policies of nonintervention and noninterference, as well as an alarming indicator of the future course of interAmerican relations. This rebellion, coupled with pressure from various
interest groups in the United States, the refusal of Great Britain to join in
the coercion of Argentina, President Roosevelt's decision to streamline the
State Department, and the emergence of a clique of policy-makers just as
devoted to the precepts of the Good Neighbor Policy as were its original
architects, produced an Argentine-American rapprochement and a temporary
restoration of Latin-American faith in the United States.

The research upon which this book is based is a product not only of
my efforts but of those of the dedicated staffs of the following libraries and
manuscript collections: the National Archives and the Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C.; the libraries of the University of Texas, the University
of Virginia, the University of Iowa, and the University of Arkansas; Sterling
Library at Yale University; the Rockefeller Family Archives in New York
XU

City; the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York; and the
Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.
For financial assistance in connection with preparation of the manuscript, I am indebted to the Research Reserve Fund of the University of
Arkansas and to the Eleanor Roosevelt Institute.
Numerous colleagues and former teachers read all or part of the manuscript at various stages of its preparation and furnished many helpful insights
and constructive criticisms. The former teachers include Clarence Lasby,
Nancy Barker, and Thomas McGann, all of the University of Texas at
Austin. The colleagues include Willard Gatewood, Timothy Donovan, and
James Chase, all of the University of Arkansas. I am also indebted to
William R. Emerson of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Norris Hundley
of the University of California at Los Angeles, John Harrison of the University of Miami, and William Griffith of the University of Kansas for the
valuable aid and advice they have given me during the course of the project.
Michael Grady Woods typed the manuscript and made numerous editorial
suggestions.
The individual who more than any other is responsible for my career
and for matching me with this topic is Robert Divine of the University of
Texas. No mentor could have done more for a student. Without the love
and support furnished by my wife, Rhoda, and my children, Nicole and
Jeffrey, I would most certainly have abandoned this project years ago.
Needless to say, any errors of form, style, and judgment in this work are
solely mine.
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1
THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY
AND ARGENTINE NEUTRALISM

The basic objectives of United States diplomacy in regard to Latin America
have remained virtually unchanged since the promulgation of the Monroe
Doctrine in 1823. Throughout the nineteenth century and the first threequarters of the twentieth, American diplomats labored to prevent foreign
intervention in Latin America, to protect United States economic interests
south of the Rio Grande, and to guard the strategic approaches to the
Western Hemisphere.1 The way in which Washington has pursued these
goals, however, has varied tremendously under the impact of domestic political warfare, the ever-changing international situation, and the public's
conception of America's role in world affairs.
The United States emerged from the Spanish-American War determined to play an ·active role abroad. Adherents of the New Manifest
Destiny won an ever-increasing number of Americans to the idea that it
was the nation's duty to spread .the blessings of freedom, democracy, and
capitalism to every region of the world.2 Social Darwinists argued that
human society was but a jungle where the laws of natural selection and
survival of the fittest operated at every level. Nations, like organisms, competed for living space and natural resources. Those that did not expand
died. The social scientists who developed the biological rationale for expansion were joined by captains of industry who proclaimed that the answer
to the cyclical depressions that plagued the American economy was the
establishment of new markets capable of absorbing the nation's surplus
production. Missionaries, who in the 1890s had "sworn to evangelize the
world in this decade," demanded that Washington protect them and that
the public support them as they brought Christianity to millions of heathens
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around the world. Convinced of the superiority of American political institutions, social imperialists maintained that the United States had a duty
to bring the blessings of liberty and democracy to those living under the
oppressive rule of tyrants and dictators. The mechanism for the new
expansionism was supplied by Alfred Thayer Mahan and his disciples.
Invoking the British imperial model, he persuaded many Americans that
United States foreign policy should focus on the acquisition of a series of
bases along the major trading routes of the world, construction of an
isthmian canal in Central America, and establishment of a large navy to
protect American merchants and missionaries as they opened up underdeveloped areas.3
Even when diplomats such as John Quincy Adams and James K. Polk
were laboring to round out the nation's continental frontiers, Latin America
had figured in the long-term plans of United States expansionists. With the
advent of the New Manifest Destiny, the area south of the Rio Grande
took center stage in the eyes of American policy-makers. Central and South
America abounded with undeveloped natural resources, potential consumers,
souls waiting to be saved, and governments in need of tutelage. Although
the Monroe Doctrine laid claim to the area for North American exploitation,
post-1900 expansionists were afraid, almost to the point of paranoia, that a
major European power would preempt the United States in the palaces,
churches, and marketplaces of Latin American society. Washington was
particularly concerned about protecting the approaches to the projected
isthmian canal, so vital to America's proposed transoceanic empire. The
three presidents who controlled the Latin-American policy of the United
States between the Spanish American War and World War I all shared
these fears and goals, but each supplied his own interpretation of the New
Manifest Destiny, and each brought to inter-American affairs his own
unique variety of imperialism.
Never questioning either America's right to exploit Latin America
economically or its duty to instruct it in the precepts of "civilization,"
Theodore Roosevelt, a devoted disciple of Mahan, directed his efforts to the
construction of an isthmian canal and to forestalling European penetration
of the New World. In pursuit of these and other goals, he coerced various
Latin American republics and then defended his activities by articulating in
1904 the definitive rationale for United States intervention-the Roosevelt
Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.4 Latin Americans felt threatened enough

2

The Good Nei.ghbor Policy and Argentine Neutralism

by Roosevelt's intervention into Cuban affairs and by his treatment of
Colombia in regard to the Panama Canal, but they were even more alarmed
by the president's overall attitude toward the hemispheric community, an
attitude that was characterized by obsession with power and insensitivity
to the rights of weaker nations.5
Responsibility for Roosevelt's empire in the Caribbean fell to his handpicked successor, William Howard Taft. Even more than Roosevelt, Taft
and his secretary of state, Philander Knox, believed that in order to preserve
Latin America as a reliable field for investment and to protect United States
strategic interests in the area, they would have to restrict European influence
to an absolute minimum. Taft and Knox perceived, however, that the
Roosevelt Corollary, if interpreted literally, would impose an awesome
burden on the United States and would lead to frequent armed intervention,
something they ardently hoped to avoid. Knox's solution to the problem of
how to protect American interests south of the Rio Grande without maintaining permanent marine garrisons throughout the hemisphere was a curious blend of corporate finance and strong-arm imperialism. The secretary
of state persuaded Taft that if the United States could displace Latin
American indebtedness from Europe to the United States, the threat of
foreign meddling would vanish, along with the need for American intervention. Unfortunately, United States financiers proved to be just as anxious
about the security of their investments as were their European counterparts.
Once they had been persuaded to invest in Latin American stocks and
bonds, they demanded that Washington use whatever force was necessary
to ensure stability and regularity of interest payments. Thus, while dollar
diplomacy was designed to facilitate United States control of the Western
Hemisphere and while it perhaps reduced the threat of nonhemispheric
interference, the policy also led to massive military intervention and so to
mounting alienation in Latin America.6
In 1912 Theodore Roosevelt, enraged by his successor's handling of
America's Caribbean and Far Eastern empires as well as his neglect of the
Rooseveltian domestic programs, challenged Taft for the presidency and, in
so doing, hopelessly split the Republican party. As a result, Woodrow
Wilson became the second Democrat to enter the White House since the
Civil War. Wilson brought a new style to foreign affairs and new objectives
to the Latin American policy of the United States. This former academician believed that the basic drive behind American foreign policy should
3
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not be material self-interest or power for power's sake, but rather a desire
to serve mankind through the propagation of freedom and democracy. This
is not to say that he ignored either the existence of powerful economic
interests in international life or the necessity of defending the nation's
strategic interests. Indeed, he looked after United States economic and
strategic concerns in Latin America quite conscientiously. Nevertheless, he
felt that American policy ought to go beyond these concerns. Reflecting his
Calvinist upbringing, Woodrow Wilson viewed the nation as God's chosen
instrument for bringing the blessings of civilization, peace, Christianity, and
democracy to all mankind. The president saw democracy as the most humane and Christian form of government; and transcending the doctrine of
predestination, he repeatedly asserted that all men were capable of being
trained in the political techniques of representative government.7 Moral
imperialism-as Arthur Link has labeled Wilson's Latin American policy
-was as interventionist as Roosevelt's big stick or dollar diplomacy.8 Wilson's tactics were all the more offensive to Latin Americans because, in
addition to producing armed intervention in Haiti and Mexico, they revealed
both a total disregard for the unique political and economic conditions that
existed in the various republics and an aggressive unwillingness to allow
the South and Central American peoples to work out their own destiny.
Latin Americans were hopeful that Wilson's World War I pronouncements about self-determination and the juridical equality of all states signaled a new era in the inter-American policy of the United States. Indeed,
a number of latino statesmen, led by Argentina's Carlos Saavedra Lamas,
enthusiastically embraced the League of Nations concept, hoping that Geneva would act as a brake on United States imperialism south of the Rio
Grande. After the United States Senate rejected membership in the league
and the American people repudiated Wilsonian idealism by returning the
GOP to power, many latinos readied themselves for a new version of the
big stick.
Despite Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge's statement, on the hundredth anniversary of the Monroe Doctrine in 1923, that the historic proclamation "is
no more to be disturbed or questioned or interpreted by other nations than
[is] the independence of the United States,"9 forces built after World War I
for a change in the tactics if not the basic goals of America's hemispheric•
policy. In the postwar decade, American investments south of the Rio
Grande grew to almost $6 billion. The rising tide of revolutionary national-
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ism, generated in part by remembrances of past North American exploitation, became of increasing concern to Wall Street and to the businessoriented Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover administrations. Too, the war had
destroyed in Britain, France, and Germany much of their capability for
economic expansion abroad and, with it, the need for intervention to prevent
extrahemispheric financial penetration. The strategic imperative for intervention had evaporated as well: after 1921 no naval power threatened the
security of the canal. A concomitant of America's global retreat from
responsibility was the desire at home to shed the task of policing the Western
Hemisphere. Anti-imperialists, spearheaded by LaFollette Progressives, demanded a repudiation of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine
and denounced United States economic imperialism for relegating most
Latin Americans to perpetual peonage.10
As a result of these diverse factors, Republican diplomats acted from
1921 to 1933 to eliminate some of the grosser aspects of United States
hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.11 The Republican phase of the
Good Neighbor Policy culminated in 1928 with publication of the Clark
Memorandum. That document, while reserving to the United States the
right of intervention under international law, did renounce the Roosevelt
Corollary and declared that the Monroe Doctrine was intended to be, not a
cover for United States imperialism, but a shield protecting the Western
Hemisphere from European interference.12
With the advent of the New Deal the concept of the Good Neighbor
began to take more definite shape. The reasons that had prompted a change
in tactics for dealing with Latin America after 1921 were still valid in 1933.
But there were also compelling new factors pushing the Roosevelt administration to adopt nonintervention and cooperation, rather than the principles
of the New Manifest Destiny, in its dealings with Latin America. There
was certainly no threat of a foreign power menacing the approaches of the
Panama Canal through construction of military bases in the Caribbean.
Moreover, the Depression had further lessened the threat of extrahemispheric
economic exploitation. After Roosevelt torpedoed the London Economic
Conference and the New Deal passed through its brief period of economic
nationalism, the president and the secretary of state, Cordell Hull (a fervent
believer in the ability of free trade to solve the world's economic problems),
began to view improved commercial relations with the New World as a
means to pull the United States out of the Depression.
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Out of a belief that hemispheric cooperation would facilitate a return
to prosperity, as well as the conviction that continued military and diplomatic intervention constituted a threat rather than a shield for American
lives and property in Latin America, the Roosevelt administration launched
a concerted drive to convince the American republics of Washington's respect for their national sovereignty and its solicitude for their economic
well-being. After ostentatiously repudiating intervention at the inter-American conference held in Montevideo in 1933, the United States and the
Cuban government in May 1934 signed a treaty abrogating the Platt Amendment, which had transformed the "ever-faithful isle" into an American
protectorate following the Spanish-American War. In August the last contingent of Marines left Haiti, and that black republic was at last free to
pursue its political destiny in its own way. The dismantling of America's
network of protectorates was accompanied by reciprocal tariff agreements
and, in 1934, by the establishment of the new Export-Import Bank to foster
trade with Cuba and other Latin American countries. The bank, established
to provide Latin American nations with capital that would enable them
to purchase United States exports, earned far less good will, however, than
did the bilateral trade agreements eventually negotiated between Washington
and ten other American republics. The United States relinquished its last
formal New World protectorate in 1936, when the State Department negotiated a new treaty with Panama that deprived Washington of the "right" to
intervene militarily.13
Latin America welcomed the Good Neighbor Policy as much for its
apparent spirit as for its substance. It seemed to many that at last the
United States intended to treat the American republics as a community of
nations, each with a unique culture and political heritage and each possessed
of the right to formulate domestic and foreign policies absolutely free from
outside interference.14 One of the principal factors behind America's renunciation of the big stick, dollar diplomacy, and moral imperialism after
World War I was the absence of any real threat to the security of the
Western Hemisphere. As Japan, Italy, and Germany moved to implement
their expansionist schemes, this sense of well-being evaporated, and as a
result the Good Neighbor Policy experienced its first major test.
As Bryce Wood has pointed out, America's renunciation of the right to
dominate was based on the anticipation of reciprocity: in response to Washington's promise to abjure intervention and to implement free trade, it was
6
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expected that Central and South American governments would make concessions to the major policy concerns of the United States. Initially Washington launched the Good Neighbor Policy in order to safeguard American
lives and property south of the Rio Grande and to promote trade between
the United States and the rest of the hemisphere. With the increased aggressiveness of Germany, Italy, and Japan after 1936, however, the objectives
of the Good Neighbor Policy changed radically. The State Department
became, for the first time since World War I, truly apprehensive about the
security of the Western Hemisphere.15 There thus developed a second phase
of the Good Neighbor Policy, in which the Roosevelt administration expected that in return for the renunciation of intervention, the American
republics would join with the United States to transform the Pan-American
system into a collective-security organization. From 1936 through 1941
Washington attempted to persuade the governments of Latin America to
view their interests in foreign affairs as identical with that of the United
States and to pledge to regard an attack on one as an attack on all.16
Latin America was well aware that one of the primary justifications for
American tmperialism prior to World War I was the threat of foreign intervention in the Western Hemisphere. Consequently, the gathering war
clouds in Europe and the Far East alarmed the American republics both
because they genuinely feared the imperial ambitions of the aggressor
nations and because they suspected that the international crisis might drive
the United States to abandon nonintervention and noncoercion. Many of
the American republics believed that the United States would be able to forge
the Western Hemisphere into a collective-security organization and then
convert the resulting hemisphere alliance system into a vehicle for traditional
American imperialism.17 One nation was particularly fearful that United
States diplomats would react to the global crisis by violating and circumscribing the freedom of action of the several states.
During the second phase of the Good Neighbor Policy, Argentina
vigorously resisted the attempted conversion of a Pan-American association
into a military alliance. Pan-Americanism was nothing more than a spirit of
cooperativeness, argued Argentine diplomats, and inter-American meetings
were simply voluntary conferences held for the purpose of consultation.18
The United States-Argentine debate over the nature of the Inter-American
System became particularly animated after Hitler invaded Poland in the
fall of 1939, thus plunging Europe into World War II. As the United States
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was drawn irresistably toward war with the Axis, moving from neutrality
to belligerency to a state of undeclared war between 1939 and 1941, the
Roosevelt administration stepped up its efforts to mobilize the hemisphere
for a possible all-out war effort. In sharp contrast, Argentina maintained a
strict neutrality toward both sets of belligerents and derided Washington's
arguments that the hemisphere must regard an attack on one nation as an
attack on all.
Argentina's challenge to the second phase of the Good Neighbor Policy,
like her determination to remain nonaligned during World War II, was
not, as many Americans were to believe, the result of Axis infiltration and
domination; nor was it a sudden aberration caused by transitory events.
Rather, both Argentina's position toward World War II generally and its
reaction to the Roosevelt administration's drive to merge Latin American
and United States foreign policies were the products of geography, economics,
immigration patterns, the Depression, and the military's historical involvement in Argentine political life. In short, Argentina's neutralist posture toward World War II and its resistance to the United States campaign for a
collective-security organization reflected Argentina's national experience.
The Argentineans are a proud, independent, and cosmopolitan people
who historically have viewed themselves as a community set apart from the
rest of Latin America. On the eve of World War II, Argentina possessed
the whitest and most Europeanized population in all of South America.
Spaniards, Italians, and, to a lesser extent, Germans innundated Argentina
between 1880 and 1930.19 One result of this influx was that Argentine culture became and remained heavily influenced by European standards and
tastes. For example, France has always played a leading role in Argentine
social and literary circles; Germany, in scientific and military affairs; and
Great Britain, in business and political matters.20
Due partly to the relatively high educational level of twentieth-century
immigrants and partly to the highest per capita income in Latin America
prior to 1943, the literacy rate in Argentina at mid century was an astounding
90 percent. The nation's educational system ranked among the best in the
Western Hemisphere. The Argentine press was the strongest and most
independent in Latin America. Educational opportunity and prosperity
produced one of the oldest and largest middle classes in the New World.21
Argentina's economy, while very strong, was still hobbled in the 1930s
by having to depend on foreign sources for certain vital manufactured goods.
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Nevertheless, because it relied on Europe rather than the United States for
these products, Argentina's economic structure was a plus in its struggle
with North America for leadership of the Western Hemisphere. Argentina
possesses one of the most productive pastoral-agricultural systems in the
world. The broad plain of central Argentina, known as the Pampas, is an
extremely fertile area with a mild climate and adequate rainfall. The tremendous quantities of meat, wheat, hides, quebracho (a substance essential
to the tanning process), and linseed oil produced by this South American
Caucasus made Argentina one of the most important producers of raw
material in the world. That nation's abundance of foodstuffs was matched,
however, by its dearth of the mineral and power resources needed for industrialization. An abundance of specialized natural resources and a need
for manufactured products, particularly heavy machinery, meant that Argentine prosperity depended upon foreign trade. Her economic lifeline ran
quite literally from the huge port of Buenos Aires to the entrep8ts of Western Europe. 22 This situation freed Argentina from economic dependence on
the United States and other American states and, much to the distress of
American diplomats who were trying to weld the hemisphere into a military
and economic unit, infused her foreign policy with an internationalist hue.
Geography, no less than economics, has had a major impact on Argentine diplomacy. The nation's location at the southeastern tip of South
America has historically isolated it from the great power coalitions and
international currents of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This remoteness has allowed Argentina the freedom to develop her own approach
to world affairs.23
Foremost among the "traits" produced by Argentina's national experience is an ebullient patriotism accompanied by excessive sensitivity to
criticism. Whether they are urban laborers, white-collar workers, or provincial gauchos living in a world of "machismo," Argentineans have bitterly
resented any implication that they are inferior and have strenuously resisted
political tutelage by the United States or any other state. Noted for their
intensity and national energy, Argentineans have distinguished themselves
in almost every field of endeavor. and they have regarded their country as
the equal of any other nation in every respect.24
From the interrelationships between immigration patterns, economic
trends, geography, and mass psvchological characteristics, two recurrent
themes in Argentine foreign policy emerged: neutralism and nationalism,
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During the course of her national experience there has been no economic or
military need for foreign alliances, and thus Argentina, relishing its independence, has shunned entangling connections with Europe, North America,
and even other Latin American states. For example, when James G. Blaine,
United States secretary of state, sought in the late nineteenth century to promote hemispheric prosperity-and, not coincidentally, to aid United States
economic penetration of Central and South America-by establishing a
Pan-American organization, Argentina vigorously resisted.25 After the outbreak of World War I, Pres. Hipolito Irigoyen refused to support either the
Central Powers or the Allies. His policy of nonalignment enjoyed broad
popular support because it brought peace and unparalleled prosperity.26 It
is safe to say that neutrality in the face of world conflict had become by
1942 an accepted tradition among foreign-policy-makers in Buenos Aires.
Neutrality did not mean isolation, however. Argentina has attempted
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to assume the role of
spokesman and protector for all Latin America. Increasingly, Argentine
diplomats perceived that the key to hemispheric leadership lay with their
nation's ability to spearhead Latin opposition to North American encroachments.27 When the first Pan-American Conference met in 1889, Argentine
representatives pointed out the possibilities for political and economic exploitation in Secretary Blaine's proposed inter-American organization and
boldly asked the United States to state its intentions. To their Latin colleagues the Argentine delegates insisted that the real hope for the Latin
American community was to be found in a Pan-Latinism from which the
United States would be excluded. So successful was Argentina in challenging North America's first real attempt to establish hemispheric hegemony
that by 1890 Buenos Aires, not Washington, stood as champion of the New
World in the eyes of many latinos.28 The passage of time would only confirm Argentina's conviction that the best method for augmenting the nation's influence in Central and South America was to oppose United States
attempts to give form and structure to the principle of inter-American
solidarity.
The Depression and the breakdown of the Versailles peace structure in
the 1930s spawned a particularly virulent strain of nationalism in Argentina
which further whetted the republic's desire for hemispheric leadership and
simultaneously fostered a determination to remain aloof from the conflicts
developing in Europe and the Far East. Within Argentina the Depression
10
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created new demands for order and stability-unfortunately at the expense
of democracy. Tariff barriers and quota systems established by the United
States and the sterling-bloc nations had a particularly unsettling effect on
this trade-oriented nation, depending as it did on free access to the grain
and beef markets of the world. Reflecting the frustrations and tensions bred
by the economic crisis, Argentine politics entered a period that Jose Romero
has referred to as the era of fraudulent democracy. During these years a
series of military strong men, supported by the conservative oligarchy, governed by manipulating Argentine's democratic processes and institutions.20
Between 1890 and 1920 Argentina produced one of the better-defined
party systems in South America. The National Democratic, or Conservative,
party dominated Argentine political life throughout the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. The party of the landed aristocracy, or estanciero, it
stood for free trade abroad and maintenance of the status quo at home. The
name Conservative was traditionally linked with foreign economic exploitation and political corruption. Although the twentieth century witnessed a
steady expansion of the party organization so as to accommodate businessmen and financiers, the heart of the National Democrats continued to he
the great landowners of the Pampas. The Radical party, middle-class to the
core, was economically and socially conservative hut was plagued by internal
disputes and an inability to focus its energies. Although Radical candidates
were often able to challenge the Conservatives effectively by clamoring for
political reform and electoral honesty, the Radicals' early history was characterized by intransigence-refusal to vote or participate in public life until
free elections were guaranteed-and its later activities were characterized by
its inability to appeal to the lower classes.80 The Socialist party, formed in
1894, was small and generally evolutionary rather than revolutionary, but
among its members were some of the nation's most eminent intellectual
and political figures. Socialists in Argentina, as elsewhere, were divided by
issues such as international anarchism, utopianism, and nationalism and, in
general, were torn between the demands of theory and the practical need
to organize unions and strikes.81 The Conservatives and Radicals, much
more than the Socialists, shifted and side-stepped, moving deftly to straddle
issues and to capture ( or purchase) a plurality.
To many Argentineans after 1929, democracy and the traditional parties
seemed to be bankrupt. As the Depression and popular frustration at the
government's inability to deal with it mounted, an increasing number of
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citizens decided that the fatherland was being crippled by a weak executive;
by a sterile Congress, devoted to petty bickering; and by municipalities
which were feeding on jobbery and corruption. Fundamental problemssuch as a poorly balanced economy, vast inequities between rural and urban
society, and illiteracy and poverty among the lower classes-cried out for
solutions. Argentine foreign policy seemed stagnant; national momentum
seemed at a standstill. Many of the discontented turned to those in Argentina who, wishing to purify Argentine national life through massive doses
of totalitarianism, looked to Benito Mussolini and Charles Maurras for
inspiration.32
The various groups that gathered under the nationalist umbrella brought
their own specific grievances and unique panaceas to the movement. First
came the impoverished sons of ruined estancieros, whose naturally reactionary ideals were accentuated by a gradual loss of the power and prestige that
they felt to be their birthright.38 The movement also included a large segment of the German- and Italian-trained officer corps, who looked to the
corporate state (or some version of it) and to expansion into southern South
America as remedies for Argentina's social and economic ills. Equally
important to the Argentine Right was the intensely anti-Communist and proSpanish Catholic clergy, whose political views were a cross between those
of Francisco Franco and Philip II. These groups sought, quite simply, to
transform Argentina into an authoritarian society that would be controlled
by the army and the Church.84 According to such groups as Alianza de la
Nacionalista, the precepts of nineteenth-century liberalism, democracy, and
constitutional government had never been applicable to South America.35
Propagandists for the totalitarian movement constantly advocated a return
to discipline, order, and authority in order to deal with the Communist
specter threatening the fatherland. 86 According to nationalist spokesmen,
emulation of the traditions of Catholic and imperial Spain would revitalize
Argentine society and enhance her position as champion of Latin America.37
The nationalist movement in Argentina was able to take advantage of
the fact that economists and descamisados alike blamed the Depression on
the nation's dependence on foreign capital, particularly British and American. Nationalist spokesmen denounced British interests in utilities, the
meat-packing industry, and railroads as a gross violation of the national
sovereignty. The New Deal was depicted as a reactionary movement designed to save North American capitalism; the Good Neighbor Policy, as a
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cover for American businessmen who were busily sucking the blood out of
every American republic from Mexico to Argentina.38
Historians such as Arthur Whitaker (Argentina) and Marvin Goldwert (Democracy, Militarism, and Nationalism in Argentina, 1930-1966)
refer to the phenomenon described above as "integral nationalism" and
contrast it with "liberal nationalism." Generally, liberal nationalists believed
in a strong, unified Argentina which would be able to play a vigorous role
in hemispheric and world affairs. They supported military preparedness and
resented European and North American economic penetration of Argentina.
Nonetheless, they refused to embrace fascism in order to accomplish their
goals. They were, in Goldwert's words, "constitutionalist, neocivilianist,
and [ after 1939] proally."39 Integral nationalism prevailed in Argentina
during the 1940s because (1) a large segment of the population supported its
diplomatic objectives-namely, resistance to United States leadership in the
Western Hemisphere, neutrality in World War II, and Argentine domination of southern South America-and (2) one of the movement's principal
components, the Argentine officer corps, controlled national politics throughout the 1930s and 1940s.
In the name 0£ eliminating electoral fraud, restoring order, and purging
the state of foreign influences, the military actively intervened in Argentine
political life from 1928 through 1945 by forming alliances with various
civilian groups, putting up candidates for office, and occasionally seizing
control of the government by force. The various chief executives of the era,
whether members of the officer corps or not, ruled only so long as they
worked to achieve the goals and meet the needs of the nation's warrior
class.4'0
As the United States responded to Japanese, German, and Italian aggression by attempting to convert the Western Hemisphere into a collectivesecurity system, the military in Argentina concluded that it was in the
interest of their country to preserve its freedom of action and to maintain
a policy of strict neutrality toward the conflicts developing in the Far East
and Europe. Indeed, nonalignment was attractive to the officer corps not
only because it conformed to their concept of the national interest but also
because it promised to fulfill a number of organizational goals, not the least
of which was self-preservation. Military planners were well aware that in
the event of hostilities with the Axis, Argentina would be on her own and
could expect no help whatsoever from the United States Caribbean Defense
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Command. Should some provocative act such as breaking relations with the
Axis be committed by Argentina, its remote location and extended coastline
would make it impossible to defend against German retaliation. A majority
of the officer corps was convinced that on military grounds alone the risk of
open conflict with the Axis had to be avoided at all costs.41
Contributing to the military's desire to resist the North American drive
for a hemispheric collective-security organization and to avoid participating
in World War II were its historic ties with the German Army. The intimate relationship between the two officer corps began in 1899, when the
Wehrmacht was invited to organize the Argentine War Academy, the
Colegio Militar. Germans holding Argentine commissions rotated on the
stafI of the institution for the next fifteen years. A decree of 1905, which
provided that only graduates of the Colegio Militar could receive commissions, created an officer corps that had a uniform educational background
and one that was strongly influenced by German ideals and standards. In
1935 Berlin dispatched a six-man commission to advise the Argentine general staff, and Buenos Aires responded by sending some twenty officers each
year to study in Germany.42 This is not to say that the rapport that existed
between the two organizations led to a desire within the Argentine officer
corps for Nazi domination of the Western Hemisphere, or even for an Axis
victory in World War II.43 Nevertheless, respect for German professional
standards and achievements did impel the army, and thus the nation, toward
noninvolvement. And of course, as German-American relations deteriorated
after 1939, the Wehrmacht encouraged their Argentine comrades to resist
United States pressure to join in converting the Western Hemisphere into
an anti-Axis bloc.
But neutrality for the military was more than just a defensive tactic; it
was a stratagem that promised to satisfy the basic organizational drive for
self-aggrandizement-that is, the tendency of every bureaucratic agency to
grow in budget, personnel, and influence. The officer corps understood that
nonalignment would enable Argentina to play the contending power blocs
off against each other and to extract, as the price for continued neutrality,
the armaments, technology, and industrial equipment that would make
Argentina's war machine the most powerful in South America.44
Thus, a variety of forces, events, personalities, and organizations combined to foster a determination within Argentina's foreign-policy establishment to remain aloof from all extrahemispheric clashes and to play as
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influential a role as possible in South America. After 1936 Buenos Aires
was prepared to resist Washington's attempts to weld the hemisphere into
an anti-Axis block, while using the international crisis to enhance Argentina's power and prestige within the Latin American community.
The first of the Argentine-American encounters over the nature of the
Inter-American System after the breakdown of the Versailles peace structure
came in 1936, when President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull convened a
special Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace. The
American delegation came determined to have the conferees endorse the
Monroe Doctrine and establish a continent-wide collective-security organization that could deal with the threat of armed aggression or subversion
from abroad. At this juncture the North American initiative for a regional
security system had definite isolationist overtones. The State Department
was aware that whatever happened in Europe and the Far East vitally
affected United States interests, but American diplomats had been unable to
do anything to halt Fascist aggression in those areas because of the strength
of isolationist opinion in the United States. The work of the Nye Committee, revisionist historians, student pacifist organizations, and other groups
convinced most Americans that European conflicts had no bearing on the
national interest. The man in the street was determined at this point that
the United States would not be drawn into another superfluous war through
participation in the League of Nations or other "European" collectivesecurity schemes. Isolationists and interventionists could agree, however, on
the necessity of preparing the defenses of "Fortress America" to deal with
any threat to the Western Hemisphere from across the Atlantic or Pacific.
As a result, at Buenos Aires, Secretary Hull urged the other republics to
sign an obligatory pledge of reciprocal assistance in case of an attack by a
non-American power on any nation of the Western Hemisphere, to create
a permanent consultative organ, and to enact for themselves the neutrality
legislation recently passed by Congress.45
The Argentine delegation was adamantly opposed to the American plan
because it contravened virtually every hallowed principle of Argentine foreign policy. Led by Carlos Saavedra Lamas, who had recently received the
Nobel Peace Prize and was president-elect of the League of Nations, the
Argentine delegation adopted a specious internationalism for the purpose
of obstructing Washington's plans. Saavedra Lamas and his colleagues proclaimed that mandatory collaboration and the establishment of a regional
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organization not only would destroy Latin America's freedom of action but
would also subvert the League of Nations. Moreover, adoption of an automatic arms embargo upon the outbreak of war ( as provided in the neutrality
laws of the United States) would violate provisions of the League of Nations Charter. More importantly, perhaps, the Argentineans were able to
convince a majority of their Latin American colleagues that the United
States would be able, by virtue of its military power alone, to dominate any
,ecurity organization. The key issue in inter-American affairs, declared
Saavedra Lamas, was not that a non-American power might intervene in
the New World, but that one American state might intervene in the affairs
of another.46 As a result of Argentina's very effective counteroffensive, the
United States had to settle for a nonobligatory resolution providing for interAmerican consultation in case of an attack on any hemispheric republic by
a non-American state. In return, Hull and his colleagues signed a pledge
which Latin America hoped would put United States imperialism to rest
once and for all. It declared inadrnissable the right of any state to intervene
"directly or indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the internal or external
affairs of any other of the Parties."47
During the interlude between the Buenos Aires meeting and the next
Pan-American Conference in 1938, the League of Nations and the doctrine
of collective security were severely discredited by the league's failure to deal
with Japan's encroachments in China and Hitler's subversion first of Austria
and then of Czechoslovakia. Meanwhile, German and Italian propagandists, cultural emissaries, and commercial agents accelerated their drive to
secure an ideological, financial, and, if possible, political foothold in South
America. Washington assumed that covert activities by the aggressor nations
in the Western Hemisphere, together with the deteriorating situation abroad,
would make the republics of Latin America more receptive to United States
arguments in behalf of a regional security arrangement.48
The International Conference of American States that was held in Lima
in December 1938 was, like the Buenos Aires meeting, dominated by an
Argentine-American conflict over the structure of the inter-American consultative system and the right of one or more American states to pass judgment on domestic developments in another. With the Spanish Civil V.,Tar
still raging and the Munich Conference barely over, Washington was particularly sensitive to the threat of German and Italian subversion in the
Western Hemisphere. The United States delegation therefore proposed joint
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action to prevent the subversion of "unstable governments" by Fascistoriented systems and suggested the establishment of regular as well as
emergency meetings of foreign ministers to delineate hemispheric policy
toward the rest of the world. Again, Argentina, joined by Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, and several other states situated far from the protective arm of
the Caribbean Defense Command, led the opposition to the United States.
The Ortiz administration, which had swept into power in 1938, was outwardly more friendly to the United States, but, like its predecessor, it was
determined to resist the creation of a regional security system and to profit
from Washington's attempts to control Latin American foreign policy.
Saavedra Lamas's successor in the Foreign Office, Jose M. Cantilo, first
sought to have the conference called off. Failing in that, he delivered a few
perfunctory remarks to the opening session and then sailed off on a protracted vacation cruise. He left behind a weak delegation which had been
carefully instructed to make no binding commitments.49
As a result, American diplomats were compelled to accept the innocuous Declaration of Lima, which weakly reaffirmed the principle of continental solidarity in the face of an extrahemispheric threat; proclaimed that
if the general "peace, security or territorial integrity" were threatened from
any source, the signatories would consult; and provided that the foreign
ministers of the several states could be called into conference at the behest
of any one member. As if these resolutions were not sufficiently vague, the
Argentineans secured the inclusion of a formal proviso that reserved complete freedom of action to each member of the Pan-American Union under
all circumstances. In the future the freedom-of-action clause would hobble
Washington's attempts to portray the Declaration of Lima as a binding
collective-security pact.50
When Germany invaded Poland in 1939, the public mood in Argentina
was not greatly different from that in the United States. True, there was
the flourishing nationalist movement and, in some quarters, even frank
admiration for Hitler and Mussolini, but the vast majority of the public and
the press sympathized with the victims of Axis aggression and their tardy
champions.111 The United States ambassador, Norman Armour, reported from
Buenos Aires that the city was shocked by the blitzkreig and was enthusiastic
in its support of the democracies. Nevertheless, these prejudiced reactions
in no way altered the nation's sense of where its national interest lay. The
economic realities, geographical imperatives, and cultural factors behind
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Argentine foreign policy remained relatively unaffected by the outbreak of
war in Europe. Above all else, the Argentineans wanted peace; they foresaw
nothing but economic distress and diminished power if their nation became
involved in an extrahemispheric war. Thus, while Argentina joined wholeheartedly with the United States and six other American republics in calling
the First Consultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Panama, Buenos
Aires was determined to block any action that might possibly involve Argentina in a war with the Axis. 52 When the United States contingent proposed
to keep Axis submarines and other naval vessels out of American waters by
establishing a three-hundred-mile neutrality zone around North and South
America, Buenos Aires protested that such a move would needlessly disrupt
relations between the New World and the Old. The Declaration of Panama
proclaimed hemispheric neutrality toward the European phase of World
War II and established the neutrality belt, but it satisfied Argentina by
leaving up to each individual state the question of whether or not to patrol.113
In the spring of 1940, the "phony war" in Europe came to an abrupt
close as German panzer units smashed through Belgium and the Netherlands and into the heart of France. Fearful that Hitler would force France
and Holland to allow their New World colonies to be used as staging areas
for the subversion or invasion of the rest of the Western Hemisphere, the
Roosevelt administration shepherded through Congress, on 18 June 1940, a
joint resolution declaring that the United States would not recognize the
transfer of American real estate from one nonhemispheric nation to another.
Immediately thereafter, the State Department called the Second Consultative
Meeting of American Foreign Ministers in order to commit the republics of
Central and South America to the "no transfer principle."54
At the Havana Conference, which opened in July 1940, North American
diplomats encountered stiff Argentine opposition as they sought to push
through a comprehensive resolution prohibiting the forceable transfer of
hemispheric territory and providing for intervention by the American states
in the event that such a transfer was attempted. While questioning both the
necessity and the justice of America's attempt to sit in judgment on political
shifts in Europe, the Argentineans opposed the United States formula, primarily on the grounds that it would lead to the assumption of sovereignty
by one American nation or group of nations over another. Assuming its
role as protector of the weak and oppressed, the Argentine delegation
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denounced Washington's plan as a threat to hemispheric neutrality and as a
gross violation of the principle of nonintervention. 55
The logjam was broken only when Hull decided to go over the heads
of the Argentine representatives and to appeal directly to the Chief Executive. Hull was able to convince Ortiz that i.n the North American proposal
there was relatively little danger to Argentina's diplomatic objectives. As a
result, from the presidential palace, the Casa Rosada, came the directive that
the Argentine contingent was to sign the Act of Havana and the Convention
on the Provisional Administration of European Colonies and Possessions in
the Americas. The first asserted that an outside attack on any American
state "shall be considered as an act of aggression against the states which
sign this declaration." The second strictly prohibited the transfer from one
power to another of European-held territory in the New World, and it provided machinery for collective American administration of affected provinces
in case such an attempt was made. Significantly, the Act of Havana went
no farther in defining the specific obligations of the parties involved, in case
war erupted between one of the American republics and a nonhemispheric
state. Argentina was well aware that inter-American solidarity was still
subject to interpretation by each American government.56
Prior to Pearl Harbor, the Havana Conference marked the final attempt
by the Roosevelt administration to awaken the hemisphere to the dangers
that lurked beyond both oceans and to convince the Americas that hemispheric solidarity was the only true safeguard against attack from the signatories of the Tripartite Pact. Havana also represented the zenith of Argentine cooperation with the United States. Convinced that Washington was
trying to drag Argentina into a war that was manifestly not in the latter's
national interest, various Argentine governments from 1940 through 1944
hewed carefully to a neutral course and attempted to utilize the war to
enhance Buenos Aires's power and prestige within the Latin American
community. Not only Argentina's challenge to Washington's crusade for
hemispheric security but also Argentina's determination to stand aloof
from a war that so vitally affected the interests of her northern neighbor
posed an apparently irreconcilable dilemma for American policy-makers.
Simply stated, their problem was how to compel an American state to alter
its diplomatic position without violating the principle of nonintervention.
Although many Latin American states made a wholehearted commitment to
the Allied cause, a number continued to support Argentina's right, short of
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armed aggression against its neighbors, to pursue its own foreign policies
in its own way. To a sizable number of latinos, especially after 1943, Washington's response to Argentina's independent stance during World War II
constituted a true test of the Good Neighbor Policy and an indication of the
direction that inter-American affairs would take in the postwar period. That
response was, in turn, largely a product of the characteristics and priorities
of various bureaucratic entities within the Roosevelt administration that were
struggling for control of the Latin American policy of the United States.

20

2
LATIN AMERICANIST VS. INTERNATIONALIST:
THE RIO CONFERENCE OF 1942

Pearl Harbor and the subsequent declarations of war on the United States
by Germany and Italy set in motion the inter-American machinery for
consultation on joint action against the enemies of the hemisphere. On 9
December 1941, Secretary of State Cordell Hull invoked Article Fifteen of
the Havana Resolutions, which declared that any attempt by a nonhemi.spheric state to violate the territorial integrity, political independence, or
national sovereignty of any American nation would be considered an act of
aggression against all and would result in consultation among the signatory
powers. In response, the Governing Board of the Pan-American Union
scheduled a meeting for 15 January 1942, to be held in Rio de Janeiro.1 The
conference, like the two preceding inter-American conclaves, was highlighted by a clash between Argentina and the United States over two issues:
hemispheric policy toward World War II and the nature of the interAmerican consultative system established during the 1930s. As in the past,
Argentina demanded the right to remain neutral and insisted that the InterAmerican System should be nothing more than a forum for discussion. The
United States sought to have all American states sever relations with the
Axis and urged that the consultative system be converted into a collectivesecurity organization. Despite this basic divergence and the crisis atmosphere created by the United States' sudden entry into the war, hemispheric
unity was preserved as Argentine and American diplomats agreed to a resolution that merely recommended to each American republic that it sever
relations with the Axis nations. Both Washington's decision to acquiesce in
Argentina's insistence on a nonbinding pact and its refusal to isolate Argentina within the hemispheric community were the outgrowth of a power
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struggle within the Roosevelt foreign-policy establishment between two rival
coalitions of diplomats.
In his search for new ideas with which to combat the Depression,
Franklin Roosevelt stimulated rather than eliminated bureaucratic conflict
and personal rivalries within his administration. Thinking that out of conflict and compromise would come the best possible solution, he deliberately
assigned two advisors or groups of advisors with diametrically opposed views
to work on the same problem.2 In practice, however, the president's techniques often blurred the lines of authority and responsibility, and led to
bitter rivalries that distorted the decision-making process. Contributing to
the confusion that characterized the Roosevelt administration was FDR's
well-known inability to say no to a subordinate who was reaching for more
power and authority. Moreover, an in-depth look at Roosevelt's personal
relations with his official family indicates that he actually enjoyed the maneuverings and Byzantine intrigues of the hundreds of powerful men who
flocked into Washington during the 1930s and 1940s. Confident that his
charm and personal magnetism would be sufficient to keep department and
agency heads loyal to him, he saw no reason to interfere with the bureaucratic bloodletting. Only if an intergovernmental power struggle threatened
either his political position or, after 1941, the war effort, did he force a
resolution.3 The State Department and the Good Neighbor Policy were
not exempt from Roosevelt's penchant for policy-making by bureaucratic
conflict.4
On the eve of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, formulation of
inter-American policy within the federal bureaucracy was the responsibility
of two "organizations" which were highly competitive but virtually invisible
to outsiders. Each had its own goals, programs, and priorities; each had a
quite definite view of the place the Pan-American community should occupy
in United States foreign policy; and each was characterized by its own
particular brand of parochialism. Although both groups functioned within
the State Department, communication between the two was virtually nonexistent. In their determination to control the Latin American field, both
bureaucratic coalitions presented policy alternatives to the president in ways
designed to gain his. approval and to discredit each other. One organization
triumphed over the other because of its special relationship to the White
House, exclusive access to certain intelligence data, and control over the
actual implementation of policy.
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The first group, which will be referred to as the Latin Americanists,
was composed of career diplomats who had for years been concerned almost
exclusively with the development of hemispheric policy. Its leaders-Undersecretary Sumner Welles; Laurence Duggan, assistant secretary for political
affairs; Philip Bonsal, chief of the Division of American Republic Affairs;
and Emilio Collado, special assistant to the undersecretary-sprang from
similar backgrounds and shared a common view of inter-American affairs.
Harvard-educated and reform-oriented, these individuals, most of whom
were ardent New Dealers, regarded Latin America as their area of expertise
and their private policy-making domain. As bureaucrats who had long been
responsible for a particular area, they were intensely parochial and thus
tended to view the entire panorama of international affairs from the perspective of the hemispheric community.5 According to Welles:
The inter-American system . . . has its roots in the common
recognition of the sovereign equafity of all the American states, and
in their joint belief that they find individual advantage in
co-operation. . . . Continued participation by the United States in
this system should become the permanent cornerstone of American
foreign policy. Hemispheric unity, and the security and welfare of
the United States itself depend on it. 6
Believing that the United States should develop a long-term nonpartisan
policy toward Latin America, this coalition of officials had devoted its efforts
during the 1930s to eradicating the anti-Americanism created by years of
United States intervention and, after 1936, to establishing an inter-American
consultative system that could act to protect the hemisphere in the event of
an external threat. The Latin Americanists regarded the association as their
own creation and hence were determined to protect its integrity amidst the
stresses and strains generated by global war. In an address to the American
Political Science Association delivered shortly after Pearl Harbor, Laurence
Duggan assured the hemispheric republics of Washington's belief that
the strength of the inter-American structure results from strict abstinence from intermeddling or interference in the internal or external concerns of the other countries. . . . The most precious asset
the United States now has in the Western Hemisphere is the confidence and respect that one man of good-will has in another. This
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could be lost overnight by a hasty, ill-considered step of apparent
urgent necessity. 7
The organization's willingness to trust in the consultative system and
the Good Neighbor Policy in order to right all wrongs is well illustrated
by its attitude toward Argentina. Although they were acutely aware that
Argentina had effectively blocked Washington's plans for the creation of a
hemispheric alliance, the Latin Americanists still believed that if a nonhemispheric power were to attack the Americas, pressure on Buenos Aires
from the other republics would be sufficient to compel participation in
common defense measures. Washington could not take unilateral coercive
action to force a change in Argentine policy without undercutting the entire
Good Neighbor Policy and obscuring the fact of inter-American mutuality
of interest.8 As Welles later wrote:
The very foundation of the inter-American system was the United
States' acceptance of the juridical equality of all the American republics. From that standpoint, particularly since no inter-American
conference could yet take action except by unanimous agreement, it
was illogical to regard Argentina as hostile to the United States
merely because her policy differed diametrically from our own.9
By January 1942, reliance on the inter-American association of nations to
solve problems between republics and to formulate hemispheric policy toward the rest of the world had become standard operating procedure within
this organization.
There was in the State Department, however, a second set of diplomats
who were concerned with the formulation of Latin American policy but
who operated quite apart from the Latin American establishment. This
group, led by Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Assistant Secretary Breckinridge Long, adhered to a much different view of inter-American affairs.
In the first place, their backgrounds were vastly dissimilar to those of
the Latin Americanists. Hull and Long were old Wilsonians. The secretary
first entered public life as a Democratic congressman in 1907 and was inevitably drawn to Woodrow Wilson when the Princeton academician turned
to national politics in 1911.10 After Wilson captured the presidency the
following- year, Hull not only became a staunch supporter of the administration's domestic programs but took the Wilsonian philosophy toward
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foreign affairs as his own. That the United States ought to be the "supreme
moral factor in the World's progress," that American political institutions
were superior to all others, and that the concept of collective security held
the key to the future peace of the world-all seemed as self-evident to the
young Tennessee politician as to the Calvinist in the White House. 11 Long,
a former student of Wilson's at Princeton, equaled Hull in his ardor for
the New Freedom and his devotion to the principles of Wilsonian diplomacy. At the 1916 Democratic Convention he authored the plank advocating
the creation of a world organization, and he was on intimate terms with
Wilson until the latter's death in 1924.12
In the second place, both because of their backgrounds and because of
their positions within the department, members of this group were less
regionally oriented than the Latin Americanists and, as a result, tended to
view United States relations with Latin America as part of a much larger
whole. Thus, although Hull, Long, and their colleagues had participated
in the formulation and implementation of the Good Neighbor Policy,18 they
generally regarded it as only a means to a larger end. In return for Washington's renunciation of intervention and for its virtual abandonment of
United States business interests south of the Rio Grande, the internationalists anticipated that the other American states would trust Washington to
determine hemispheric policy toward the rest of the world.14 The InterAmerican System was to act first as a collective-security organization, a sort
of New-World League of Nations to prevent the forces of fascism from
spreading to the Western Hemisphere, and second as a device to mobilize
Latin American support for United States policies toward the rest of the
world.
A sometimes member of this group was Adolf Berle, who had joined
the State Department in 1938 as assistant secretary of state for Latin American affairs. Although always interested in hemispheric matters and in
preserving the sanctity of the Inter-American System, Berle, a former brain
truster and general counsel to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation from
1933 to 1938, had not participated in establishing the "special relationships"
between the American republics and the United States that characterized the
Good Neighbor Era. He, along with Assistant Secretary of State Dean
Acheson, attempted to remain in the good graces of both the Welles group
and the internationalists.1 11 Nevertheless, when forced to choose, Berle generally sided with the internationalists. As assistant secretary from 1938 to
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1944 and as ambassador to Brazil during 1944 and 1945, Berle was in a position to influence both inter-American relations and the bureaucratic situation,
and he sometimes did assert himself, particularly from 1944 on. He was
more important, however, as a conduit of information to the White House.
Berle continued to enjoy independent access to the Oval Office throughout
his career, and Roosevelt valued him as a relatively impartial witness to
events within the State Department and the hemisphere. 16
The internationalists were at once less and more parochial than the
Latin American group: less, in that they saw Washington's relations with
Latin America as only one side of a multifaceted global problem; more, in
that their knowledge of hemispheric affairs was, in places, quite superficial.
Ignorance of indigenous political conditions and regional rivalries was an
inevitable by-product of Hull's, Long's, and Berle's being formulators of
general policy. Not surprisingly, then, the internationalists evaluated the
American republics primarily on the basis of the latter's attitude toward
World War 11.17 Preservation of the consultative system and hemispheric
unity based on "the juridical equality of all the American republics" certainly did not top their list of diplomatic priorities.
After i:he attack on Pearl Harbor the internationalists clearly expected
each New World nation to sever all ties with the Axis and even to participate actively in the war effort. From their perspective, World War II "was
a life-and-death struggle, the result of which could only mean freedom and
advancement for Latin America or domination and probably occupation by
the Axis."18 In the epic battle about to be waged against fascism, one was
either for the forces of freedom and humanity or against them: nonalignment by a hemispheric state after 7 December 1941 was nothing less than
treachery.19
The internationalists' tendency to take an oversimplified view of Latin
American affairs and their overriding determination to obtain hemispheric
support for the war against the Axis powers are perhaps best exemplified by
their attitude toward Argentina. The obstructionist tactics pursued by various Argentine governments during the 1930s enraged Hull and his associates
to such a degree that by 1938 they were convinced that Germany was directing Argentine foreign policy. Moreover, when the government of President
Ram6n Castillo proclaimed a state of siege in January 1942 and set about
systematically to suppress domestic dissent, the internationalists concluded
that the people of Argentina were consumed by a desire to aid the Allies but
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were being prevented from doing so by an unscrupulous group of individuals
who were temporarily in control of the government. 20
Thus, by the time the Governing Board of the Pan-American Union
responded to Secretary Hull's request for a meeting of foreign ministers,
these two cliques-each with its own goals, priorities, and assumptions-had
arrived at totally different conclusions as to the direction that United States
hemispheric policy should take. The Latin American establishment had
resolved to protect the Inter-American System and to preserve hemispheric
unity, whatever the cost. The internationalists were equally determined to
eradicate all traces of Axis influence in the Western Hemisphere and to get
each state to sever all relations with America's enemies. The split within
the State Department might well have remained hidden had Argentina
decided to adopt a vigorous anti-Axis stance, but such was not to be the case.
Argentina's decision to continue her policy of nonalignment even after
Pearl Harbor and to resist pressure from the United States to make a total
commitment to the Allied cause at the forthcoming conference of foreign
ministers was a product not only of the nation's location, economy, tradition
of neutrality, 21 and burgeoning nationalism, but of an intense political rivalry between Dr. Ram6n Castillo and Gen. Augustfn Justo. Each had his
agents and supporters within the federal bureaucracy, Congress, the army,
and the general electorate. Each saw in the problem of Argentine policy
toward World War II an issue that would not only vitally affect the national
interest but one that could make or break his political future.
Of the two men, Justo was by far the more experienced in national
politics, and originally at least, he possessed a much broader power base.
Elected president in 1932, this brilliant, ambitious officer concentrated on
creating a national rather than just a military following during his term
in office, and he quickly earned a reputation as an adept political maneuverer .22 During his stay in the Casa Rosada he continued to cultivate the
military by increasing overall troop strength and coercing Congress into
voting for ever-higher military appropriations. In addition, a working
alliance with the .Radical party, which at that time controlled the Chamber
of Deputies in the national legislature, provided him with an impressive
stronghold in the civilian sector. By 1938 Justo had gained enough control
of the political process and enough support to choose his successor and to
rig the election without fear of military intervention or popular revolution. 23
As heir apparent, he selected Roberto Ortiz, leader of the Radical party;
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Justo believed that Ortiz was the man most likely to continue his economic
policies, protect the Justo reputation, and pave the way for his return to the
presidency in the next election.24 In order to balance the ticket and preserve
the delicate political truce that he had engineered, the general-president
reluctantly accepted Sen. Ramon Castillo, a National Democrat, as Ortiz's
running mate.25
With the ticket duly if fraudulently elected, Justo's scheme seemed to
be developing according to plan. However, the collapse of Ortiz's health in
1940 allowed the vice-president to assume the duties of chief magistrate and
radically altered the situation. It quickly became apparent that Acting
President Castillo was not disposed to serve as a mere link between Justo
administrations.26 The new chief executive ignored pressing economic and
social problems and devoted his efforts instead to attracting political allies
in the hope of being able to defy Justo, serve out a full term in office, and
hand-pick his successor.27
Casting about for means with which to enlarge his anemic constituency,
Castillo quickly concluded that the most fertile area for political cultivation
would be the integral nationalist movement then flourishing in Argentina.28
In an attempt to draw this group into his camp, he proclaimed throughout
1941 his intention to keep Argentina nonaligned and to fend off all threats
to the national sovereignty.29 The army, by far the most important element
in the nationalist coalition, refused to join forces with the acting president,
however, until he made certain specific pledges.30 Realizing that he must
have the support of the military in order to survive, Castillo met secretly in
October 1941 with a group of leading army commanders from the Campo
de Mayo and promised that he would proclaim a state of siege at the earliest
possible date, close various pro-Allied newspapers, and, above all, maintain
strict neutrality.31 With this meeting, the alliance between Castillo and the
integral nationalists was consummated.
Justo, momentarily taken aback by his rival's audacity, responded by
assuming a pro-Allied posture and urging intervention at every opportunity.
An outspokenly anti-Axis stand not only provided the general with an issue
over which to attack Castillo, it also further endeared him to the generally
pro-Allied Radicals and, somewhat ironically, made him the spokesman for
all liberal nationalists within Argentina.32
By the end of 1941, then, the battle lines between Castillo and Justo
had been drawn on the issue of Argentine policy toward World War II.
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The Japanese navy's destruction of the United States' Pacific Fleet and
Washington's subsequent calling of the Third Meeting of Foreign Ministers
of the American Republics set the stage for a showdown between the two
political adversaries.
In the weeks following America's abrupt entry into World War II,
President Castillo gradually realized that the forthcoming Rio meeting
offered a unique opportunity not only to cement his relationship with the
integral nationalists but also to discredit Justo and thus to win the support
of the bulk of Argentina's citizenry. He realized that most Argentineans,
however much they might despise Hitler and his associates in aggression,
hoped to remain aloof from World War II.33 Even pro-American groups
in Argentina, such as the navy and a sector of the Radical party, had come
out in favor of strict nonalignment. Citing, among other things, the nation's
exposed position; its large German, Italian, and Spanish populations; and
the inability of the United States Caribbean Defense Command to defend
southern South America, they urged Castillo to resist any attempts to have
Buenos Aires sever relations with the Axis or use Argentine ships for convoy duty.34 The ambitious chief executive was also well aware that not only
the integral nationalists but all of his countrymen were sensitive to any hint
of foreign pressure.35 Given the history of United States intervention and
Anglo-American economic imperialism south of the Rio Grande, many
Argentineans believed that they had almost as much to fear from an Allied
as from an Axis victory. Thus, when in the opening weeks of 1942 the State
Department made it quite plain that it was going to press hard at Rio for
a severance of all hemispheric ties with the Axis, Castillo perceived an
opportunity to strengthen his political position by using the meeting to portray Washington as the interventionist threat of old, his administration as
defender of the national sovereignty, and Justo as the toady of a foreign
power.36
Despite the history of Argentine obstructionism in the 1930s, both
groups of policy-makers within the State Department were confident that
Buenos Aires would join wholeheartedly with the Allies when the Rio Conference convened. True, Argentina's response to Pearl Harbor had differed
markedly from that of the rest of Latin America. By the end of December
1941, most of the beneficiaries of the Good Neighbor Policy had either
severed relations with or declared war on the Axis, while the Castillo administration had simply decreed that all American states that were at war
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with Germany, Italy, and Japan were nonbelligerents and hence not subject
to the limitations of Argentine neutrality.37 Still, reports from the American
embassy in Buenos Aires were quite encouraging about the posture that
Argentina would ultimately assume toward World War II. The same day
that Hull roused the Governing Board to action, Ambassador Norman
Armour informed him that the Conservative regime gave little evidence that
it would not live up to its inter-American obligations or that it could not
be trusted with lend-lease. Displaying considerable ignorance of the true
situation and a lamentable inclination to believe the best about the government to which he was accredited, he predicted that nationalist-neutralist
groups would be able to exert a significant influence on government policies
only through a coup. Expressions of support for the United States in other
Latin nations, revulsion at Japan's surprise attack, and Argentine economic
ties with the United States were all important factors impelling Argentina
toward a pro-Allied policy.88
Armour's rather misleading reports were only partially responsible
for the general optimism that prevailed in Washington, however. For their
part the Latin Americanists were willing to trust in the dividends that past
United States diplomatic restraint would pay, and they were certain that the
United States could achieve a pro-Allied consensus within the context of
the inter-American consultative system. The internationalists, reflecting
Hull's faith in the ability of trade concessions to win friends and influence
governments, were confident that economic aid provided to Argentina since
the outbreak of war in Europe would, in conjunction with other factors, be
enough to draw Buenos Aires into the anti-Axis camp. And, in fact, the
economic concessions made by the Roosevelt administration had been quite
significant. By March 1941 the Export-Import Bank had committed itself to
$62.42 million in loans to Argentina, by far the largest amount proffered
to any one Latin American country.39 In late 1941 Argentine and American
diplomats concluded a reciprocal trade agreement that was extremely favorable to Argentina. The pact, which was to run through November 1944,
lowered duties on thirty-nine items composing 18 percent of United States
exports to Argentina, while cutting rates on items constituting about 70
percent of previous Argentine exports to America.40 As a result of these
breakthroughs and of heavy United States purchases of Argentine strategic
materials, Argentina's $28 million deficit with the United States ballooned
to a $53 million surplus within a year.41 If anything, attempts to placate
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Argentina increased during the two months between Pearl Harbor and the
convening of the Rio Conference. In response to hints from Buenos Aires
that the best method for keeping fascism from the Western Hemisphere
would be to continue to lower tariffs and make other economic concessions,
the State Department inaugurated a second aid campaign which included
the dispatch of a complete military instructional mission and the extension
of further Export-Import and Treasury Department credits.42
Whether they put their faith in Pan-Americanism or in foreign aid,
those in Washington who took an optimistic view of the Argentine situation
were destined to be disappointed. Gradually, from a variety of sources, the
State Department began to glean Argentina's true intentions. In early January, during a discussion with Welles at the State Department, Ambassador
Felipe Espil provided a clue to what would be the Castillo administration's
attitude toward a United States-dominated security system. With tongue in
cheek, Espil observed that the act of nine American states' declaring war on
the Axis without first consulting with their neighbors constituted a violation
of existing inter-American agreements, especially the Declaration of Lima.
In view of their "high-handed action," there was absolutely no need for the
Rio meeting. "The Argentine Foreign Office," Espil informed his bemused
colleague, "could not keep silent with regard to this impression since it is its
intention to join in loyal application of the consultative system." 43
The following week a Radical member of the Argentine Chamber of
Deputies and a visiting professor from the University of La Plata called at
the State Department and informed Berle that Castillo and his foreign minister, Enrique Ruiz Guifiazu, represented nobody, that one-third of the army
was Nazi, and that the United States would be able to get nothing out of
the Argentineans at Rio. The only solution to the problem of pro-Allied
hemispheric solidarity, they declared, was a change in the Argentine
government.44
In addition, by the last week of December, Armour's dispatches had
become extremely pessimistic, tending to confirm Hull's suspicions that Argentina would once again pursue an obstructionist course. The ambassador
and his staff were quite sympathetic to Justo, and the embassy received most
of its information on the state of public opinion, the intentions of the Castillo
administration, and other vital matters from the general's followers. Armour's once-optimistic reports now indicated that Castillo meant to block
United States attempts at Rio to secure a comprehensive rupture of relations
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with the Axis. Moreover, according to the embassy, the state of siege was
being employed specifically to deny Justo outlets with which to promote his
campaign for the presidency and generally to suppress the overwhelmingly
pro-Allied sympathies of the populace.45
Even more alarming to Washington than the Espil interview, the information given to Berle, or Armour's dispatches were reports from American representatives in the other hemispheric republics that Argentina was
seeking to persuade a number of southern South American states to form a
neutralist coalition that would be capable of resisting United States economic
and diplomatic pressure to sever ties with the Axis. Despite Welles's efforts
to block such proceedings, Argentine officials held a series of preconference
meetings in Buenos Aires and Rio. They urged the foreign ministers of
Chile, Paraguay, and Peru to join with Argentina in combating North
American "intervention" and in defending each American nation's right to
pursue an independent foreign policy.46 While the ultranationalist Ruiz
Guifiazu spoke grandly of "austral republics" and "harmonizing the economic interests of neighboring countries," other Argentine diplomats warned
their South American colleagues that Washington's policies would create an
entity that would be superior to the state, a kind of "supersovereignty" that
might outlast the war and pave the way for perpetual United States domination of the Americas.47
By mid January, then, there could be no mistake as to what Argentina's
policy would be at the forthcoming conference of foreign ministers. The
Castillo government's determination to remain nonaligned during World
War II and its campaign to persuade as many South American governments
as possible to follow suit precipitated a clash between the internationalists
and the Latin Americanists. Because both organizations realized that the
key issue at Rio would be Argentine opposition to Washington's attempts
to line up the entire hemisphere behind the Allied war effort, the struggle
between the two coalitions of policy-makers for dominance within the State
Department and the conflict between their philosophies of inter-American
relations centered on their differing views as to how the American delegation
should react if Argentina sought to block a resolution committing the entire
hemisphere to severance.
It must be noted that in the federal bureaucracy the ultimate objective
of an agency advising the president is to obtain White House approval for
its policies. Therein lies the key to larger budgets and wider responsibilities
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for the organization and to advancement and power for the individual administrator. In designing policy alternatives the internationalists and the
Latin Americanists were motivated as much by their estimation of what
would meet Roosevelt's approval as by their view of inter-American affairs
or by their personal prejudices. Quite simply, the undersecretary and his
colleagues reasoned that FDR's commitment to the Good Neighbor principles would cause him to endorse the unity-above-all approach, while Hull
anticipated that the president's preoccupation with the war would lead him
to approve a hard-line attitude toward all those who refused to cooperate.
The internationalists were certain for two reasons that their approach
would prevail. Aside from Secretary Hull's preeminent position in the
diplomatic chain of command, statements and actions made by the Latin
Americanists prior to and during the Rio Conference indicated that they
had acquiesced in their rivals' views. The United States delegation, which
was to be headed by Welles and dominated by the Latin Americanists, met
with Hull prior to its departure and agreed that no effort should be spared
to secure from the American republics a declaration that would actually end
relations with the Axis. Subsequently, dispatches from the United States
delegation in Rio promised that if Argentina resisted a binding resolution
regarding severance, the remaining republics would eject her from the interAmerican community and proceed with a total rupture.48
The internationalists' sense of security was totally unwarranted, however. The power structure within the United States foreign-policy establishment bore no resemblance to the table of organization. Instead of there
being a direct line of command from the president to the secretary and his
staff (internationalists) and to the Division of American Republic Affairs
(Latin Americanists), there existed two coequal organizations, both of
which had direct and separate access to the chief executive.49 In short, the
department was compartmentalized rather than being unified under a single
authority. The Latin Americanists' entree to the White House, in conjunction with select information that came into their possession in mid January
and a tacit coalition with a powerful intragovernmental ally, enabled them
to put a particular face on the Rio situation. As a result they were able to
gain presidential approval for their projected policy and at the same time
to exclude their rivals from the decision-making process.
Of inestimable value to the Latin Americanists was the fact that the
recommendations of the United States military with regard to hemispheric
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policy coincided with their own. Reflecting its traditional preoccupation
with the security of the hemisphere, particularly the Panama Canal, top
officials in the Caribbean Defense Command urged the State Department,
on the eve of the Rio Conference, to persuade the republics of southern
South America not to declare war on the Axis or commit any other provocative act that could lead to a military assault by Germany and its Allies. 60
In the wake of the destruction of the Pacific Fleet and the continuing drain
caused by convoy duty in the Atlantic, the United States Navy barely possessed the resources with which to protect the canal; it certainly could not
guarantee the safety of the southernmost republics. The military planners
who were concerned with hemispheric defense were particularly troubled
about Argentina's situation. During Argentine-American staff talks held
throughout the winter of 1941-42, American officers had become acutely
aware of the Argentine navy's weakness and of the potential threat that its
anemic condition posed to the Straits of Magellan.51 Consequently, United
States strategists believed that Buenos Aires, perhaps more than any other
capital, should avoid a tough anti-Axis posture.52 The military's support of
Argentine nonalignment stemmed not only from sound strategic considerations but from traditionally close ties with the Argentine officers' corps. A
perpetual concern for similar problems and an identity of organizational
goals caused a considerable degree of solidarity.
The information that Brazil would not sign a severance resolution unless the proposal met Argentina's approval was even more useful to the
Latin Americanists than was the military's position. Although relations
between Brazil and Argentina, who had sometimes been bitter rivals, were
quite cordial during the late 1930s, ties began to weaken as the integral
nationalists within Argentina clamored for a "Greater Argentina." Shortly
before the opening of the Rio Conference, Brazil's President Getulio Vargas
and his foreign secretary, Oswaldo Aranha, informed Welles and his associates that their government as well as the overwhelming majority of the
Brazilian people were anxious to show complete support for the United
States. Unfortunately, the general staff was apprehensive about the fate of
southern Brazil if that nation became involved in World War II while
Argentina remained neutral. As a result the officer corps would not allow
the Foreign Office to place Brazil on a course that was diametrically opposed
to that of her powerful neighbor to the south.53
Instead of going through channels with this vital intelligence, the Latin
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Americanists held it until the last possible moment and then went straight
to the White House. In a private interview with Roosevelt just prior to the
delegation's departure, Welles confided that in his estimation, Brazil would
be the key to the conference because that country and Argentina would not
tread opposite paths. Warning that Hull's judgment was beclouded by an
irrational antipathy toward Argentina and hence could not be trusted, he
argued that whatever happened at Rio, inter-American unity should be preserved so as to prevent the Axis from fishing in troubled waters. In short,
the undersecretary proposed, and Roosevelt agreed, that Latin America
should be urged to take as tough a stand toward the Axis as the individual
states could reasonably support, but that there should be unity when the
meeting ended.54
The campaign to convince the internationalists that Welles and the
United States delegation would brook nothing less than a binding severance
resolution continued as the opening date for the conference approached.55
When the undersecretary addressed the initial session of the Third Meeting
of Foreign Ministers, his remarks were as tough and uncompromising as the
internationalists could have wished:
The shibboleth of classic neutrality in its narrow sense can ...
no longer be the ideal of any freedom-loving people of the Americas.
There can no longer be any real neutrality as between the
powers of evil and the forces that are struggling to preserve the
rights and the independence of free peoples.56
The Latin Americanists' program of dissimulation worked to perfection, for as the American republics turned to the problem created by the
corning of World War II to the Western Hemisphere, the internationalists
were ignorant not only of the Latin Americanists' long-range objectives for
Rio but of the Brazilian situation and the Welles-Roosevelt interview as
well.57 Only once, apparently, did Hull, Long, and their subordinates evidence any suspicion. On the opening day of the conference, Berle cabled
Welles, outlining once again the course that negotiations should follow. "In
the Department from the Secretary on down," wrote Berle, "the feeling is
in accord with the belief that rather than a compromise formula, a break
in unanimity would be preferable .... The Argentines must accept this view
or go their own way." 58
The Latin Americanists anticipated problems with Argentina and Bra-
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zil at Rio, but they were shocked by the degree to which hemispheric
solidarity had been shattered. Almost as soon as they stepped off the plane
on February 12, Welles and his colleagues learned that Argentina's power
play to block a United States-sponsored obligatory severance resolution was
approaching a successful climax. The inauspicious nature of America's entry
into World War II and its alarming vulnerability during the first months
of 1942 made ultimate Allied victory seem far from certain. It was obvious
to representatives of many hemispheric republics that Latin America's extended coastline, the weakness of her navies, and the sharply reduced defensive capacity of the United States would make any nation that adopted
a hostile posture toward the Axis extremly vulnerable to retaliation. 59 And,
in fact, in late December and early January, Germany, Italy, and Japan had
intimated to Chile and a number of other republics that if those countries
were to break relations with the Axis, they would find themselves immediately at war.60 These considerations, together with traditional fear of Yankee
imperialism, had caused a number of states to entertain Argentina's suggestions. · The American delegation realized that to run roughshod over
Argentina, especially given Brazil's attitude, would polarize the hemisphere.
In talks with key figures of the Brazilian delegation, the undersecretary
began to give ground immediately. He agreed with Foreign Minister
Aranha that no greater encouragement could be given to the standard-bearers
of fascism than a break in hemispheric unity, and he again expressed his
belief that the conference could not take action except by a unanimous vote.
Encouraged by the American's obvious willingness to compromise, Vargas
and Aranha told Welles that the Argentineans were not as adamant as they
appeared: Ruiz Guifiazu would almost certainly sign a severance resolution
if he could fall back on some face-saving device. 61
Before engaging the Argentineans in a test of wills, Welles and Jefferson
Caffrey, the United States ambassador to Brazil, a man who thoroughly
sympathized with Welles's point of view, began to sound out opinion in the
other hemispheric delegations concerning mandatory severance of relations
with the Axis. The Caribbean, Central American, and northern South
American states presented little problem. After the United States promised
the removal of all tariffs on war materials, negotiation of lucrative longrange contracts for raw goods, and aid for developing local industries with
the objective of establishing more diversified economies, these states announced that Argentina's veto power should not be allowed to interfere with
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hemispheric defense. Turning to the South American republics, American
officials used a variety of arguments in order to extract unenthusiastic endorsement of a rupture with the Axis from Bolivia, Paraguay, and Peru.
These republics, no less than Argentina, were far from the protective arm
of the Caribbean Defense Command and were very vulnerable not only to
Axis attack but to Argentine pressure as well.62
Washington's success in lining up votes for an obligatory pledge initially
had no effect on the Argentineans. Repeating his standard battery of arguments in support of nonalignment, Ruiz Guifiazu refused to even consider
severing diplomatic ties with Germany, Japan, and Italy.63 In Buenos Aires,
Castillo promised Armour that his government would go along with all
other political and economic measures, including the furnishing of essential
raw materials and port facilities and the enactment of measures designed to
prevent Axis propaganda and subversion; but Argentina would continue to
maintain diplomatic ties with the Axis.64
Realizing that Argentina's position would likely determine the policies
of Brazil as well as a number of lesser Latin American states, the Latin
Americanists first sought to exert as much diplomatic pressure as possible on
the Argentine delegation to sign an obligatory severance pact and then
offered them a way out by suggesting a compromise formula. With Welles
orchestrating their efforts, the foreign ministers of Mexico, Venezuela, and
Colombia took turns urging the Argentineans to make a full commitment
to the Allied cause. When their blandishments failed to move Ruiz Guifiazu
and his colleagues, Welles's cohorts collectively introduced a severance resolution at the plenary session of the conference.65 After Peru and Chile came
out in favor of a rupture on February 19, Ruiz Guifiazu began to waver.
United States military advisors subsequently informed their Argentine
counterparts, who were intensely desirous of cashing in on the lend-lease
bonanza, that financial and economic aid could be given only to those countries that cooperated in the defense of the hemisphere. The climax of the
assault on Argentine neutralism came during three long conversations held
between the nineteenth and the twenty-second. After haranguing Ruiz
Guifiazu on the dangers of neutrality, the undersecretary, as the Brazilians
had advised, proposed a middle course. Asserting that there could be no
compromise on the severance issue, Welles promised: "I as well as the other
chiefs of delegations will make every effort to find some phraseology acceptable to all, provided the necessary principles are maintained intact."66 At
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this, the beleaguered foreign minister succumbed and agreed to cable his
government, requesting permission to sign a severance resolution.67
The heads of the delegations moved quickly to write a compact that
everyone could live with. The key paragraph awkwardly reflected the
Argentine-American compromise:
The American Republics consequently declare that in the exercise
of their sovereignty and in conformity with their constitutional institutions and powers, provided the latter are in agreement, they
cannot continue their diplomatic relations with Japan, Germany,
and Italy, ...68
Unfortunately, Ruiz Guifiazu apparently acted without authorization
from Buenos Aires in agreeing to this resolution, and as a result, post-signing
festivities were interrupted by the recall of the foreign minister. After being
roundly berated by Castillo, the chastened diplomat returned to Rio and
disavowed his signature. To charges of bad faith he replied only that his
government was absolutely determined to avoid war. 69 Actually, the resolution, like all previous inter-American security pacts, committed Argentina
to nothing specific. Castillo's willingness to scuttle the agreement for the
sake of appearances was a product primarily of his plan to assume a highly
visible anti-American, neutralist stance.
At this point an untimely outburst from Washington played into Castillo's hands by hardening the resolve of the Argentine citizenry to pursue
an independent course. In response to Buenos Aires's disavowal, Tom Connally, the parochial and combative chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, declared to reporters that "we are trusting that Castillo will
change his mind, or that the Argentine people will change their President."70
Despite the State Department's hurried announcement that the views of the
legislative branch did not represent those of the executive, many Argentineans were convinced that Connally was representative of the true spirit
of the Good Neighbor Policy.
In order to retain an absolutely free hand, Welles had throughout the
conference led the internationalists, who were then absorbed in strategic
talks with British officials, to believe that not only he and the entire American delegation, but Brazil as well, were prepared to take a hard line against
the Argentineans if they failed to cooperate. "President Vargas told me
yesterday afternoon," the undersecretary reported to Washington on the
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twenty-third, "that the Argentines would come along and that he himself
had made it clear to Ruiz Guifiazu that Brazil would support the United
States 100%; that the final decision of Brazil in this regard had been reached
and that he, Vargas, had the support of practically every citizen in Brazil."71
Moreover, in the course of "reassuring" the State Department, the Latin
Americanists either inadvertently or deliberately reinforced the internationalists' negative view of Argentina. In his dispatch to Hull informing him that
Castillo had ordered Ruiz Guifiazu to disavow the first severance pact, the
undersecretary remarked that "the very definite conclusion has been reached
by all of the Foreign Ministers with whom I have spoken that some influence of an extra-continental character is responsible for the decision reached
by Dr. Castillo."72
Meanwhile, the American delegation was retreating in order to establish
a new position around which to rally the hemispheric republics and thus
preserve unity. 73 After hours of tedious debate the conclave unanimously
adopted a resolution representing the lowest common denominator. Of the
pact's four major points, the third contained the crucial alteration. After
reaffirming that an act of aggression against one of their number was an act
against all and after vowing to cooperate for mutual protection until the
current crisis had ended, the agreement proclaimed that "the American
Republics consequently, following the procedure established by their own
laws within the position and circumstances of each country in the actual
continental conflict, recommend the rupture of their diplomatic relations
with Japan, Germany, and Italy, ..."74
Julius Pratt, in his biography of the secretary of state, has recorded
Hull's reaction to the ratification of the Pact of Rio and the confrontation
between him, Welles, and FDR that followed. On January 24 Hull was
sitting calmly beside his radio, awaiting news of an ironclad hemispheric
defense pact-with or without Argentina-when article three, which contained the innocuous severance provision, was announced. His first reaction
was disbelief; his second was speechless fury at what seemed an American
Munich. He immediately alerted FDR, and both men contacted Welles on
a three-way telephone hookup. The secretary, his voice "quivering with
rage," told his subordinate that article three was a basic change of policy
which had been made without his knowledge. Terming the recommendatory resolution a virtual "surrender to Argentina," Hull ordered the undersecretary to repudiate it. Instead of submitting, Welles appealed directly to
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FDR, who abruptly ended the debate: "I am sorry, Cordell, but in this case
I am going to take the judgment of the man on the spot .... Sumner, I
approve what you have done. I authorize you to follow the lines you have
recommended." 75
Adolf Berle's diary provides a similar but more personalized account.
Berle and Laurence Duggan (chief of the Division of American Republic
Affairs and one of the Latin Americanists) had been summoned to Hull's
apartment shortly after the secretary learned of Welles's "betrayal" and were
present throughout the entire telephone conversation. According to Berle,
Hull became abusive of both Argentina and the undersecretary and repeatedly laid his authority on the line. FDR's subsequent approval of Welles's
position was a crushing political and spiritual defeat for Hull. Duggan and
Berle tried to calm him, arguing that the United States would still be able
to hold the anti-Axis republics in line and thus salvage its "moral leadership"
in Latin America, but to no avail. Declaring that "a lot of things were
going to change" in the department, the secretary, despite Roosevelt's endorsement of the recommendatory resolution, even went so far as to draft
a telegram (which was never sent) both repudiating the recommendatory
resolution and recalling Welles. "Along past midnight," Berle wrote in his
diary, "Duggan and I left to get a stiff drink, which represented my sole
remaining idea of a tangible approach to the situation. For it is obvious
that now there is a breach between the Secretary and Sumner that will never
be healed-though the Secretary will keep it below hatches to some extent .
. . . I felt that several careers were ending that night." 76
In the days that followed, each group tried to vindicate its position. The
Latin Americanists reiterated their view that preservation of hemispheric
unity and the integrity of the consultative system not only would work to
Washington's long-range interest in the Western Hemisphere but would
serve America's strategic interests during World War II as well. If the
delegates had been unable to agree to some type of severance resolution,
however superficial, it appeared that Latin America would divide right down
the middle between the pro-Allied and the nonaligned states. Those nations
closer to the Canal Zone, and hence nearer to the protective arm of the
United States, might follow Washington's lead even to the point of polarizing the Pan-American community. If, however, Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
and their weaker neighbors were isolated, they would only fall into the
arms of the hemisphere's enemies. Because of the intrinsic power of these
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republics and their distance from the defensive umbrella of the United
States, they would become "untrammelled" centers of Axis activities in the
Western Hemisphere. Moreover, contended Welles, Duggan, and Bonsal, if
the United States had forced a break in ranks at Rio, it would have been
attacked from one end of the hemisphere to the other for undermining the
principles of democracy and unity upon which the Inter-American System
was based. Undue pressure would have destroyed the trust that the Roosevelt
administration had taken years to accumulate.77
To the internationalists, however, Latin America, not the United States,
was on trial at Rio. During the 1930s Washington had shown meticulous
respect for the sovereignty of her southern neighbors. Now that the very
existence of the hemisphere was threatened, argued Hull and Long, Latin
America must quickly fall into line behind the Allies, who, after all, were
fighting and dying to preserve democratic institutions and to save the entire
New World from Axis domination. 78 The internationalists believed that the
global crisis warranted immediate action against all states that were not
willing to cooperate fully with the Allies, and they were convinced that
Roosevelt would eventually concur.
Apparently, to Roosevelt's mind the key to the situation was Brazil.
During the anxiety-filled days after Pearl Harbor, American military leaders
repeatedly advised the White House that because of the strategic position of
Brazil, its wholehearted cooperation with the Allies was essential to the war
effort.79 During his preconference interview with Roosevelt and in several
mid-conference phone calls to the White House, Welles convinced the president that if the United States continued to pursue a hard line, it would
certainly alienate Brazil and drive that nation into the arms of the neutralists. Even if Vargas could be persuaded to sign a compulsory resolution, the
undersecretary insisted, the military would eventually revolt, remove Vargas
from office, and disavow the Rio agreements.80
Thus, the American position at the Rio Conference was shaped by
Argentina's determination to remain neutral and by Brazil's refusal to isolate Argentina, but it was also a product of the goals and characteristics of
a particular coterie within the foreign-policy establishment. By utilizing
direct access to the White House, control over vital intelligence, intragovernmental allies, and its proximity to the actual negotiating process, the WellesDuggan-Bonsal group eliminated their rivals from the decision-making
process and secured approval of their policy recommendations, Like Ger-
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many in the aftermath of World War I, however, the internationalists,
although humiliated, were left with the sinews of power. Their resolve to
regain control of the Latin American policy of the United States and their
bitterness toward both the Latin American establishment and Argentina
would have profound implications for the wartime history of the Good
Neighbor Policy.
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SUMNER WELLES AND THE ART OF COERCION

In the weeks following the Rio Conference, the Hull-Welles controversy
lay like a pall over the State Department. "This has been a bad week,"
Adolf Berle confided in his diary on February 1. "Welles has been away
and the Secretary has been in bed .... Following the blow-up with Wells
in Rio a week ago, he came to the office on Monday but was nervously and
spiritually torn to pieces, to a point where his doctor kept him in bed. . . .
He emerged Friday to go to the cabinet meeting, but this was about all."
Peacemakers such as Berle and Acheson tried to mediate between the two
warring factions, but with no success. The question boiled down to who
would be secretary of state. At Rio, Welles and Roosevelt had made policy
behind Hull's back. "Sumner is really preserving a direct line of power
through the White House," Berle wrote. "The Secretary will be satisfied
with nothing less than cutting that off."1
Although Roosevelt's approval of Welles's approach at Rio clearly
shifted the balance of power within the department in favor of the Latin
Americanists, time was on the side of the internationalists. In many ways
1942, which was punctuated by one military disaster after another, was the
most trying year in the history of the republic. In late May the Germans
launched a successful military drive designed to capture the Suez Canal; and
by July, German troops were only seventy-five miles from Alexandria. In
Russia a Nazi offensive pushed relentlessly toward the Volga and the Caucasus. German U-boat activity in the Atlantic became so effective that by
summer the flow of United States goods to Allied Europe had slowed dramatically. The situation was no less discouraging in the Far East. As the
last American forces surrendered in the Philippines in May, the Japanese
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were busy consolidating their positions in the Dutch East Indies and unleashing their naval forces on New Britain and the Solomon Islands. With
newspapers and newsreels recounting one military disaster after another,
Americans became less and less willing to tolerate dissent at home and
abroad.2
The reaction of the American press to the Castillo government's policy
of nonalignment and to the Pact of Rio made it imperative, from a political
point of view, that the Latin Americanists induce Buenos Aires to cooperate
in the Allied war effort as fully and as quickly as possible. Ironically, those
journalists who originally had been the strongest supporters of the New
Deal and the Good Neighbor Policy were the first to link Argentine militarism with National Socialism and to blast the Roosevelt administration
for "appeasing" Buenos Aires at the Rio Conference. "If anyone thinks that
a benevolently neutral Argentina is not an important asset to the Axis in
America," said Freda Kirchwey in the Nation, "he has not followed Nazi
methods of political warfare."3 In an article in the same issue of that journal, Hugo Fernandez Artucio labeled the Castillo government "the advance
guard of an army of invasion against the shores of America."4 Denouncing
the Rio Conference as the most perfect example of appeasement since the
Munich meeting of 1938, the New Republic charged that the State Department's past policy of seeking to persuade the Latin American dictatorships
to merge their foreign policies with that of the United States through the
open bribery of trade agreements, outright loans, and military supplies had
simply strengthened the pro-Nazi and pro-Fascist groups that were now
blackmailing the United States.6 Virtually everyone within the "liberal establishment"-that is, those Americans who by the early 1940s were denouncing,
on the one hand, New Deal domestic policy for not going far enough in
achieving economic and social justice and, on the other, New Deal foreign
policy for not producing true Soviet-American solidarity-agreed that the
"sellout" at Rio was basically an attempt to smooth over the damage caused
by two years of trying to buy off the Castillo government.6
Some newspapers, primarily those that continued to support the administration's domestic and foreign programs, were willing to give the Latin
Americanists the benefit of the doubt as to whether or not the good faith
displayed by the United States delegation at Rio would convince Argentina
and Chile to throw in with the Allies. Nonetheless, they made it clear that
their continued support of the administration's hemispheric policy was de44
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pendent on Buenos Aires's and Santiago's abandonment of neutrality. The
St. Louis Post-Dispatch hailed the Rio accords as "the kind of compromise
which remains after the concessions are made, a strong unmistakable definition of policy," but then warned that "Argentina and Chile must be won
to the declaration which their diplomats have tentatively approved." 7 Other
proadministration columnists simply chose to ignore the recommendatory
nature of the January pledge and to view it as a binding agreement. One
foreign-policy analyst declared that "the Pact of Rio unquestionably put
Argentina and Chile under obligation to expel the Nazi Fifth-Column from
their midst, and cooperate with the United States in defeating the Axis." 8
Whether they were critical or tolerant of the administration's actions at
Rio, the vast majority of commentators on foreign affairs took a negative
view of the Castillo government and its policies. Even as early as the spring
of 1942 many journalists began to join Cordell Hull, Breckinridge Long,
and their associates in viewing the Castillo regime not only as a government
that was refusing to join the free world in its struggle against the forces of
evil but also as one that was destroying democratic institutions and suppressing the popular will within Argentina in order to do so. According to
this segment of opinion, the Good Neighbor Policy had won the hearts and
minds of the Argentine citizenry, who now trusted the United States and
wanted Argentina to take its place beside the defenders of democracy. Only
the small clique ensconced in the Casa Rosada prevented them from acting.
"Dr. Ruiz-Guifiazu's obstructionist attitude went contrary to the expressed
wi~hes of a large part of the Argentine population," observed the Washington Post, "and reflected only the views of the minority government which,
by a fluke, happens to be in power in Buenos Aires.',o The implication of
such a view was clear: if the Castillo administration did not change its
policies to reflect the pro-Allied sentiments of the people, then it was America's duty to help the Argentineans change their government.10 Tom Connally may not have spoken for the chief executive, but his views apparently
coincided with those of a sizable sector of the American public.
Franklin Roosevelt was as sensitive to public opinion as any president
in the nation's history-a fact that was never far from the minds of those
within the foreign-policy establishment. The Latin Americanists realized
that if they were going to retain control of inter-American relations and
implement their view of the Good Neighbor Policy, they would have to
secure concrete proof that hemispheric solidarity and nonintervention had
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won Argentina and Chile to the anti-Axis banner. Shortly after the close of
the Rio Conference, FDR dashed off a telegram in which he bemoaned
unfavorable press comments on the Pact of Rio. Welles's reply indicated
that he was well aware of the president's anxiety and of the tenuousness of
the Latin Americanists' position. "I fully share the point of view you yourself expressed," he wrote to his former classmate at Groton, "and that is that
immediate implementation in the sense of action is required in order to counteract the alleged mistaken press comments which have been reported." 11
Nevertheless, the Latin Americanists believed as strongly as ever that
overt coercion of Buenos Aires, whether verbal, economic, or military, would
alienate the Argentine people and drive them to support the Castillo government and its neutralist policies. More importantly, a frontal assault would
shatter hemispheric solidarity; convince the other Latin nations that Washington had returned to the era of the big stick; and during what many
considered the greatest trial the United States had yet faced, undermine its
influence south of the Rio Grande. In mid February 1942, in a speech to
the Cuban Chamber of Commerce, Welles went to great lengths to reassure
the American states that the entry of the United States into World War II
did not sound the death knell of the Good Neighbor Policy. He blasted
those in the United States who advocated the overthrow of those Latin
governments that did not conform to Washington's expectations. The Roosevelt administration's hemispheric policy was still based on nonintervention
in the political affairs of the other republics and on "recognition in fact, as
well as in word, that every one of the twenty-one American Republics is the
sovereign equal of the others." To condemn existing governments and to pit
one political faction against another would "be to ape a policy which has
been pursued during the past five years by Hitler."12
The problem, then, for Welles, Duggan, Bonsal, and their associates
was to provoke the Castillo government to abandon neutrality and eradicate
all traces of Axis influence in Argentina. At the same time they were determined to avoid blatantly coercive policies that would alienate friendly,
pro-Allied elements in Argentina and would undermine Latin America's
faith in the Good Neighbor Policy. From 1936 through January 1941 the
Latin Americanists rejected unilateral coercion and attempted to use the
consultative system in order to persuade Argentina to support, first, hemispheric defense measures and, then, the Allied cause. At Rio, however, the
other republics had gone as far as they intended to go in pushing Argentina
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toward a break. Further attempts by Washington to invoke hemispheric
opinion against Argentina would only lead to charges that the United States
was trying to convert the Pan-American System into a blunt instrument
with which to beat Argentina to its knees.13 Denied this avenue of attack,
faced with mounting criticism of their philosophy, and threatened by the
feud with the internationalists, the Latin Americanists turned to propaganda
and a policy of selective pressure to obtain a reorientation of Argentine
foreign policy.
Welles and his cohorts were unwilling at this point to foment a revolution against the Castillo regime,1 4 but they were certainly not averse to
aiding those who advocated a pro-Allied change in Argentina's international
posture. The Argentine press, one of the oldest and most articulate institutions in the Western Hemisphere, was a major factor in shaping not only
Argentine opinion but the attitudes of latinos everywhere. The federally
subsidized integral-nationalist sheets El Pampero and El Cabildo were
vehement critics of the United States and were avid supporters of the administration's policy of neutrality, while the older, more widely read Buenos
Aires dailies such as La Nacion, La Prensa, and Noticias Graficas generally
favored a return to constitutional elections and sympathized with the Allied
cause. Using powers granted to it under the state of siege to suppress dissenting opinion, the Castillo government sought through direct if rather
inept censorship and restriction of newsprint ( nearly all of which had to be
imported) to control those papers that were most critical of its policies.15
As a principal supplier of this critical material, the United States was in a
perfect position to "aid its friends and punish its enemies." Amid cries from
the Argentine Foreign Office that Washington was impinging on Argentina's national sovereignty, the United States began shipping paper only to
those journals that urged alignment with the United States.
The Latin Americanists' program of selective supply got off the ground
in early February when Armour notified his superiors of the newsprint
shortage, and the State Department subsequently prevailed upon the Combined Shipping Board to create precious additional space for this commodity
aboard Allied ships destined to call at Buenos Aires. Selective replenishment
continued throughout the spring and summer, until finally the Casa Rosada
retaliated. It first ordered the Flota Mercante, an Argentine shipping line
under government supervision, to stop carrying American newsprint to
Argentina, and then it announced a complete government takeover of dis-

47

The Roosevelt Foreign-Policy Establishment

tribution, thus effectively ending the State Department's power to influence
domestic editorial opinion.16
By early 1943 the "democratic" press was suffocating for lack of paper.
In a last-ditch effort to protect pro-Allied forums in Argentina, Washington
attempted to use that nation's desire to export more fresh fruit as a lever to
pry permission from the Foreign Office to resupply the anti-Axis press. Over
lunch with Ambassador Espil, Philip Bonsal hinted that the United States
would buy huge quantities of fruit in return for increased cargo space for
newsprint aboard Argentine ships and, more importantly, for control over
allocation. Replying that such an agreement would constitute a clear violation of Argentine sovereignty which would in turn provide the nationalists
with a propaganda field day, Espil flatly rejected the scheme.17 The Castillo
administration was no longer inclined to permit Washington to supply its
critics with the paper upon which to print their antigovernment broadsides.
Not content to rely solely on Argentine sources to sway public opinion
in that country, the State Department turned to direct and inevitably more
offensive methods of propaganda. In their search for more effective ways
of influencing Argentine opinion, the Latin Americanists approached the
Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA). The agency
had been established by President Roosevelt in 1941 to "formulate and execute programs in the commercial and economic fields and the fields of the
arts and sciences, education and travel, the radio, the press and the cinema
that would further national defense and strengthen the bonds between the
nations of the Western Hemisphere." 18 Under Nelson Rockefeller, the
OCIAA labored from 1941 through 1944 to mobilize latinos everywhere in
behalf of the crusade against the Axis. Among other things, it served as a
grievance board for cooperating governments, as an Allied propaganda
bureau, and as an intelligence-gathering agency for other branches of the
United States government. In April, at Welles's behest, the OCIAA set in
motion plans to construct a long-range radio station in Uruguay that would
be capable of beaming anti-Axis broadcasts to the Argentine provinces of
Buenos Aires, Rosario, and Cordoba.19 Program schedules were to be approved by the State Department. In August, Robert Wells, chairman of the
coordinating committee for Argentina within the OCIAA, reported to Duggan that during the summer, OCIAA operatives had begun broadcasting
three radio programs in Argentina which were designed to extol the virtues
of the United States. Also they had hired Argentine nationals to complain
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to various papers that were running pro-Axis editorials, and they persuaded
many American businessmen to cancel their advertising in unfriendly
sheets.20 Because, however, the source of this propaganda was so obvious and
because Argentineans were so incensed at attempts to brainwash them, direct
efforts to influence Argentine opinion were even less successful than were
attempts to work through the indigenous press.
The Latin Americanists realized that it would be months, if ever, before
their propaganda efforts bore fruit in terms of a firm Argentine commitment to the Allied cause. Given their tenuous hold on hemispheric policy
within the foreign-affairs establishment, Welles and his colleagues found it
imperative to apply pressure directly on the Castillo government in order to
obtain immediate results. Several members of the group, most notably
Norman Armour and Philip Bonsal, correctly perceived the source of Castillo's political power to be the Argentine military, so they began to urge
adoption of policies that would exploit the officer corps' preoccupation with
acquiring large quantities of munitions and the latest, most sophisticated
military equipment. From Buenos Aires, Armour advised Welles and Bonsal that World War II had stimulated feelings of both insecurity and aggression within the military and that if Washington were to ignore Argentina's
rather frantic requests for arms aid, while ostentatiously "building up"
Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Chile, the officer corps would overnight
become an advocate of Argentine-American cooperation in the struggle
against the Axis.21 Bonsal not only relayed Armour's recommendations to
his superiors with his endorsement; in early February he also took it upon
himself to suggest the establishment of a seaplane patrol base in southern
Brazil-specifically at Rio Grande de Sul, only about four hundred miles
round-trip from Buenos Aires. The stationing there of a dozen long-range
bombers to be eventually turned over to the Brazilians, he observed, would
have a useful effect on the Argentineans.22 Both Welles and Roosevelt, who
subsequently initialed an air-base agreement with Brazil, were enthusiastic
about the balance-of-power approach, not only becau.se it seemed to offer an
opportunity to play on the military's fear that Argentina's neutralist policies
were relegating her to the status of a third-rate power in South America,
but also because it did not conspicuously violate the Good Neighbor Policy.
To those who might accuse the United States of attempting to coerce Buenos
Aires by denying it arms aid while building up its rivals, Washington could
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reply that it would be manifestly unjust to take from its allies in order to
give to a neutralist power such as Argentina.
The State Department embarked on its campaign to maximize insecurity
within Argentina's officer corps, and thus within the Castillo administration,
almost immediately after the signing of the Pact of Rio. As the various
delegations were preparing to depart, Ruiz Guifiazu informed Welles that
his government expected to reach an agreement with American military
representatives for the transfer of arms, ammunition, and ships under lendlease provisions. Welles, whose capacity for chilling formality was notorious
in diplomatic circles, replied stiffly that it would be the Roosevelt administration's policy to distribute materials of war only when such aid would
contribute to the defense of the United States. Citing massive United States
aid to Brazil and to numerous other nations that had not yet declared war
on the Axis, Ruiz Guifiazu angrily charged the Roosevelt administration
with pursuing a blatantly discriminatory policy. Welles retorted that so
long as Argentina refused to contribute to the common defense of the hemisphere, it alone was responsible for its shortage of munitions.23
The foreign minister responded to the Latin Americanists' arms-aid
diplomacy by trying to beat them at their own game. Throughout 1941 and
into 1942 the United States held a series of meetings with high-ranking naval
officers from the American republics to coordinate plans for the defense of
the hemisphere. Members of the Argentine navy arrived in Washington in
December 1941 and worked feverishly through the winter and early spring
to coordinate Argentine-American naval operations in the Western Hemisphere before deteriorating diplomatic relations between their two countries
wrecked the talks. Aware of the United States Navy's intense desire to gain
effective control of the Straits of Magellan, Ruiz Guifiazu ordered Ambassador Felipe Espil to attend the sessions and to extract an unconditional
pledge of military aid from the United States by playing off the navy's
desire for a military accord against the State Department's desire to squeeze
further diplomatic concessions from the Castillo government. In short, Espil
was to sabotage the discussions unless American diplomats authorized a full
measure of lend-lease aid to Argentina.24
The Latin Americanists were far less concerned about the military
security of the South Atlantic than they were with securing a break in
relations between the Castillo government, on the one hand, and Germany,
Italy, and Japan on the other. Not only would a no-strings-attached aid
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agreement destroy any leverage the Latin Americanists might be able to
exert on the Argentine army, but in addition, once the War Department
had made a commitment to deliver lend-lease supplies, however small the
amount, the Castillo regime would be able to hold up to the Argentine
people these arms consignments as proof that Washington recognized Argentina's Rio policy to be consistent with hemispheric security. To forestall
such an interpretation and to maintain the balance-of-power stratagem intact, the State Department instructed United States military representatives
at the staff discussions to insert into the Argentine draft of an aid agreement
a proviso making Argentina militarily responsible for Allied shipping in the
South Atlantic.25
Despite repeated assaults on the obligatory patrolling section by a distraught Espil, the United States held firm. To the Argentinean's contention
that the required convoy duty would lead quickly to a state of belligerency,
Welles, knowing full well that American convoying in the winter of 1941
had led to a state of undeclared war between the United States and Germany, replied that the United States had managed to maintain its neutrality
while guarding Allied ships in the Atlantic in late 1941. The undersecretary
informed Espil that the State Department would like nothing better than
to furnish its neighbor to the south with arms, but this was impossible without some positive action that would convince the rest of the Americas that
Argentina was living up to its hemispheric commitments. To no one's
surprise, Ruiz Guiiiazu rejected the American proposal, and as a result, in
late April, the negotiations between the Argentine mission and the War and
Navy departments collapsed.26
The refusal of the State Department to make even token deliveries of
arms to Argentina during 1942 and 1943, despite giving substantial aid to
the neutralist governments of Chile and Spain, played into the hands of the
nationalists. In the first place, Washington's attempts at lend-lease diplomacy proved of inestimable aid to the Castillo government in its continuing
campaign to justify nonalignment. When the Argentine delegation returned
home from Washington empty-handed, Ruiz Guifiazu told the nation that
"the denial of military equipment to Argentina by the United States represented the most flagrant kind of discrimination as well as ill-concealed
coercion."27 In July he informed the Chamber of Deputies that the government's plans for an eventual break with the Axis could never be implemented as long as Washington denied Argentina the arms with which to
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defend herself against Axis aggression.28 In the second place, because the
State Department's policy of discriminatory lend-lease aid forced the Argentineans to search for alternative sources, it had the effect of driving Buenos
Aires closer to Berlin.29 Initially the balance-of-power technique did create
insecurity within certain sectors of the officer corps and hence put pressure
on the Castillo government to assume an actively pro-Allied role in the war.
In early 1943 the United States military attache in Buenos Aires uncovered
a memorandum sent by the Argentine general staff to President Castillo,
arguing that Argentina's position vis-a-vis her neighbors had become greatly
weakened because of discriminatory lend-lease aid. The memo urged absolute conformity to the Rio declarations in order to end Argentina's isolation.80 Castillo rejected the recommended solution, however, because he
believed that the bulk of middle- and junior-grade officers and a majority
of the citizenry favored a policy of strict neutrality and because he was
himself an ardent nationalist. He sought instead to satisfy the military's
demands by negotiating with the Third Reich for the munitions that would
preserve Argentine ascendancy in southern South America.81
Topping the Latin Americanists' list of weapons in their war on
Argentine neutrality and Axis activities within Argentina was a program
of selective economic coercion. Various United States intelligence sources
within Argentina advised the department throughout 1942 that there was
little chance that the Castillo government would break relations with Germany, Japan, and Italy unless the Allies could inject an element of doubt
into the booming Argentine economy. Because of the changes wrought in
the international marketplace by World War II, the United States, in the
wake of the Rio Conference, appeared to be in an excellent position to create
anxiety and insecurity within the Argentine business community. With the
fall of France and the advent of the Battle of Britain, the United States
became virtually the sole supplier of steel machinery, railway replacement
parts, tires, petroleum equipment, and other industrial items to Argentina.32
Like discriminatory lend-lease aid, economic constriction could be justified
on the basis of the war effort. Moreover, because the United States had by
the end of 1941 concluded long-term contracts for a number of Argentina's
strategic raw materials, including feldspar, manganese, antimony, silver,
beryl, tungsten, tin, lead, and quebracho, the State Department believed that
it could exert economic pressure without fear of endangering this vital source
of goods. So immune did Washington feel from Argentine retaliation that
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in early 1942 Welles informed Espil that his government did not really favor
successful consummation of pending raw-materials contracts. Since Argentina would have to sell in order to survive, and of course would not think
of dealing with the Axis, the Allies could purchase all that they needed on
the open market. 33
The Latin Americanists realized that economic deprivation would exert
pressure on Argentineans of virtually every political persuasion and every
walk of life, from Conservative to Communist, from estanciero to descamisado, and they believed that if they could convince a majority of the citizenry
that neutrality did not mean prosperity, then they would undermine a powerful argument in behalf of continued nonalignment. If, however, Washington engaged in gross and indiscriminate coercion, economic pressure would
only unify the proud Argentineans behind the Castillo government's policy
of neutrality and would revive latent anti-Americanism in Argentina and
throughout the Americas. Thus, fearful of resurrecting charges of dollar
diplomacy, Welles and his colleagues rejected traditional implements of
economic compulsion such as an embargo or blockade and turned instead
to a program of selective deprivation which was designed to reward proAllied groups while punishing those who advocated either neutralist or proAxis policies. In its desire to avoid a frontal attack, the State Department
devised a formalized mechanism for systematic intervention into Argentine
economic affairs that in the end antagonized Argentineans to perhaps a
greater degree than the more direct methods that the Latin Americanists
were striving to avoid.
Despite the desire of Welles, Duggan, and Bonsal to pursue a selective
approach that would penalize only specific groups, early efforts at economic
coercion were capricious and indiscriminate. In March 1942 the Board of
Economic Warfare (BEW) began refusing export licenses to United States
exporters wishing to sell electrical equipment, chemicals, and other items to
Argentina. Later in the month the State Department notified the British
Foreign Office that in order better to supply the needs of the Allies, the
United States would henceforth restrict the exportation of a wide variety of
goods to the Argentine. The British were requested in the name of the war
effort not to make up these deficiencies. 34 By early April, Argentine importers of North American products were having so much difficulty obtaining
export licenses for goods they had bought in the United States that the
Castillo government ordered its official purchasing commission to come
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home. Business Week reported that, in the weeks after the Rio Conference,
American traders had often been unable to obtain licenses for Argentina but
had encountered no difficulty when it came to Mexico, Brazil and Chile.35
Such blanket tactics were only stopgap measures, however. In the last
week of March the State Department presented BEW with a complex
design that would pinpoint pro-Axis firms within Argentina for punishment.
The plan sought to take advantage of an ardently pro-American clique
within the Central Bank, the federally supervised but privately owned
national bank of Argentina. In conformity with the State Department directive, the BEW announced that as of April 1, licenses for exports to Argentina, including goods in transit through the United States, would be granted
only under certain procedures. Importers in Argentina who desired North
American products would have to apply to the Central Bank in Buenos
Aires for a Certificate of Necessity and would have to supply all information
the bank might require. The bank, in collaboration with the United States
embassy, would then issue certificates based on the needs of the Argentine
national economy and on estimates of available supply and transportation
facilities. Exporters in the United States would have to obtain an original
copy of the certificate from the importer. After April 1, all applications for
export licenses had to be accompanied by such documents. This licensing
system put the State Department in a position to bring direct pressure to
bear on the Castillo government by depriving the Argentine economy of
vital raw materials and finished goods, thus creating a judicious amount
of instability in the marketplace.36 It would at the same time permit Washington to reinforce those firms that were cooperating with the Allies and to
punish those dealing with Axis subsidiaries. From Buenos Aires, Armour
advised that he, as well as "the bulk of the thinking Argentine people"
heartily agreed with the department's recently implemented policy of freely
sharing scarce commodities with America's allies while distributing Argentina's share in such a way that "the friendly majority of the Argentine
people would be strengthened at the expense of the unfriendly but influential
minority." 37
Another, more traditional device utilized by the Latin Americanists to
penalize the "influential minority" was the Proclaimed List. Established in
1941, it enumerated Latin American firms that were trading with the Axis
and forbade United States concerns from having any contact whatsover with
them. With an eye always to limiting commercial ties between Argentina
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and Germany and to enriching those businesses that supported the Allies,
the State Department added more and more Argentine firms to the list
during 1942. Buenos Aires, which viewed the Proclaimed List as nothing
less than a crude weapon with which the United States was attempting to
coerce a nonconforming nation, protested vigorously, pointing out that the
United States and Argentina had joined together in 1916 to object to similar
measures imposed on neutrals by the British. Sounding surprisingly like
Hull, Welles replied that the fifth-column threat to the Western Hemisphere
was immeasurably greater in 1942 than during World War I. The Roosevelt
administration would continue to do everything within its power to "prevent
the fires of Hitlerism in this hemisphere from being fed with our own
resources." 38
The undersecretary's rhetoric reflected his and his subordinates' growing sense of frustration. For despite the complex licensing system instituted
in April, the Proclaimed List, and other subtle and not-so-subtle devices of
economic compulsion, Buenos Aires remained as committed as ever to nonalignment. If anything, it became increasingly tolerant of German sympathizers and Axis activities in Argentina. Despite domestic discontent with
the administration's exclusion of workers, peasants, and the petty bourgeoisie
from the political process and despite its refusal to sponsor measures of social
justice, Castillo's political position remained secure. His foreign policies
more than satisfied the principle source of his support, the integral-nationalist
middle- and junior-grade officers who wanted above all to maintain Argentina's freedom of action and to avoid any hint of truckling to United
States demands.31) In addition, the Proclaimed List and the licensing system
served to heighten both nationalism and support for neutrality among
groups otherwise quite critical of the Castillo government. Adding to the
Casa Rosada's sense of security and the Latin Americanists' mood of frustration was a pervasive apathy among the populace that stemmed primarily
from continuing prosperity. Although import-export cutbacks by the United
States had some effect on the Argentine economy, the overall impact of the
State Department's program was negligible. The Allied war machine continued to consume virtually all of Argentina's exportable surplus of raw
materials. The British Ministry of Food-the sole purchaser of meat from
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay for the United Nations-used
lend-lease funds to purchase over 2.13 billion pesos in goods from Argentina
during the period from 1941 through 1943. This transaction, coupled with
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Argentina's skyrocketing trade with her South American neighbors, produced a net increase in foreign trade in 1942 of 11.5 percent over 1941. While
imports declined, exports increased 21.79 percent, creating huge foreignexchange credits abroad. The fact that imports of iron products from 1939
to 1943 dropped from 693,000 tons to 76,000 tons did not spell economic
disaster, as so many in the United States had hoped. The decline only served
to make Argentina more self-sufficient: between 1935 and 1943 Argentine
manufacturing increased by 100 percent.40 After 1942 Buenos Aires was able
partially to fulfill the nation's requirements for certain machine parts and
high-grade steel and iron by negotiating a series of very favorable trade
agreements with Franco's Spain.41 As 1942 drew to a close, Business Wee,k
painted a depressing picture for those who had hoped that economic instability would persuade Argentina to break with Germany, Italy, and Japan
and to crack down on Axis sympathizers within its borders:
Argentina has felt almost no disturbing business repercussions from
the war.... There's tremendous volume of building in Buenos
Aires; the streets are jammed with automobiles; hotels are full and
nightclubs are doing a thriving business; the stock market is booming; export trade as a whole, despite the loss of continental European markets, is prospering because of huge meat sales to the United
Nations and soaring export prices.42

In its efforts to resist North American economic pressures, the Castillo
government was able to benefit immeasurably from a tacit coalition with
Great Britain. Throughout 1942 and 1943 London displayed a marked unwillingness to join in the Latin Americanists' policy of selective coercion,
while British businessmen and diplomats used the widening breach between
Buenos Aires and Washington to increase England's economic and political
influence in Argentina. Perhaps the most important factor behind British
noncooperation was the important place that Argentina occupied in the
Churchill government's plans to rebuild the empire in the postwar era. From
1940 through 1943 Britain was forced to liquidate a large part of her holdings throughout the world. In the United States, for instance, British assets
melted from $4.5 billion to $1.5 billion. Latin America was the only area
in which British investments held firm. Over one-third of the British capital
in that area resided in Argentina, a nation that was traditionally favored by
British businessmen because of high market potential, abundant raw mate-
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rials, and a spotless record of debt repayment. As of May 1943, British
nationals controlled over $1 billion in Argentine rails, $36 million in banking, $900 million in mining and manufacturing, and $177 million in government bonds. Whitehall's economic planners operated on the assumption that
if the British Empire were to survive the war, then His Majesty's government would have to preserve investments and commercial ties with Argentina, the keystone in the economic arch connecting Britain and Latin
America.43
That Whitehall believed that United States businessmen were seeking
to take advantage of Britain's preoccupation with World War II in order to
further their economic interests made the Churchill government even less
willing to join in sanctions. As Europe's markets dried up during the dark
days of 1940 and 1941 and as the United States' need for raw material
increased, Argentine-American trade grew by leaps and bounds. The activities of aggressive American businessmen naturally prompted the wellentrenched and cohesive British colony to suspect that the Yanks were seeking to profit from Britain's distress. As the British Foreign Office put it,
stepped-up United States business activity had "given rise to the impression,
however false, that there may be some desire on the American side to supplant British traders in their established and traditional markets, not only
for the war period but permanently thereafter."44 This was certainly the
view of Sir David Kelly, Britain's ambassador to Argentina:
While the Americans were very resentful of the Argentine Government's refusal to line up with the other South American Governments by at least breaking off relations with the Axis, they were
quite reasonably doing everything possible to build up the trade
supremacy for which their geographical situation and the virtual
cessation of British exports afforded a solid foundation. 45
Indeed, the British business community in Argentina was so frightened
of competition from United States traders that, from 1941 on, a number of
them supported Ruiz Guifiazu and his neutralist policies. During an April
1943 visit to the State Department, Jose Augusti, publisher of Noticias
Graficas, told Sumner Welles that "whatever superficial appearances might
be, the pressure of British interests in the Argentine Republic until the
present moment has been for the retention of Ruiz Guiiiazu in office and
for the continuation of the foreign policy which he had pursued." According
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to Augusti, the British financial, railroad, public-utility, and commercial
interests were persuaded that if the United States succeeded in diverting
Argentina from its course of neutrality, North American influence would
immediately become preponderant, as it had in all of the Latin republics
that had either broken relations or declared war. These businessmen, he
concluded, "were determined that British hegemony of the commercial and
financial spheres should continue to be exercised in this remaining part of
South America where for a hundred years they had been predominant."46
Despite the support for the neutralists that was shown by British
nationals living in Argentina, Whitehall was for a brief period willing to
take action to ensure that all the American republics line up solidly behind
the Allied war effort. Shortly before the Rio Conference, Sir Ronald Campbell approached the State Department, suggesting that the United States and
Great Britain collaborate in toppling those Latin governments that were
proving less than enthusiastic about doing battle with Hitler and Mussolini.
He mentioned Argentina and Brazil specifically. When Duggan and Berle
demurred, Campbell asked permission to proceed unilaterally. The Americans, however, would have no part of it. Direct immediate intervention
appealed to the British Foreign Office because it would be over with quickly
and because there was a possibility that Britain's role might be concealed.
British officials were not willing to participate in lesser sanctions, perceiving
that half-way measures, while certain to provoke charges of British imperialism, stood little chance of success.47
In view of Washington's refusal to support direct clandestine activities
leading to the overthrow of neutralist and pro-Axis governments and in
view of a total lack of sympathy among British citizens toward the coercion
of Argentina, 48 Great Britain launched an unofficial campaign in 1942 to
soften the effect of United States sanctions and to use the widening breach
between Washington and Buenos Aires to enhance Britain's prestige in
Argentina. Argentine representatives, arguing that heavy United States
lend-lease shipments to Brazil were threatening to upset the balance of
power in southern South America, contacted Great Britain in June and
requested assistance in building up their armament industry. Whitehall
responded favorably, and Argentina subsequently began to export small arms
to Britain in return for the raw materials needed to feed her munitions
plants. In addition, Industrias Metalurgicas and Plastica Argentina contracted with Vickers and Armstrong, England's leading producers of arms,
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for technical experts in the manufacture of cannon, machine guns, and other
weapons.49 All the while, British officials were attempting to convince the
Castillo regime that the United States was rendering aid and comfort to its
political enemies. Throughout 1942 General Justo, with the tacit support of
American officials in Buenos Aires, continued to rail at Castillo and to plot
his own strategy for the presidential elections to be held in 1943.50 As the
United States embassy sought to conceal its support for Justo from the Castillo administration, British journalists and spokesmen exerted every effort
to link the general with North American influence and interests.51 Lastly,
in conjunction with these stratagems, the British colony inaugurated an intense propaganda offensive to improve the United Kingdom's image in
Latin America. As British traders sought to protect their economic sphere
of influence through a vigorous promotional campaign, including shortwave
broadcasts from London and coordinated marketing efforts by British businessmen in Buenos Aires, other "sources," both official and unofficial, circulated the rumor that Britain fully understood and approved of the reasons
for Argentine neutrality; these sources compared their country's attitude of
friendship and understanding with the seemingly implacable hostility of the
United States.52 In early 1942, for example, Evelyn Baring, a prominent
British businessman who was Lord Halifax's brother-in-law, told Raul
Damonte Taborda, a leading Radical politician, that London was not interested in Argentina's domestic political situation and did not find Argentine
neutrality offensive. England was interested only in preserving its customers
and markets in Argentina and in preventing the United States from absorbing them. 53
All in all, British activities in Argentina did not facilitate implementation of the Latin Americanists' policy of propaganda and selective deprivation. State Department complaints served to produce changes only in
Whitehall's rhetoric. When the Castillo government attempted to utilize the
Anglo-American differences to rally support for its program of resistance to
pressure from the United States, the State Department protested vigorously
to London. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden reluctantly agreed to instruct
the Argentine ambassador that he should warn his government to avoid
creating false impressions regarding British attitudes, and Eden consented
to state publicly that His Majesty's government fully supported the position
of the United States.54 Nevertheless, Great Britain would continue to sell
munitions and machinery to Argentine concerns, to expand its investments,
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to purchase all available Argentine food surpluses, and to profit generally
from the Argentine-American rift. United States diplomats and businessmen
learned quickly that Winston Churchill's oft-quoted observation-that he
had not become His Majesty's first minister to preside over the dissolution
of the empire-applied to England's economic satrapy in Latin America as
well as to her more visible colonial holdings in the Middle East and Asia.
Despite British obstructionism, continued Argentine prosperity, and
Castillo's talent for turning Washington's subtle attempts at coercion to his
political advantage, the Latin Americanists were convinced that time would
vindicate their policy of propaganda and selective pressure. As Argentina
gradually realized that its national interest was inextricably intertwined with
the Allied cause, hemispheric unity and the Good Neighbor Policy would
remain intact. Unfortunately for Welles and his colleagues, their inability to
modify the Castillo government's policy of neutrality and to eradicate proAxis activities in Argentina undermined the Latin Americanists' power and
prestige within the Roosevelt administration and opened the way for other
governmental agencies to issue a serious challenge to the State Department's
authority in inter-American affairs. This challenge in turn played into the
hands of the Hull internationalists and contributed ultimately to their
triumph over Welles and his associates.
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4
THE ROOSEVELT FOREIGN-POLICY
ESTABLISHMENT AND THE FAILURE
OF SELECTIVE INTERVENTION

As the Latin Americanists moved from stratagem to stratagem during 1942
in an unsuccessful attempt to modify Argentine policy, they were forced to
deal with a challenge to their control of policy not only from the hard-liners
within the State Department but from other groups as well. Franklin Roosevelt had in 1933 brought to Washington a small army of bright, innovative
men who, the president hoped, would be capable of dealing with the problems created by the Depression. These men-Henry Wallace, Jesse Jones,
Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Harold Ickes, Rexford Tugwell, and Adolf Berle,
to name a few-were not only intelligent and inventive but self-willed and
ambitious as well. The plethora of problems to be solved, coupled with
Roosevelt's penchant for blurring lines of jurisdiction and inviting competition among his subordinates, meant that by the eve of World War II, the
administration "team" consisted of a gaggle of accomplished bureaucratic
empire builders who were bound together only by common ties of loyalty to
Roosevelt.
To a large extent, foreign affairs had escaped the attention of the various
department and agency heads during the 1930s, probably because the president himself had evinced little interest in diplomacy. State Department
leaders had to contend only with each other for control of policy. With the
outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 and with America's gradual shift from
a policy of neutrality to one of undeclared war by the fall of 1941, powerful
figures within the federal bureaucracy who had not heretofore been concerned with diplomacy turned their attention to foreign policy with a vengeance. As a result, fully a score of departments and agencies, some old and
some spawned by the war itself, emerged to challenge the State Department
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for control of policy-making-a development that profoundly affected Argentine-American relations and the course of the Good Neighbor Policy.
One of the most accomplished bureaucratic imperialists in the Roosevelt
foreign-policy establishment was Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr. He perceived that the American public's growing disillusionment
with the State Department's "soft line" toward Argentina offered a unique
opportunity to add an important area in foreign affairs to his domain. As a
result, he and his subordinates set about to convince FDR, who was acutely
aware of the mounting anti-Argentine sentiment in the United States, that
Argentina constituted a Nazi outpost in the New World, that financial
coercion offered the best opportunity to force the Castillo government to
abandon its "pro-Axis" policies, and that the Treasury Department's operatives and affiliated agencies were in the best position to apply pressure on
Buenos Aires.
The Treasury Department's decision to advocate a get-tough policy
toward Argentina was a product not only of its bureaucratic rivalry with
the State Department but of the personal prejudices of the leadership within
the department and of the parochial priorities and perceptions of the organization as a whole. Aware both of the strong anti-Semitic strain in Argentine nationalism and of the close relationship between the Argentine and
German military organizations,1 Morgenthau had come to the conclusion by
1942 that Argentina stood for the very principles against which America was
fighting in Europe and the Far East. Much as Hull and Long, Morgenthau
and his assistant for international affairs, Harry Dexter White,2 were convinced that the totalitarian practices of the Castillo regime indicated affiliation with the members of the Tripartite Pact. The liberal White (who in
1948 was allegedly driven to his death by Elizabeth Bentley's charges that
he was a Communist agent) found the totalitarian policies of the Conservative-backed Castillo particularly repugnant.3
Adding to the department's inclination to adopt the toughest possible
stance toward Argentina was its tendency, as an organization, to judge foreign states solely on the basis of their international financial conduct. From
the perspective of those who were responsible for measures of economic
warfare, the Castillo government's financial policies were as damning as if
Buenos Aires had permitted the armies of the Third Reich to use Argentine
territory to launch an attack on New World members of the Grand Alliance.
The Treasury Department's concern over Argentina's failure to sever fi-
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nancial ties with the Axis is well illustrated by a mid-1943 report from White
to Morgenthau on the Argentine situation:

In the weeks preceding the extension of our freezing order to the
Axis (April 10, 1940) large sums were transferred to Argentina on
behalf of the Axis countries in the form of bank transfers and currency shipments. In this way a large part of the funds which we
had hoped to prevent from being used for Axis activities escaped
our control. This accumulation of Axis funds in Argentina has resulted in the Axis' using Buenos Aires as the center point from
which to transmit funds to Axis agents in all the other American
republics.
We have proof that Argentine holding companies and financial
institutions are widely used by the Axis and its satellites to hold
substantial amounts of dollar assets in the United States in evasion
of our freezing control. With these funds they carry on transactions
contrary to the purposes of our freezing order and inimicable to our
war effort.4
Thus, uninhibited by concern for the well-being of the Good Neighbor
Policy, the survival of the inter-American consultative system, or any of the
other factors that restrained the Latin Americanists, Treasury Department
officials urged measures of all-out economic warfare against Argentina
throughout 1942 and attempted to run roughshod over the State Department
when it objected.
In the struggle with the State Department, Morgenthau and his subordinates were able to take full advantage of Roosevelt's tendency to promote
bureaucratic proliferation. The agency most useful to the Treasury in its
drive to gain control of Argentine policy was the Office of Foreign Funds
Control, established in 1940 under the control of the secretary of the Treasury. Among other things, this agency, which was headed by John W.
Pehle,5 was charged with preventing "all financial and commercial transactions between the United States and any other American Republic that
directly or indirectly benefited the Axis" and with bringing a halt to "all
financial and commercial activity on the part of persons or corporations in
the United States whose influence or activity was deemed inimicable to the
security of the Western Hemisphere."6 Armed with this weapon, the Treasury Department was in a position to coerce the Castillo government by dis-
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rupting Argentine-American trade.7 In addition to agencies under its direct
control, such as Foreign Funds, the Treasury was able to count on the
support of powerful allies within the foreign-policy establishment, most
notably Vice-President Henry A. Wallace and the Board of Economic
Warfare (BEW).
Established by an executive order on 17 December 1941, the BEW was
placed at once under Wallace's control. He appointed as its executive director Milo Perkins, an old friend and a dedicated promoter of the vice-president's purposes. BEW was divided into three sections: the Office of Imports,
which was charged with procuring strategic materials and with preclusive
buying all over the world, but especially in Latin America; the Office of Exports, which was to use its licensing power to prevent goods from reaching
Axis nations; and the Office of War Analysis, which selected targets of economic importance for strategic bombing. From its inception to its demise
in mid 1943, BEW under Wallace and Perkins was involved in one dispute
after another with the State Department. The conflict stemmed both from
bureaucratic competition and from philosophical differences on the part of
the leaders of the two organizations.8
Henry Wallace was, not surprisingly, bored and frustrated with the
vice-presidency. A man of vision, ambition, and action, Wallace longed to
play a major role in the struggle against international fascism and in the
formulation and implementation of postwar programs. Establishment of
BEW provided the vice-president with the bureaucratic vehicle he needed.
Wallace and Perkins were determined to use their agency so as to control
every aspect of overseas purchasing, from planning to financing. In reaching
for these powers, BEW threatened to encroach on the jurisdiction not only
of the State Department but of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
(RFC), under the powerful and conservative Texas financier Jesse Jones.
Since the beginning of the war, the State Department had infuriated BEW
officials by vetoing every BEW project that threatened to affect the international political situation, while Jones in RFC turned over the funds for
BEW programs only after he was convinced that they would not damage
private United States economic interests. To Wallace and Perkins, the State
Department was a bureaucratic tar baby; Jones was a penny-pinching reactionary; and BEW was the only agency capable of bringing efficiency
and speed to foreign procurement. In the same way that Donald Nelson and
the War Production Board controlled every aspect of domestic purchasing,
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BEW would dominate overseas procurement.9 After weeks of intense lobbying at the White House by Wallace and BEW officials, FDR issued an
executive order on 13 April 1942, authorizing BEW to represent the United
States in its dealings with the economic-warfare agencies of other nations, to
draw funds from RFC at will, and to dispatch its own agents to work
directly in foreign capitals.10
The leadership within BEW viewed the April 13 order as nothing less
than a carte blanche. As one interoffice memo put it, "The Presidential
directive gives Wallace and Perkins the whip hand and they will not hesitate to use it."11 On April 16 Perkins sent a terse directive to all government
agencies in Washington that were concerned with procurement, including
the RFC and the State Department. First, he called for a complete list of
outstanding contracts between the procurement agencies and any foreign
government or corporation; and second, he notified the agencies that thenceforth all purchasing and development work abroad was to be done solely
under the direction of BEW. Perkins believed that he and his agency were
embarked on a great crusade not only to win the war but to vindicate
Wallace and punish those bureaucratic entities that he believed had been
hindering BEW operations. "H. A. [Wallace] will stand or fall on the success of our efforts within the next six months," Perkins confided to a friend.
"If we do the job we must do, then the faith of the President in us and in
giving us our authority will be justified.... If we .flop, we are going to
catch hell, and with good reason."12 As to BEW's rivals within the foreignpolicy establishment: "I've been a pretty patient man because I'm more
interested in winning the war and getting something done than I am in the
matter of prestige and dignity. . . . But I hope Mr. Welles will realize that
there is a limit to my graciousness and when that is reached somebody will
have a fight on their hands."13 Second-level officials in BEW could not
contain their glee. A week before the presidential order, Sumner Welles
had sent a stiff note to all government agencies, advising them that all foreign missions would be responsible to the State Department. "So far as
BEW is concerned," wrote Jerry Greene to a fellow staff member, David
Hulburd, "the presidential order . . . turns the Welles letter into a badly
used pie plate. . . . Henceforth BEW can send whom it pleases where it
pleases and the missions will be responsible to Wallace and Perkins, not to
State."14
It quickly became obvious that in determining export and import pri-
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orities, Wallace and BEW officials would not hesitate to pursue political
objectives. In mid 1942, for example, Welles had convinced FDR to continue
United States oil shipments to Spain. The decision infuriated Wallace and
Perkins, because they placed Franco in the same class with Hitler and Mussolini and because they were sure that some of the oil was being transhipped
to Italy. In mid April, Wallace told Greene that no longer would BEW
have to acquiesce in such accommodationist decisions. The agency, he said,
was now in a position to take its case directly to the White House.16
State Department officials, whether disciples of Hull or followers of
Welles, viewed the mere existence of BEW as an encroachment on the department's prerogatives, and they worked assiduously throughout 1942 and 1943
to decrease BEW's power. From February through April 1942, Welles complained strenuously to FDR that Perkins was trying to take control of all
activities that were in any way related to foreign trade.16 According to Dean
Acheson, Hull regarded the April 13 executive order augmenting the authority of BEW as a "bitter and humiliating defeat," and the secretary moved
quickly to have it rescinded. To the chagrin of Wallace and Perkins, Hull
persuaded Roosevelt in early May to modify the order, causing BEW to
have to go through the State Department in negotiations with other Allied
agencies and subsuming BEW representatives abroad to the authority of the
local American embassy.17 The vice-president, an experienced infighter, had
no intention of remaining quiet while his bailiwick was being attacked.
When, in mid May, Wallace learned that Welles was working openly to
place additional limitations on the jurisdiction of BEW, he declared that he
and Perkins would "fight like hell."18
Further contributing to the row between BEW and the State Department was the latter's belief that Wallace was responsible for much of the
left-wing criticism that was being leveled at its "expedient" policy toward
Vichy France and, subsequently, toward Vichyite authorities in North Africa. Not only Hull but Berle, Welles, Acheson, and their subordinates
were all extremely sensitive in this regard. Indeed, it is safe to say that by
1943 Hull, Long, and Berle in particular had begun to believe that a conspiracy to discredit them was being formed by ultraliberal publications such
as the New Republic and the Nation and their hero, Henry Wallace. Thus,
any augmentation of BEW's power was seen as a victory for the hated
"left," for the "fellow traveller-type individual who has very little to recommend him except the rather slavish following of the Russian propaganda."19
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The struggle between the State Department and BEW was accentuated
by far-reaching differences between the leaderships of both agencies as to
the role the United States should play in world affairs, especially in Latin
America. Wallace, like Hull, was committed to free trade; but, unlike the
secretary of state, Wallace envisioned a postwar world that would be characterized by international economic interdependence, complete with a world
granary and other communal projects. Wallace was an outspoken champion
of those submerged peoples who were struggling for political democracy and
social justice. When pressed on the matter, however, he was not above sacrificing one for the other. When asked by Vice-President Sergio Osmefia of
the Philippines to give his opinion on the function of dictatorships in Latin
America, Wallace replied that as long as a great majority of the people in
a country did not know how to read and write, a dictatorship that rapidly
increased the percentage of literacy, improved nutrition, and increased industrialization might be justified as a preliminary to democracy. Moreover,
Wallace believed that the United States should use its economic and political
leverage to aid the exploited masses in their struggle for power and dignity
-even to the point of intervening in the affairs of other states.20 For example, he believed that Washington should require Latin American governments and/or businesses to guarantee certain wage levels and working conditions before it purchased products from them. Thus, for Wallace, the
Good Neighbor Policy consisted of a hemispheric campaign to obliterate
social injustice.21 Hull viewed Wallace's quest for a social revolution as a
threat to the war effort and to democratization in the postwar era.22 Welles
was convinced that the vice-president's approach to inter-American affairs
was no better than Hull's. One wanted to export political democracy; the
other, economic and social justice. To the undersecretary, Wallace's projected activities constituted unwarranted interference in the affairs of other
nations, and in Latin America they would revive charges of United States
imperialism. In turn, Wallace regarded State Department officials as a collection of reactionaries who openly supported the corrupt church-army-landowner alliance that dominated so many Latin American nations.23
Nonetheless, the Castillo government in Argentina was not originally
that offensive to Wallace and Perkins. They found the regime's autocratic
methods distasteful, but they were willing to walk the path of expediency.
In mid April, Wallace advised BEW officials that the agency would not
swing its economic club to bring Argentina and Chile into line with the rest
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of the Americas. Their neutrality was sufficiently unimportant to allow the
State Department to handle the matter.24 Only a month later, however,
Wallace and Perkins were calling for all-out economic war against Argentina. The reason for this turnabout was twofold. The leadership in BEW
quickly became convinced that the Castillo government was thoroughly and
permanently pro-Fascist and that Argentina was serving as headquarters for
all fifth-column activities in South America. By 1943 Wallace was announcing that Germany had decided that World War II was lost and that Germany was converting Argentina into a staging area for World War III.211
Perhaps even more importantly, Wallace and Perkins sensed the State Department's vulnerability in regard to its Argentine policy and decided to
exploit it. As a result, throughout the remainder of 1942 and 1943 the vicepresident warned Roosevelt that the Castillo regime and its pro-Axis policies
were very real threats to freedom and democracy in the hemisphere, and he
attempted to use State Department "appeasement" of Argentina to discredit
Hull, Welles, Berle, and Acheson within the foreign-policy establishment.26
From early 1942 through mid 1943 Wallace and BEW managed the
licensing system in a way that would compel the Castillo government to
prevent the use of its territory as a base for Axis subversive activities and
prevent the use of its financial, trade, and communication facilities by the
Axis.27 The tendency of the BEW mission to operate independently of the
American embassy28 produced bitter complaints from Ambassador Armour,
who railed against "duplication of effort" and charged that meddling by
BEW and the Treasury Department was subverting Welles's policy of selective
coercion.29 Perkins was able to fend off all threats to the mission's control
over licensing until November 1942, when the State Department persuaded
the White House to create the position of Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs, which was to act in Argentina for the BEW as well as for
other purchasing agencies. The counselor was to be directly responsible to
the ambassador.80 Despite, or perhaps because of, this loss of power, Wallace
and the board continued to support the Treasury Department's arguments
that Argentina was a Fascist pro-Axis nation and to advocate the strongest
possible measures of economic coercion.
Given its rivalry with the State Department, the Treasury felt by 1942
that it could no longer count on the embassy or the American Republic
Affairs Division for an adequate flow of information on the Argentine situation. Morgenthau and White, ever the resourceful bureaucrats, soon turned
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up alternative sources. The top echelon in Washington was kept abreast of
domestic political developments and Axis espionage activities in Argentina
not only by the Treasury Department's regular field agents but also by the
FBI and by Military Intelligence. Indeed, J. Edgar Hoover fully supported
Morgenthau's position and had offered the services of his agents to the
secretary personally .31
From February through May 1942 the Treasury Department utilized its
subsidiary agencies, its intragovernmental allies, and its intelligence sources
to achieve one primary goal-namely, the freezing of Argentine assets in the
United States. In the minds of Morgenthau and his associates, freezing
would serve a twofold purpose: it would force the Castillo government to
renounce neutralism and abandon its permissive policies toward financial
transactions beneficial to the Axis, and it would allow the Treasury Department and BEW to control commercial and financial relations between the
United States and Argentina.32 On May 7 White proposed that BEW
completely freeze $500 million in Argentine funds in the United States and
that this be accompanied by a general licensing system to be administered
by the board.33 On May 12, at the first meeting of a special interdepartmental committee on Argentina, the vice-president and BEW representatives
formally confronted the State Department delegation with a proposal relating to freezing. Admitting that certain actions had to be taken in order
to curb financial transactions in Argentina that were favorable to the Axis,
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs Dean Acheson and Duggan urged
the Treasury Department not to "walk in with a club to kill a mosquito."34
Freezing, which is generally regarded among diplomats as the most extreme
action that one nation can take against another short of war, would be
counterproductive in a number of ways. Besides alarming the entire hemisphere, it would strengthen the hand of the nationalists and "would reverse
the present perceptible trend against the Castillo government in Argentina."35 White was not persuaded. The time for negotiation and accommodation was past, he declared: "The broad and inescapable fact is that
Argentina is not cooperating, has no intention of cooperating, and is a hotbed
of intrigue against the United Nations."36
The first phase of what was to prove a continuing clash between the
State and Treasury departments over freezing reached an angry climax on
the thirteenth and fourteenth of May. Ignoring the State Department's
long-observed prerogative of vetoing action by other executive departments
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in the field of foreign affairs, Morgenthau decided to by-pass Hull and go
directly to the president. On the day after the interdepartmental committee
meeting, he called at the White House and asked FDR for an executive
order freezing Argentine assets. The secretary not only went to great lengths
during the interview to prove that Argentina was being used as a cloak by
the Axis for "important economic and financial operations" but also implied
that the State Department was doing a very poor job in preventing such
activities. Not only would a freeze forestall specific financial abuses; it
would also drive the Castillo regime into close collaboration with the United
States and show the rest of the Americas that Washington would not hesitate
to use its vast economic power to obtain solid hemispheric support for the
war effort.87
Morgenthau's initiative, which the Treasury Department did not attempt to conceal, infuriated both the Hull group and the Latin Americanists
and drove them into a momentary alliance. Hull detested Morgenthau for
his bureaucratic aggressiveness and his intimate relationship with FDR.38
The freezing proposal angered the Latin Americanists for the same reasons
that Acheson and Duggan had outlined in their meeting with White and
BEW officials-freezing would convince many Latin Americans that the
United States had reverted to using the big stick, and it would destroy any
chance that Washington had of achieving a peaceful reorientation of Argentine foreign policy. On May 14, Hull, Long, Welles, Bonsal, and other top
officials in the State Department gathered in the secretary's office, drafted a
comprehensive refutation of the Treasury Department's proposal, and sent it
to the White House. This note first tried to counter the absolutely negative
image that Morgenthau and White had painted of Argentina. Was not
Buenos Aires selling strategic materials to the Allies, allowing Allied ships
to utilize Argentine ports, and refusing to sell gas to Axis-controlled airlines? Moreover, a freeze would be particularly unfortunate at that time
because the policies pursued by the State Department since Rio were starting
to bear fruit. Not only public opinion, "carefully influenced by us," but "the
powerful military and naval elements in Argentina, which really maintain
the present Government in power, are beginning to question the desirability
of Argentina's present policy." Most importantly, a freezing order would
destroy the good will established throughout Latin America by a decade of
restraint. Freezing would confirm "the thesis which the Axis is subtly
promoting, namely, that the United States, under the guise of hemispheric
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solidarity is actually embarked upon a policy of ruthless econormc imperialism. "39
This broadside, the product of a momentarily unified State Department,
was sufficient to overwhelm the Treasury Department's arguments. Roosevelt effectively shelved the freezing proposal with a one-sentence scrawl on
Hull's memorandum: "C.H. Not in accord with Good Neighbor Policy.
F.D.R." 40
The president's decision to reject a general freeze, however, produced
only a momentary respite from Morgenthau and his men. In conjunction
with BEW, the Treasury Department had been conducting an independent
study of the complicity of the Argentine government in German espionage,
propaganda, and financial activities. At Hull's behest, FDR had told Morgenthau to halt the project and "keep out of there." 41 During the course of
a cabinet meeting on May 15, however, Morgenthau passed Wallace a note
saying that he had persuaded the president to allow the Treasury Department and BEW to continue their study. A week later, White notified
Breckinridge Long that the Treasury Department was preparing a special
mission to go to Argentina in order to conduct a complete investigation of
Axis activities there.42 Long replied that such an expedition would prove a
hindrance rather than a help in gathering intelligence in Argentina and that
the embassy would refuse to cooperate with any Treasury men who were
sent. "We are supposed to be equipped to get what you want," the assistant
secretary informed Morgenthau, "and if we are not equipped, we will get
equipped."43
Evidently afraid that White and Morgenthau might use the State Department's intransigence to elicit an executive order creating some new
bureaucratic apparatus, Hull on May 30 notified the Treasury that Merle
Cochran, a State Department economic officer who had wide experience in
Latin America, was being ordered to Argentina to gather complete information on "transactions which appear to involve directly or indirectly Axis
interests." 44 Moreover, Cochran was to carry with him explicit instructions
to Armour to make "strong representations" to the Argentine government
"regarding its failure to implement Resolution V passed by the Rio Conference by severing commercial and financial intercourse between Argentina
and the Tripartite Pact and its failure to take measures to eliminate financial
and commercial activities which are prejudicial to the welfare and security
of the American republics." 45
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The Cochran mission hardly mollified Morgenthau and his cohorts.
Convinced that the United States could never hope for real cooperation from
Argentina in any matter and sure that the Treasury Department possessed
a presidential mandate to uncover and uproot pro-Axis activity in that
nation, Treasury officials complained bitterly throughout 1943 that the State
Department was hoarding vital information. Moreover, the Treasury Department continued to criticize the State Department's handling of financial
control measures. White pronounced Cochran's mid-September report totally
insufficient. 46 "Many matters which the Treasury is interested in are not
even discussed in the report and those matters which were discussed only
cover the situation on a superficial basis."47 Not only was the report useless,
but the solutions suggested to deal with the few problems that were uncovered were insufficient as well. "The primary purpose of the State Department's letter," concluded White, "was an effort to 'make a record' in this
matter ."48
State Department officials bitterly resented the Treasury Department's
constant criticism and demands. Complained a young officer to Bonsal,
"Treasury thinks we have done a lousy job on Argentine freezing and tells
us so half a dozen times a day .... Don Hiss told me he is getting plenty
fed up . . . . I have been fed up a long time."49 Nevertheless, the State
Department's resistance to the Treasury's demands for a larger voice in
policy decisions and to its calls for an overall tougher line toward Argentina
gradually began to weaken. When White cut off Export-Import Bank loans
to all Argentine banks, the State Department could manage only a mild
protest. Subsequently the State Department approved for ad hoc freezing
forty-four of the sixty-four Argentine firms suspected of trading with the
Axis (from a list submitted to it by White in November) and agreed to cut
off credit facilities in the United States to Argentina's two largest financial
institutions, Banco de la Naci6n and Banco de la Provincia. The two banks,
one partly owned by the Argentine central government and the other by
the provincial administrations, had incurred the Treasury Department's
wrath by not cooperating with the United States in eliminating all transactions that would be of possible benefit to the Axis powers or their citizens.50
Hull's vigorous support of Welles's policy of selective pressure, which
was expressed in the State Department's note of May 15 to Roosevelt, was
a product of the bureaucratic stiuation. He and his colleagues viewed Argentina basically as a Fascist threat to the security of the hemisphere and viewed
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the Latin Americanists as a group of insubordinate usurpers, and these perspectives had changed not a bit. Indeed, in late June, Berle noted in his
diary that Hull and Welles were farther apart than ever. Welles had committed the sin of speaking and acting as if he were the secretary "when there
is an alive and very active Secretary of State in the immediate vicinity."
According to Berle, Hull had been working to "clear the decks." Welles in
turn retaliated by seeking to gain control of as much of the departmental
machinery as possible. 51
Throughout the fall and winter of 1942-43 the internationalists used
the pressure being applied by the Treasury Department and BEW to force
the Latin Americanists to acquiesce in a tougher policy toward Argentina.
Hull and Long argued not only that the evidence dredged up by White and
his associates constituted further proof of Argentine perfidy but that if the
State Department did not seize control and launch an all-out campaign to
obliterate Axis activity in Argentina and turn the Castillo government away
from nonalignment, then the Treasury Department would. Thus, although
the threat to the State Department's control over policy regarding Argentina
that emanated from the Treasury Department and BEW during 1943 had
the immediate effect of uniting the internationalists and the Latin Americanists behind a policy of selective coercion, in the long run the rivalry between
the two departments played into the hands of Long and Hull and paved the
way for the adoption of a hard line toward Argentina.
Meanwhile, domestic developments in Argentina during the latter half
of 1942 were contributing to the Latin Americanists' continuing loss of power
and prestige within the foreign-policy establishment. Intelligence reports in
August and September provided virtually irrefutable proof that Argentina
had become the center for Axis espionage and subversive activities in the
Western Hemisphere, and those reports intimated that members of the Castillo government were planning right-wing Putschen in neighboring nations.
At the beginning of World War II the staff of the German embassy
in Buenos Aires was overly large, numbering some one hundred and fifty
compared to a mere thirty for the British.52 This establishment became the
headquarters for efforts to propagandize Latin America into a pro-Axis
stance and to acquire all information that might profit Germany in the
struggle against the Allies. Funds to support espionage operations poured
into the embassy from trade balances in Argentina ( which, because of the
war, could not be liquidated through regular trade channels) and from
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various German bank accounts in Buenos Aires. Newspapers and pamphlets
spread Goebbels's blandishments throughout the interior of South America.
Espionage cells, reporting directly to the embassy, attempted to infiltrate and
influence various Latin American governments, pinpointed Allied ship
movements, and labored in numerous other ways to facilitate the Axis war
effort.53 Armour rather provocatively described the Nazi intelligence network as "a state within a state."54 President Castillo reacted to this threat,
not by ordering a roundup of all suspected German agents, but by issuing a
decree ordering that fifty-nine alleged Communists be interned or expelled
from the country.55 Shortly thereafter, the Casa Rosada declared that as part
of its continuing effort to protect the internal security of the republic, it was
imposing a complete ban on press reports of foreign-policy debates within
the Chamber of Deputies.56 To Armour's complaints that the government's
permissive policies were allowing "the criminal attacks of the Axis aggressors" to come ever closer to the Americas, Foreign Minister Ruiz Guifiazu
replied that there had been energetic official intervention by the very efficient
agency within the Ministry of the Interior that existed in order to stamp out
all anti-Argentine activity.57 When the United States embassy and the FBI
investigated the efficiency and objectives of the Interior Ministry's spy-prevention machinery, however, its appraisal differed sharply from that of the
Argentine Foreign Office. Reports on the Castillo regime's efforts to suppress Axis activity, which were submitted in September, indicated that such
an agency did exist but that it had received practically no funds. Moreover,
the police had devoted their efforts under the existing state of siege to
stamping out "Communist activities" and to restricting the operations of
"pro-democratic organizations."58 Axis agents continued to enter Argentina
both from other Latin American states and by way of Spanish vessels bound
from Europe. The study concluded that Argentine measures for implementing the Rio resolutions were negligible and observed that the attitude of the
Argentine government was still one of "intransigent isolationism."119
As long as the Castillo regime appeared to be guilty only of neutralism
and a tolerant attitude toward pro-Axis activities within Argentina, the
Latin Americanists could argue with some effect that a blatantly coercive
policy was inappropriate. If, on the other hand, advocates of a get-tough
policy could prove that Argentina was deliberately following a pro-Axis
policy and was itself a threat to the security of South America, then their
opponents' position would become untenable. In August 1942 the State
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Department received from an unusual source a series of reports that seemed
to substantiate the internationalists' view of Argentina and that facilitated
their drive to snatch control of hemispheric policy from Welles, Duggan,
and Bonsal. Very early in the war, intelligence agents of the Polish government-in-exile penetrated Argentina's ruling circle. From time to time
throughout 1942 and 1943 Anthony Biddle, Washington's ambassador to the
London-based Poles, received detailed reports on policy-planning within
both the Argentine government and the military establishment. In mid
August, Polish secret agents in Buenos Aires infiltrated a secret meeting of
the nation's highest-ranking military officers, who had come together to discuss Argentina's relationship to World War II. Those in attendance, all of
whom were integral nationalists, decided that in view of recent German
successes, Argentina should indicate as much sympathy for the Axis as possible. The collapse of the United Nations was to be followed by a campaign
in Argentina against Communists and Jews and by the establishment of a
thoroughly totalitarian system. At the end of the meeting, the generals and
colonels approved detailed plans for facilitating right-wing coups in neighboring states. The resulting governments would presumably favor creation
of an anti-United States bloc in South America.66
Meanwhile, dispatches from the United States embassy in Buenos Aires
and public utterances by officials of the Castillo government seemed to
indicate that Washington's policy of aiding its friends and punishing its
enemies was having no impact whatsoever. Charge d'Affaires Edward Reed
reported in late September that Castillo's determination to pursue a policy
of nonalignment was as firm as ever. Although aware that a majority of
Argentineans were pro-Allied, Castillo claimed that nearly everyone wanted
to avoid war. Thus, according to Reed, the president perceived that neutrality would please both the public in general and the integral nationalists
in particular.61
In a major policy speech given during Argentina's ninetieth anniversary
celebration, Ruiz Guiiiazu outlined the administration's foreign-policy objectives for the rest of the war. Argentina would adhere to a strict neutrality
as being the course most beneficial to the national interest. Aside from
shielding the country from a war in which it had no real stake, nonalignment was producing an autonomous economy, one dependent on no single
nation or bloc of countries. Proclaiming that every war had produced a
victor who was determined to establish economic hegemony over its part of
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the world, the foreign minister declared that it would be Argentina's aim
to establish closer relations with neighboring states in order to resist economic
and even political absorption in the postwar period.62
Then, in September, a ground swell of antigovernment sentiment
swept Argentina, and it seemed that the Latin Americanists' long-held faith
in the Argentine people was about to be rewarded. On September 5 the
Chamber of Deputies summoned the minister of the interior so that he
could explain why his department had not taken measures to suppress the
Nazi party in Argentina. Meanwhile, former President Justo, who was still
championing Allied-Argentine solidarity, stepped up his campaign against
the government and its "pro-Axis" policies. When Brazil entered the war
in late August, three hundred thousand Argentineans gathered under Justo's
leadership to express their support. The climax of the pro-Allied movement
came on September 28, when the Radical-controlled Chamber of Deputies
passed a resolution by a vote of 67 to 64, urging the administration to sever
all ties with the Axis nations. Castillo moved quickly to stem the pro-Allied
tide. Declaring that the conduct of foreign relations was a function of the
executive branch, he simply ignored Congress's severance resolution.63 At
his direction the Conservative-dominated Senate refused to endorse the
Chamber's rupture resolution. Turning to Justo himself, the president
launched a propaganda campaign to offset interventionist agitation, and he
neutralized the general's key supporters in both the army and the government. Of particular importance was the forced resignation of Gen. Juan
Tonazzi as minister of war. Castillo selected as his successor Gen. Pedro
Ramfrez, a prominent integral nationalist who quickly set about replacing
Justista army officers with men of his own philosophical bent.64 In November the Conservatives, who were supporters of Castillo's "prudent neutrality," swept the legislative elections, improving their advantage in the
Senate and coming within just a few seats of controlling the Chamber of
Deputies.611
Thus, it appeared by the fall of 1942 that all the carefully laid plans of
the Latin Americanists were going awry. As Castillo became more entrenched and as evidence of close ties between the government and Axis
interests in Argentina mounted, Welles realized not only that his policy of
selective pressure had failed but that he was not going to have another
chance. The Hull internationalists, aided by mounting public anger at Argentine nonalignment, a politically sensitive president, and two aggressive
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bureaucracies, were waiting in the wings, ready to mount a massive frontal
assault on Argentine neutrality. Frustration breeds aggression, and Welles
was no exception. Whether out of blind rage or a calculated attempt to retain
control of Latin American policy, the undersecretary, in a speech to the
National Foreign Trade Convention on October 8, delivered the most blistering attack yet made by an official of the Roosevelt administration on Argentina and her fell ow neutral, Chile :
I cannot believe that these two republics will continue long to permit their brothers and neighbors of the Americas, engaged as they
are in a life and death struggle to preserve the liberties and the
integrity of the New World, to be stabbed in the back by Axis
emissaries.66
Repeatedly alluding to unspecified evidence gathered by the FBI, he charged
Argentina with permitting activities that had led directly to the sinking of
Brazilian, Colombian, Mexican, Dominican, Argentine, Paraguayan, Uruguayan, and United States ships.
Opinion on both sides of the Rio Grande correctly viewed the Trade
Convention speech as marking the dawn of a new, get-tough era in Argentine-American relations. Foreign-affairs observers in the United States
greeted Welles's broadside with thunderous approval. After enduring a year
of global war, the American public was even less willing to tolerate independent action within the hemispheric community than it had been in the
a&ermath of Pearl Harbor. The Washington Post spoke for the vast majority
of Americans when it lauded Welles for his forthright stand:
The fact is that at a time when we are fighting for our very
lives and for the freedom of all nations ... the time has come for
every nation to stand up and be counted. They must choose whether
they are prepared directly or indirectly to aid the enemies of world
freedom or sever their relations with the forces of evil. 67
Predictably, the undersecretary's attack brought a storm of protest from
the Argentine Foreign Office. In an indignant note to the State Department,
Argentine officials maintained that the speech was nothing less than an
insult to their nation's honor. The information in the address was imprecise,
and the charges were vague. The Foreign Office informed Washington that
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not only was Mr. Welles's "crude" address slanderous; it had come at an
inopportune time for Argentine-American relations. According to Ruiz
Guifiazu, Buenos Aires had been planning to conclude with the United
States a definitive agreement on Argentina's role in the war; but given the
public's anger over the Trade Convention speech, this would he impossihle.68
This "definitive agreement" was a figment of the foreign minister's imagination. Welles's speech, however, allowed the Castillo government to act the
injured party and to take the propaganda offensive.
The Trade Convention address marked a turning point both in the
history of Argentine-American wartime relations and in the bureaucratic
struggle for control of policy formulation. Despite Welles's momentary
popularity in the United States, his public indictment of Argentina and
Chile marked the beginning of the end for the Latin Americanists' influence
within the foreign-policy establishment. By revealing to the world that the
Western Hemisphere was divided by two competing power centers with
widely divergent attitudes toward World War II, Welles destroyed the
fa~ade of unity which he long had argued was necessary in order to prevent
Axis penetration of the New World and to preserve the Good Neighbor
Policy. Because the address invoked one American state against another, it
undercut the principles upon which the Inter-American System was based,
principles which the Latin Americanists had said should form the basis not
only of the United States' relations with Latin America but of its relations
with the rest of the world as well. In short, the Trade Convention speech
constituted an admission by Welles that the United States could not produce
a basic reorientation of Argentine foreign policy within the context of the
Good Neighbor Policy. As the undersecretary's credibility evaporated, so
did his power. In the wake of the Trade Convention address, those who
continued to argue for a policy of restraint were left leaderless and were
increasingly unable to prevent themselves from being excluded from the
decision-making process.
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5
THE TRIUMPH OF THE INTERNATIONALISTS

As the first year of America's participation in World War II came to a
close and the second began, those within the Roosevelt foreign-policy establishment concerned with hemispheric affairs were as determined as ever to
secure a severance of all relations between Argentina and the Axis powers.
The discrediting of the Latin Americanists' policy of selective pressure and
the resulting loss of power permitted the internationalists to assume control
of policy and to initiate a totally new approach to Argentine-American
relations. With Sumner Welles taking a me-too position until his departure
in September 1943, and with Morgenthau and Wallace continually maneuvering to seize control of Argentine policy, Hull, Long, and their subordinates acted to weld the American republics into a solid anti-Argentine front,
tried to force a severance of telecommunications between Buenos Aires and
the Axis · capitals, and then launched an intensive propaganda campaign
designed to link Argentina with international fascism.
The State Department's decision to employ the techniques of overt
coercion was the product of a number of factors, not the least of which was
pressure from both within and without the formal foreign-policy establishment. Charges of appeasement, which were leveled at the State Department
by a number of newspapers and prominent figures in the United States
because of its dealings with the Petain and Badoglio governments, made
Hull and his associates particularly sensitive to Argentina's continuing ties
with Germany, Italy, and Japan and to the autocratic nature of Argentina's
wartime governments. Moreover, despite the fact that 1943 witnessed a
turning of the tide in favor of the Allies in virtually every theater of war,
the American public was even less willing than it had been in 1942 to tolerate
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nonalignment by any American state. Adding to pressure on the State
Department to adopt a get-tough policy was its bureaucratic rivalry with the
Treasury Department and BEW. Morgenthau, White, Wallace, and Perkins
continued to hammer away at the freezing issue and to go over Hull's head
to the White House at every opportunity. No less important was the internationalists' determination to vindicate the position they had taken in the
wake of the Rio Conference. They were determined to prove that isolation
and coercion were the only ways to deal with nations who dared to "dally
with evil."
Finally, the State Department's hard line stemmed from disappointed
hopes associated with the revolution of June 1943. When a coalition of army
officers overthrew the Castillo government, both the American people and
administration officials mistakenly assumed that the cause of the revolt was
a desire to align Argentina with the Allies. When the new regime failed to
sever ties with the Axis, disillusionment in the United States caused a backlash that strained Argentine-American relations to the breaking point.
Prior to Welles's fateful Trade Convention speech, the State Department, under the direction of the Latin Americanists, had attempted to
achieve a realignment of Argentine foreign policy within the context of
hemispheric solidarity. After the undersecretary's blast, however, Washington abandoned the principle of inter-American unity and labored to forge
the other American republics into an anti-Argentine phalanx that would, by
creating within Argentina a sense of isolation and guilt, force the Castillo
government to adopt an active pro-Allied stance. Hull and the internationalists operated on the assumption that if they could Pan-Americanize censorship of Argentina, they could immeasurably increase pressure on Buenos
Aires for a rupture and at the same time neutralize charges of North American imperialism. Welles, who by this time had completely abandoned his
Rio philosophy, joined in the drive to pit one American republic against
another.
Hoping to camouflage Washington's attempts to discredit the Castillo
government, the State Department sought to work through the various
inter-American bodies created at Rio to coordinate the defense establishments
and mobilize the resources of the hemisphere. Of these bodies, the most
useful proved to be the Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense of the Hemisphere (the Montevideo Committee). Established at the
Rio Conference in January 1942 to prevent clandestine Axis operations in
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the Western Hemisphere, the committee was first to set forth general antiespionage guidelines for the entire hemisphere and was then to evaluate the
threat of Axis subversion in each republic, study the countermeasures being
taken, and make specific recommendations to the government in question.
Representatives of the seven member nations-the United States, Mexico,
Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Venezuela, and Uruguay-were not to act as agents
of their home governments but were to work for the best interests of the
hemisphere as a whole.1
From the outset, the Argentineans and the Americans rejected the
Burkean concept underlying the committee. Privately denouncing the body
as a tool of United States imperialism, the Argentine member notified the
other representatives that any resolution passed would be binding only when
ratified by the home government of each republic.2 Meanwhile, the American representative, Carl B. Spaeth, attempted to use the committee to
stimulate anti-Argentineanism throughout the hemisphere, primarily by persuading it to brand Argentina as a haven for Nazis and as a threat to the
peace and safety of the hemisphere.3
Spaeth's approach to inter-American affairs actually went beyond Hull's
and represented an amalgam of the views of the secretary of state and
Henry Wallace. That Spaeth should take this approach was hardly surprising, since he had been head of the Western Hemisphere Division of BEW
before coming to the State Department. The United States, he believed,
should act vigorously to foster political democracy and social justice south
of the Rio Grande. During a conversation with Berle in August 1943, Spaeth
confessed that the tendency on the part of some in the Roosevelt administration, who were ostensibly "New Dealers," to cooperate with "old dealers"
in various Latin American countries was quite distressing to him. It was
apparent, he said, that the leadership in the State Department was doing
everything possible through loans and other forms of aid to maintain in
power those who were in positions of special privilege. Whatever his misgivings about the conservatism of the Roosevelt foreign-policy establishment,
however, Spaeth sympathized thoroughly with the anti-Argentine views of
the Hull internationalists. Determined to eradicate every vestige of Axis
influence in the Western Hemisphere, he perceived Buenos Aires to be
nothing less than an active ally of the Third Reich.4 To charges by some
of the Latin Americans that his vigorous efforts to compel the Latin coun-
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tries to adopt uniform legislation against Axis activities threatened their
national sovereignties, he replied, "Eyewash."5
In late 1942 Spaeth began pressing his colleagues on the committee to
accept the results of a study of German, Japanese, and Italian spying efforts
in South America, which had been conducted by the United States, and to
publish it as their own. It was, not surprisingly, a scathing indictment of the
Castillo government and its policies. The document that Spaeth attempted
to foist upon the Montevideo Committee proved, among other things, that
the German high command had transformed Argentina into headquarters
for its South American spy network. At least four groups of espionage
agents, many of whom were aides to the military attaches of the German
embassy in Buenos Aires, were gathering information and transmitting it to
Berlin. Included in these communiques were reports on arrivals and departures of Allied merchantmen and the movements of British and United
States fleets, data on the location and production levels of Allied armament
and munition industries in South America, and details of hemispheric arrangements for defense of the Panama Canal and the Brazilian coastline.
Attached to Spaeth's incriminating report were appendices naming members
of the four Axis cells and actual copies of messages sent by these cells to
Germany by way of illegal radio transmitters. 6 As soon as the bill of particulars was completed, Spaeth began to lay the groundwork for publication
by making the espionage memo available to the more "dependable" members of the committee.7 Arguing that hemispheric defense required that all
American states be made aware of German espionage and subversion, the
American delegate managed to convince the chairman of the body, Uruguay's foreign minister Alberto Guani, that he should support eventual
publication. Guani strongly suggested, however, that the committee first
notify Buenos Aires and then allow the Castillo regime ample time to rectify
the situation. Hull protested that making the report available to Argentina
would cause Axis agents to take cover and would give the Castillo government an excuse for inactivity. Nonetheless, he subsequently agreed in the
name of "hemispheric cooperation" first to show the memorandum to Buenos Aires and to warn that publication was being considered.8 At the same
hour that Armour called on the Argentine Foreign Office to deliver the text
of the espionage report, Welles in Washington summoned Espil to the State
Department. After handing the ambassador a copy of the memorandum,
the undersecretary launched into a diatribe against Argentine neutrality
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during which he accused the Castillo government of only paying lip service
to the ideal of inter-American solidarity and, by permitting German spy
rings to flourish in Argentina, of endangering the security of the entire
hemisphere. Espil implored him not to publish the document lest it provoke
widespread anti-Argentine feeling in the United States and throughout Latin
America and thus end all chance for reconciliation and reunification. Welles
replied somewhat self-righteously that Argentina had only herself to blame
and that the United States reserved the right to take whatever action it
deemed necessary if the Castillo government's counterespionage efforts
proved to be insufficient.9
Ironically, the chief advocate of immediate publication during succeeding weeks was Sumner Welles. As part of a continuing effort to retain
some degree of influence in the making of hemispheric policy, the undersecretary had adopted an ultra-hard-line posture toward Argentina and now
urged that the report be released either by the Montevideo Committee or, if
it refused, unilaterally by the State Department. Publication, he proclaimed,
could only strengthen the hand of "friendly" elements in Argentina.rn To
Welles's chagrin, his former supporters joined with his traditional enemies
within the State Department in quashing his motion for immediate release.
From Buenos Aires, Ambassador Armour pleaded for enough of a delay to
allow the increasingly cooperative Argentine authorities to move against the
network of German spies. The bureaucratic threat from the Treasury
Department had driven Hull into a momentary alliance with the Latin
Americanists in mid 1942; now he joined with them once again, this time
to block Welles's bid to regain control of Argentine policy. Agreeing with
Armour that Washington appeared to have found a vulnerable spot and
should exploit it to the fullest, Hull flatly rejected the undersecretary's
suggestion.11
By December 1942 the threat of publication appeared to be bearing fruit.
Early in the month the Castillo government formally charged as spies six
alleged Nazi agents, one of whom was the German naval attache, Captain
Dietrich Niebhur. Niebhur was named as chief of the entire Axis espionage
system in Argentina. In addition, the minister of the interior in January
1943 ordered the governors of the fourteen Argentine provinces to preempt
any activity that might be detrimental to the individual or collective security
of the American republics.12
The goal of American policy-makers in late 1942 and early 1943, how-
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ever, was a rupture of all relations between Argentina and the Axis, not the
perfection of Argentine neutrality. Thus, the Castillo government's counterespionage and antisubversion activities, no matter how effective, proved incapable of halting publication of the report. With Buenos Aires as committed
as ever to nonalignment, the State Department gave Spaeth the go-ahead on
21 January 1943 to present the espionage memorandum to the Montevideo
Committee with a recommendation for its immediate publication. The
Argentine representative protested vigorously, arguing in vain that the memo
involved United States-Argentine relations only, that Buenos Aires was
taking vigorous action to prevent Axis abuse of Argentine neutrality, and
that the present investigation would be compromised by release of the document. His objections were all to no avail, however, for the remaining five
members voted to adopt Brazil's resolution in favor of immediate promulgation.13 As a result, during the first week in February, the committee's
"findings" were broadcast throughout the Americas by means of United
States shortwave radio stations. During the days that followed, American
radio stations in Uruguay beamed anti-Argentine comments, which had
been extracted from various Latin newspapers by the OCIAA, throughout
Argentina.14
Though it had been deprived of its leadership and its privileged access
to the White House, the Latin American establishment continued to function within the State Department and to oppose the hard-line policies initiated by the internationalists. Duggan, Bonsal, and lower-level officials in
the American Republic Affairs Division argued throughout late 1942 and
1943 that Argentine neutrality posed no real threat to the Allied war effort
and that continued hemispheric unity was the most effective weapon that
could be employed against Axis penetration of the New World. Warning
that overt coercion and public attacks on the Castillo regime would simply
arouse nationalism and latent anti-Americanism in Argentina and throughout Latin America, they held that the only positive leverage the United
States could exert on Buenos Aires was by withholding arms aid and by
winning the war in Europe.15 Bonsal had argued long and hard against
publication of the espionage memorandum, and both he and Duggan had
objected to Spaeth's repeated suggestions that Argentina be ejected from the
Montevideo Committee.16 Nothing better illustrates the Latin Americanists'
ongoing opposition to the get-tough policies and their inability to control
policy in general, however, than an intradepartmental dispute involving

84

The Triumph of the Internationalists
vVashington's attempts to sever cable communications between Buenos Aires
and the Axis capitals during late 1942 and early 1943.
In the fall of 1942 Hull and Long decided that continued telecommunications between Argentina and the Axis nations represented both a flagrant
breach of the Rio resolutions and a major threat to the Allied war effort and
that, as such, they had to cease. Transatlantic wireless service from Argentina to Europe was provided by Transradio International Argentina, a firm
jointly owned by British, American, and Argentinean companies. The
dominant partner was Great Britain. Cable and Wireless Ltd., the British
holding company involved, controlled 65 percent of the stock. While Argentineans owned 65 percent of the bonds issued by the consortium, they controlled only 16 percent of the stock. The remainder of the stock was held
by tl1e Radio Corporation of America. Although Transradio operated by
virtue of a direct grant of authority from the Argentine national government, Washington went to the British, not to the Argentine Foreign Office,
in its campaign to interdict communications between Buenos Aires and
occupied Europe.17 Late in the summer of 1942 Breckinridge Long began
pressuring Whitehall to have Transradio cut its circuits to the Axis capitals
and fire its "pro-Axis" employees. Fearful of alienating both Cable and
Wireless Ltd. and the Castillo government, the British Foreign Office resisted Long's blandishments, arguing that if Transradio were closed down,
purely Axis-controlled communications companies would step into the
void.18 Nevertheless, Washington continued to harangue the British on the
dangers of permitting radio communications between Buenos Aires and
Europe. After the RCA representative on Transradio's board of directors
voted for severance in October, the British Foreign Office capitulated and
ordered Cable and Wireless Ltd. to vote similarly. Whitehall insisted, however, that the Castillo government be advised of the company's decision well
before service was interrupted, since Transradio was operating under a
federal charter and providing an essential service to the country.19
At this point the Latin Americanists, led by Bonsal, entered the fray and
vigorously supported Whitehall's demand for prior notification. Ordering
the consortium to close its European circuits and to fire certain employees
labeled by the United States as undesirables without first consulting the
Casa Rosada would be worse than pointless. Unilateral action by Transradio
would most likely produce nationalization, and it would drive the Castillo
government and the Argentine people into an anti-United States coalition.
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"The Argentine Government together with a great many Argentineans,
many of them good friends of ours will be highly indignant that a foreign
company operating in Argentina should presume to dictate to the Argentine
Government about what it should do in carrying out its international commitment,"20 argued the chief of the Latin American desk in a memo to the
secretary. Hull and Long disagreed. The internationalists asserted that because the Castillo government would not voluntarily sever telecommunications with the Axis, as provided in the Rio resolutions, the Allies would
have to present Buenos Aires with a fait accompli. In short, if the Argentine
government refused to act in its own best interest and that of the hemisphere,
the United States would have to act for it. Accordingly, Hull overruled the
British and the American Republic Affairs Division of the State Department (ARA), and Long ordered the board of Transradio to shut down its
European operations immediately.21
Before the British-dominated consortium could decide whether to comply with the secretary's demand or to put forth additional arguments, the
Argentineans moved to nip the threat to their transatlantic lines of communication in the bud. On October 9, a spokesman for the Casa Rosada
announced that government interveners were being placed in all telecommunications companies operating in Argentina so as to prevent transmission of
information prejudicial to the Argentine national interest and detrimental
to those American republics involved in the war. When the Castillo regime
announced a month later that it would in the immediate future issue an
edict prohibiting either diplomatic missions or private firms from sending
coded messages to points outside the Western Hemisphere, it appeared that
Washington's threats had paid off.22
After prominent Argentine nationalists denounced the proposed decree
as prejudicial to Argentine neutrality and derided Castillo for truckling
to Allied demands, the Casa Rosada began to reconsider its position.
To the enragement of the internationalists, the long-awaited proclamation
regarding telecommunications, published on December 4, suspended international exchange of radiograms in code but exempted one hundred words
per day for each embassy and consulate. The Argentine undersecretary for
foreign affairs explained that to forbid all privileged communication would
be a violation of international law and would almost surely lead to a break
in relations with Germany, Italy, and Japan.23
Although they had given up hope of cutting all radio communications
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between Argentina and occupied Europe, the internationalists still believed
that they could act through Transradio to deny code facilities to the Axis.
Over the repeated and strenuous objections of the Latin Americanists, the
State Department compelled Transradio to notify the Argentine Foreign
Office on 19 January 1943 that it intended to deny code facilities to the Axis
with or without the government's permission.24 Issuing a press release that
proclaimed that Transradio International was an Argentine company providing a vital service to the Argentine people and hence could not accept
orders from any foreign government, the Castillo regime once again intervened in the cable matter. At this juncture, intervention was designed to
ensure that the German and Italian missions had access to Transradio's
facilities rather than to prevent transmissions detrimental to the Allied war
effort. As the Latin Americanists had predicted, Washington's tactics not
only failed to interdict Argentine-Axis telecommunications but enabled the
Casa Rosada to denounce the United States for its interventionist tactics.

One of the most prominent organizational characteristics exhibited by
the internationalists was a tendency to view all developments in Argentina
through the prism of World War II. Every shift in the political arena,
every public disturbance, and each new edict handed down by the Castillo
government were interpreted as additional manifestations of the internal
struggle that was supposedly raging between Argentine interventionists and
neutralists. Consequently, when the Castillo regime was overthrown by a
military junta in 1943, the internationalists and most members of the American press, who shared the Hull group's preoccupation with World War II,
assumed that the new regime intended to sever all ties with the Axis nations,
to join wholeheartedly with the Allies, and to inaugurate a new era of
democracy. Norman Armour, who hoped for a number of reasons that the
new regime would be all that the Castillo government was not, and Sumner
Welles, who convinced himself that the coup would pave the way for a
restoration of hemispheric solidarity and of his control over Latin American
policy, also labored under this misapprehension. When it became apparent
that the new government in Buenos Aires was the product of a number of
forces and events, most of them unrelated to Argentina's posture toward the
war, that it intended to preserve Argentine neutrality, and that the junta
was determined to govern without benefit of Congress or constitution, the
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disappointed and disgusted internationalists, joined by the bulk of the American people, became more determined than ever to force Argentina into a
pro-Allied stance. Moreover, as a result of their unfulfilled expectations in
connection with the June revolution, many Americans both inside and outside the State Department became convinced that Argentina would assume
the proper attitude in foreign-policy matters only after a "fundamental
upheaval" in domestic politics and a return to democratic procedures. Consequently, following a brief period of grace immediately after the revolution,
the State Department resumed its get-tough policy with the explicit objective
of forcing Argentina to abandon neutrality and with the implicit goal of
returning that nation to free elections and constitutional government. In the
process of implementing this new, stridently hard-line approach, American
policy-makers developed a disturbingly familiar justification for coercion
and, in so doing, threw into sharp relief their assumptions about the
relationship between foreign policy and domestic affairs.

By the spring of 1943 Ramon Castillo had managed, despite his success
in keeping Argentina out of World War II, to alienate the one faction that
was absolutely necessary to his continued presence in office-the military. In
April 1943 Castillo made it clear that while he did not intend to stand
for reelection in 1944, he would hand-pick his successor and do whatever was
necessary to ensure his election. The heir apparent was Senator Robustiano
Patr6n Costas, who was a sugar magnate, a prominent figure in the National
Democratic party, and provisional president of the Senate.25 Since Patr6n
Costas had no national following to speak of, it was obvious to most Argentineans that he, like virtually every other political candidate in Argentina
after 1930, would succeed to office through fraud.
The army was determined for a variety of reasons to prevent another
illegal election, even if it had to assume direct control of the central government. Many were simply growing weary of what they believed to be the
manipulation of the armed forces by corrupt politicians. Integral nationalists
within the officer corps were convinced that the two dominant political
parties were thoroughly corrupt, that representative democracy was a failure,
and that it was the army's duty to seize control of Argentina and to restore
order and discipline to national life. These individuals also hoped that by
establishing a military government, they could purge Argentina of all for-
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eign (British and American) influences. A pro-Allied liberal-nationalist
faction, which drew its strength primarily from the navy, favored the ouster
of Castillo because of his refusal to align Argentina with Great Britain and
because of his toleration of Axis espionage activities within the republic. 26
A third, apolitical group agreed to participate in a coup purely for the good
of the military. Before 1941 the Argentine military was probably the best
equipped and most formidable force in South America, but with massive
lend-lease aid to Brazil, the balance of military power in South America had
shifted in favor of Argentina's northern neighbor. Thus, a large number of
officers were clamoring for Castillo's removal because he had not secured
the hardware necessary to maintain Argentine military superiority on the
continent. By far the strongest of the components in the anti-Castillo coalition were the integral nationalists, who were led by a group of political
opportunists including Generals Pedro Ramfrez and Edelmiro Farrell and
Colonels Enrique Gonzalez and Juan Peron. These fascistoid ( to borrow a
term from historian Marvin Goldwert) officers hoped to use the widespread
discontent within the military and Castillo's political vulnerability in order
to further their own ambitions.27
During the first months of 1943, dissatisfaction with Castillo's policies
and the desire among integral nationalists to "revitalize" Argentina spawned
a mysterious military organization called the GOU (variously interpreted as
Grupo Obra de Unificaci6n; Gobierno, Orden, Union; and Grupo de Officiales Unidos). This secret clique within the officer corps was united only
in its determination to overthrow the existing regime and then install a
military junta. 28 Shortly after its founding, the charter members of the
GOU, led by Gonzalez and Peron, initiated a drive to broaden the base of
the anti-Castillo movement both by adding new converts from within the
military and by establishing an alliance with the Radical party. Warning of
the need to guard against a Communist conspiracy, playing upon fear of
involvement in the war, appealing to the desire to resist external pressure,
and utilizing a variety of other themes, the GOU attracted disciples in
barracks throughout Argentina. Meanwhile, in the civilian sphere, the antiCastillo officers openly courted the Radical party, which readily agreed that
Castillo was impossible, pronounced Patron Costas totally unacceptable,
and hinted broadly that they would support Gen. Pedro Ramfrez for the
presidency .29
The confusion surrounding the coup of June 5-7, particularly in regard
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to who was to head the new government, reflected the lack of consensus on
policy within the GOU. General Ramfrez, the Radicals' choice, was minister
of war at the time of the coup and thus, in terms of political experience and
continuity, was the logical figure to succeed Castillo in the Casa Rosada.
Moreover, his leadership traits and professional conduct had won him respect throughout the army. Pro-Allied liberals within the GOU distrusted
Ramfrez, however, because they thought that he was too closely identified
with the ultranationalists. This group's first choice to head the new government was Gen. Arturo Rawson, commander of the huge Campo de Mayo
military base and the man who was slated to lead the "revolutionary" troops
into the capital on the appointed day. Because of the GOU's internal divisions and the overriding need to preserve unity within the anti-Castillo
coalition, the officers who were planning the coup had made no definitive
decision as to who was to head the new government even as the troops at
the Campo de Mayo boarded their trucks for the assault on the seat of
government.
As a result of this confusion the coup perpetrated on the morning of
June 4 produced two governments in three days. As Rawson's column
approached, President Castillo fled the Casa Rosada for the safety of a
minesweeper situated in the Rio de la Plata. Impressed with the apparent
unity of the military and the almost complete public apathy at his ouster,
Castillo resigned without a murmur on the fifth. Meanwhile the ambitious
Rawson had taken advantage of his position as commander of the revolutionary forces and had proclaimed himself president. His subsequent announcement that he intended to sever all ties between Argentina and the
Axis nations ensured that his administration would be brief. On June 7 the
GOU, the majority of whose members were either pro-Axis or neutralist,
forced Rawson to step down in favor of former Minister of War Ramfrez.80
He in turn was succeeded as head of the War Ministry by Edelmiro Farrell;
and Juan Peron, destined to become Argentina's next man on horseback,
became undersecretary. 31 During the nine months that followed, Ramfrez
attempted to retain control of a military-political coalition whose only common denominator was opposition to Castillo. All the while the ambitious
officers around him, most notably the young undersecretary of war, maneuvered to establish a power base that would perhaps permit one of them to
seize control of the government if Ramfrez should falter. 82
Reports from the American embassy in Buenos Aires on both phases of
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the revolution correctly identified the Argentine military as the driving force
behind the coup but mistakenly assumed that the sole motive of the officers
involved was to align Argentina with the Allies and thereby to acquire the
massive lend-lease aid necessary for Argentina to reestablish its military
preponderance in southern South America.33 On June 1 Armour reported
that rumors were rampant in Buenos Aires that a group of activist officers
headed by General Ram1rez was plotting revolution because of their concern over Argentina's inability to obtain enough armaments. Conscious of
the shifting balance of power in South America, this group, according to the
ambassador, had continually urged solidarity with Britain and the United
States in order that Argentina might become eligible for lend-lease.34 In the
wake of the general's pronouncement that henceforth Argentina would live
up to all of her international obligations, Armour predicted that the revolution, though carried out by the army, not only would bring about a basic
realignment in foreign policy but would usher in a new era of democracy
in the domestic political arena as well.311 That the GOU replaced Rawson
with Ramrrez on the ninth in no way altered the embassy's estimation of
the rationale or objectives behind the coup. Pronouncing Ramfrez a political
opportunist whose views differed only slightly from those of Rawson, Jack
Camp, one of Armour's lieutenants, summed up both revolutions as "the
work primarily of a group of 18 colonels who call their organization 'GOU'
and who were dissatisfied with the corruption and fraud in the Argentine
Government and wished Argentina to take its place in the American community of nations by breaking relations."36
Despite these optimistic predictions, Hull made a half-hearted attempt
to use the threat of nonrecognition in order to obtain specific assurances
from Buenos Aires. Both after the coup of June 5 and the Ramfrez succession on June 7, the ambassadors of the various American republics entered
into consultations looking toward recognition of the new governments. The
overwhelming sentiment among the Latin American envoys was for immediate de facto recognition. 37 When Armour, acting at Hull's behest, pressed
for a delay in order to give first Rawson and then Ramfrez a chance to
outline the specific steps they planned to take in order to align Argentina
with the Allies, the Latin diplomatic corps accused Washington of attempting to use recognition to bargain for a rupture, and they refused to wait
more than twenty-four hours before establishing relations with the new
regime.88 To the State Department, the foreign-policy statements of both of
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the soldier-presidents were disturbingly vague. Rawson proclaimed that he
did not intend to continue Castillo's "incomprehensible" policy of isolation,
but he warned the United States not to expect extreme measures right away.
On the ninth, Ramfrez informed the head of the United States Air Mission
in Argentina that his government might break with the Axis if there were
a specific provocative act and if there were no hint of pressure from Washington.30 Chile, Bolivia, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay were more than
satisfied with these pledges, however, and indicated that they would extend
recognition, with or without the United States. In view of the intention of
certain American republics to proceed with recognition and in view of the
embassy's continuing reassurances, Hull authorized the establishment of
diplomatic relations with the Rawson government on the sixth and with the
Ramfrez regime on the ninth.
In spite of the fact that Ramfrez clung steadfastly to neutrality, refused
to convene Congress, and suppressed domestic dissent, Armour continued
throughout June and July to send glowing reports to Washington about the
new administration and to plead for a conciliatory policy.40 As late as July
13, Armour, no doubt reflecting the views of his contacts in the Radical
party, cabled Hull that "Ramfrez' popular strength is growing and it is not
illogical that he wants to become the legally elected President. . . . With
proper use of the press, the President can break relations and return Argentina to democracy without precipitating internal conflict." Moreover, compared to Castillo, Ramfrez was a rabid reformer: "The present movement
did dislodge the Conservatives from their entrenched position ... and are
[sic] taking measures to clear up all the graft and corruption of the old
regime." He urged Washington to provide Buenos Aires with positive incentives in the form of aircraft parts and increased allocation of petroleum.41
With proper support from the United States, Ramfrez would unite with the
Radicals behind a program of national union, and a "new Argentina" would
emerge, one that would be ready to live up to its defensive commitments
and to play a constructive role in postwar planning.42
The American embassy's optimism and its erroneous evaluations
stemmed from faulty intelligence, a natural tendency to identify with the
host country,4 3 continuing ties with the Radicals, and pressure from two
other American organizations operating in Buenos Aires. Although the
State Department had moved in November 1942 to subordinate to the ambassador the representatives of the Board of Economic Warfare, the Treasury
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Department, and other agencies concerned with measures of economic warfare, its efforts had been only partially successful. Throughout the remainder
of 1942 and 1943 Armour repeatedly warned Y.l ashington that BEW operatives in particular were making policy on their own, not only in the
economic sphere but in the political arena as well. BEW's absorption by the
newly created Foreign Economic Administration (PEA) in July 1943 augmented rather than lessened the pressures on Armour and his staff.
By mid 1943 the struggle for control of foreign economic policy within
the federal government was becoming openly rancorous and, as a result, increasingly embarrassing to the administration. While Wallace's and BEW's
relationships with the State Department grew more and more strained
during the year following Roosevelt's executive order of April 1942, their
feud was relatively mild compared to the one that developed between BEW
and RFC. Wallace and Perkins viewed Jesse Jones as Wall Street's preeminent representative within the administration. His economic nationalism
and financial elitism were, they believed, not only hindering the war effort
but laying the groundwork for a third world conflict. Jones, in turn, dismissed Wallace as a wild-eyed radical who, if left to his own devices, would
destroy capitalism in the United States and facilitate Communist expansion
abroad. In the spring of 1943, BEW, in an attempt to seize control of the
financial apparatus through which RFC funded overseas procurement, began
to press the White House to transfer supervision of the United States Commercial Corporation from Jones to Wallace. Jones retaliated by attacking
Wallace through the press and through his conservative allies in the Senate.
When the vice-president issued a public statement intimating that Jones
cared more about the fiscal integrity of RFC than about winning the war,
Roosevelt decided to call a halt to the confrontation.44
Not surprisingly, the president solved the problem by creating a new
agency, the Foreign Economic Administration, to which he allocated many
of the duties pertaining to economic warfare that had previously been performed by the State Department, BEW, and RFC.411 To head this new
bureaucracy, Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins, whose advice on personnel
matters was crucial, chose Leo Crowley, a Wisconsin Democrat who had
come to Washington in 1934 as chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation.46 In Roosevelt's and Hopkins's eyes, Crowley was particularly
well suited for his new post. Identified with none of the major factions then
contending for control of foreign policy, Crowley was also a prominent
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Catholic layman who could and did serve as liaison man with the Irish
Catholics during the 1944 campaign.47 Other members of the foreign-policy
establishment were not as enthusiastic. Both Wallace, who was of course
prejudiced against Crowley because of the demise of BEW, and the Latin
Americanists were distressed by Crowley's appointment of the president and
executive vice-president of the United Fruit Company as chief consultants
to PEA. Moreover, virtually everyone agreed that Crowley was a bureaucratic entrepreneur whose sole guide in the formulation of policy was the
principle of organizational aggrandizement.48
Shortly after his confirmation, Crowley warned Dean Acheson in connection with the Argentine situation that his agency had "clear authority
from the Congress to act in all matters relating to economic warfare."49 It
became increasingly obvious during 1943 that first BEW and then PEA
believed that the political situation in Argentina was having a decisive
impact on their efforts to deny the Axis financial facilities, markets, and
other economic assets in the New World and that the two agencies were
determined to wrest control of United States economic policy from the
American embassy in Buenos Aires. 50 Although BEW had advocated a
hard line toward the Castillo government throughout 1942 and had used the
certificates of necessity in order to force a basic reorientation in Argentine
foreign policy, it, like the regular staff of the American embassy, interpreted
Ramfrez's accession to office as a prelude to the assumption by Argentina of
an actively pro-Allied policy. Immediately after the coup, BEW officials
began arranging for delivery of power and utility equipment and other vital
industrial goods. 51 On June 10, Hector Lazo, a top field agent for BEW
and subsequently for FEA, arrived in Buenos Aires and began to administer
the new policy with a degree of vigor and independence that was alarming
to the American embassy. Armour reacted to what he considered an open
challenge to his authority first by having the State Department demand that
BEW-FEA submit to him52 and then by engineering an Argentine-American rapprochement in hopes of stealing the rival agency's thunder.
The high expectations and optimistic predictions contained in the
ambassador's cables were echoed by newspaper editors across the country
during the days immediately following the coup.53 As previously noted,
many moderate-to-liberal journals had assumed throughout the period after
the Rio Conference that the great mass of Argentineans were friendly
toward the United States and would support Argentine alignment with the
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Allies but that their desires were being suppressed by an autocratic, pro-Axis
dictatorship. Just as had Armour and his colleagues, foreign-policy observers
in the United States interpreted the June revolution as a manifestation of
the people's will and as a prelude to democracy at home and solidarity with
the Allies abroad. The New York Times was cautious but hopeful: "We
feel sure, as we have always done, that the masses of the Argentines are
friendly to this country and to the cause of the United Nations. This friendship may now have greater opportunity to express itself."54 Typifying the
false logic that entrapped so many other Americans, the St. Louis PostDispatch proclaimed that since Castillo had been autocratic and pro-Axis,
the men who had overthrown this malefactor must be devoted to democracy
and committed to the Allied cause. Arguing that "a good 90% of the
country's population was ... opposed to his [Castillo's] policy of prudence
-a policy which meant theoretical neutrality as far as the war was concerned, a cold shoulder to the Pan-American solidarity agreement of Rio de
Janeiro, and a foothold for the Axis propaganda and espionage network," 55
the Post-Dispatch assured its readers that the recent changing of the guard
at the Casa Rosada meant compliance with the Rio resolutions and a break
with the Axis.
Despite a steady flow of favorable reports from the embassy, the events
that transpired in the fortnight immediately following Castillo's ouster dispelled the aura of optimism and convinced the State Department and much
of American press opinion that the new regime in Buenos Aires was as
totalitarian and pro-Nazi as its predecessor had been. Postcoup promises to
convene Congress, to set a date for national elections, and to sever relations
with the Axis remained unfulfilled.56 In addition, reports from the FBI to
the White House painted an alarming picture of the new regime. Hoover
had never been optimistic about the Argentine situation. On June 8 he
transmitted to Hopkins a 500-page volume entitled A rgentina Today. Significantly, pages 92 through 369 were devoted to "The Axis in Argentina."
On June 12 Hoover provided Hopkins and Roosevelt with a brief sketch of
Ramfrez and his cabinet members. The profile emphasized that Ramfrez
had served a total of four years in Germany and Italy and characterized him
as a neutralist, as a devout Hispanist, and as pro-Nazi; Vice-President Saba
Sueyro "is a Nationalist and entertains pro-Axis sympathies." With two exceptions, other cabinet members were labeled either neutralist or pro-Axis.57
On 14 June 1943 the Casa Rosada suspended Acci6n Argentina, an
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organization of some four hundred thousand members that had supported
the United Nations financially and morally throughout the war and had
consistently advocated a return to constitutional government in Argentina.58
More than anything else the suspension of this association precipitated
American opposition to the new regime.59 On June 16 the New York Times
observed with obvious dejection that there had evidently been two contending revolutions within Argentina, one spearheaded by the prodemocratic
Radicals and one fomented by the military. It was clear that the latter had
triumphed and that there now existed a purely military dictatorship in
Buenos Aires.6° Claiming to have recognized the true nature of the Ramfrez
regime from the outset, liberal newspapers urged the State Department to
once again wield the big stick in the name of freedom and democracy. 61
The Nation berated Washington for not having insisted from the very
beginning upon a constitutional government that would surely have adopted
an anti-Axis attitude:
Washington's misguided haste in giving diplomatic sanction to the
new regime must have greatly enhanced its prestige....
It took us sixteen years to decide to recognize the Soviet government, which had been established by a people's revolution; we
might profitably have waited sixteen days to recognize the reactionary government of Argentina, set up by a military coup.62
Deeply troubled by the closing of Acci6n Argentina as well as by the
revulsion evidenced by the domestic press, the secretary of state cabled
Armour on June 16 that he and the rest of the department were becoming
increasingly concerned about the Argentine situation, and he chided the
ambassador for painting a falsely optimistic picture.63
Ramfrez's refusal to break with Rome, Berlin, and Tokyo, to restore
constitutional government in Argentina, and particularly to permit Acci6n
Argentina to continue operating linked him with Ramon Castillo in the
minds of both the internationalists and the American people. Moreover, to
Hull, Long, Spaeth, and their associates, Ram1rez's suppression of an organization that advocated democracy at home and a pro-Allied posture in
foreign affairs validated their belief that autocracy and neutralism were
inextricably intertwined. Gradually, Hull and his colleagues were coming
to the conclusion that democratization of the Argentine political system was
an essential precondition to Argentina's assuming a truly pro-Allied posture.
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Although they were unable either to emulate Roosevelt, Wilson, and Taft
or to use military force in order to institute political reforms in Latin America, the internationalists in the summer of 1943 did launch a frontal assault
on the Ramfrez government, using the presumed division between government and people in Argentina as justification.
Ironically, it was Sumner Welles who articulated the citizen-versusgovernment rationale and who announced the department's decision to
initiate a new era of confrontation. The undersecretary had originally shared
Armour's optimism and had joined with the ambassador in urging that
Washington adopt a conciliatory posture, but after the closing of Acci6n
Argentina, he quickly tacked before the prevailing wind. In response to a
request by the secretary that he "straighten Armour out,"64 Welles wrote his
colleague in Buenos Aires on June 24 that the recent change of government
provided a golden opportunity for reviewing the goals and assumptions
underlying United States policy toward Argentina.
Welles observed that the Good Neighbor Policy, initiated over a decade
before, had succeeded in convincing the Americas of the sincerity of United
States pronouncements about nonintervention and hemispheric defense; and
as indicated by the tremendous reception accorded to FDR in Buenos Aires
in 1936, the Argentine people were among the most enthusiastic in Latin
America about New Deal diplomacy. Although the Argentine delegates at
Rio indicated that they thought that it was in the best interests of their
country to go it alone, this attitude was not shared by many millions of
Argentineans. Unfortunately, due to the autocratic methods pursued by both
the Castillo and the Ramfrez governments, they were not able to express
their opinion or to effect a change in official policy. The high hopes generated by the June revolution were illusory, and the autocratic-neutralist
policies followed by the military junta proved that the United States could
not rely on subtle pressure techniques and public opinion-both inside and
outside of Argentina-to bring about a change in Argentine foreign policy.
The only alternative, he suggested, was a direct get-tough confrontation
with the strong men in power.65 Implicit in Welles's communique was the
assumption that the Argentine people would accept virtually any pressure
tactic designed to force Ramfrez to sever relations with the Axis, because a
continuance of relations with the Axis powers was contrary to the will of
the majority. From this point until the end of 1944 the State Department
operated on the supposition that it possessed a mandate from the Argentine
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citizenry to force the Casa Rosada (1) to break relations with Germany,
Italy, and Japan and (2) to lend all possible aid to the Allies. For Welles,
adoption of the citizen-versus-government rationale was both a result and
a reflection of his impotency in the area of hemispheric policy-making. For
Hull, Long, Spaeth, and their colleagues, it was the natural outgrowth of
their Wilsonian view of international relations.
Convinced that they had the full support of both the Argentine and the
American people, the hard-liners within the State Department once again
set about the business of forcing Buenos Aires to sever all ties with "international fascism." Throughout June and July, Washington lectured the
Ramfrez government on the steps it must take to align Argentina with the
Allies. Among the most important were (1) an immediate break in diplomatic relations, (2) complete interruption of telecommunications, (3) censure of all press and radio opinion that was in any way favorable to the
Axis, (4) complete cooperation in implementing the Proclaimed List, and
(5) conclusion of a comprehensive petroleum agreement that could make
Argentine oil and tankers available to those hemispheric republics that were
at war with the Axis. Moreover, Washington now required Buenos Aires
to employ a particular justification for the break when it came. Hull rejected
Foreign Minister Segundo Storni's contention that Argentina must wait for
some specific provocative act before withdrawing her ambassadors from the
Axis capitals. The secretary demanded not only that Buenos Aires break
immediately but also that severance be based explicitly on the Rio resolutions.66 As both parties knew, a rupture founded on principle rather than
on a particular offense would constitute a tacit admission by the Argentineans that neutrality was incompatible with hemispheric solidarity and
that its foreign policies had been in violation of the inter-American agreements initiated at Rio. It would, in short, be an implicit admission of guilt
by Buenos Aires and a complete vindication of the internationalists, wiping
out, for them, the humiliation of their defeat at the hands of the Latin
Americanists.
But the Ramfrez regime refused to sever ties with the signatories of the
Tripartite Pact. It decided in late July to plead its case before the bar of
hemispheric opinion in hopes that it could generate a ground swell of sympathy within Latin America, which would in turn compel Washington both
to stop pressuring Buenos Aires and to meet Argentina's demands for lendlease aid. Contrary to the Casa Rosada's expectations, this ill-conceived
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stratagem played right into the hands of the hard-liners, who used the
incident to portray Argentina as a nation that was both insensitive to the
needs of those engaged in the monumental struggle against the Nazi-Fascists
and as a threat to the peace and safety of South America as well.
Quite aside from the fact that neutrality served the organizational goals
of the military, conformed to traditional principles of Argentine diplomacy,
and reflected widespread public apathy toward the war, those in charge of
the Argentine Foreign Office in the summer of 1943 believed that nonalignment was in perfect harmony with the principles of hemispheric solidarity
and that it was in no way harmful to the inter-American community.
Moreover, they believed that Washington's withholding of lend-lease aid,
imposing of economic sanctions, and launching of a propaganda war
against Argentina constituted gross coercion, designed to force Buenos Aires
to take a position not in the national interest. They believed, in addition,
that Washington's policies would so appear to the rest of the hemisphere if
only the facts were made known. Thus, when Washington decided to recall
Ambassador Armour, the Argentine Foreign Office proceeded with plans to
publish both a public indictment of United States policy and a comprehensive defense of Argentina's position.
When it became evident that the new government in Buenos Aires had
no intention whatsoever of ejecting Axis diplomats and interests from
Argentina, the Roosevelt administration began to search for some method
of showing its displeasure and for a specific event to serve as a "last straw."
When in late July the Ramfrez regime placed government interveners in
eight important United States plants in Argentina-including Ford, International Harvester, General Motors, Goodyear, and Firestone-Hull cabled
Armour that the president had decided on a full-scale review of United
States policy toward Argentina, and Hull ordered the ambassador home for
consultation.67 Before Armour left, the Foreign Office presented him with
an aide-memoire covering the entire scope of American-Argentine wartime
relations.
Although the Argentine Foreign Office first presented its case privately
to the State Department via Armour, the text of the note seems to indicate
that it had been designed from the beginning to appeal to a hemispheric
audience.68 Complaining that name-calling in the United States press was
endangering relations between the two countries, Foreign Minister Storni
insisted that his government had pursued an extremely benevolent neutrality
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toward the United States throughout the course of World War II. Argentine ships had operated exclusively in the service of Britain and the United
States; Argentina had recognized its northern neighbor as a nonbelligerent
immediately after Pearl Harbor; and both the Castillo and Ramirez administrations had restricted the secret communiques of Germany, Japan, and
Italy, while other neutrals had permitted absolutely free use of their cables.
In addition, Argentina had supplied the Allies with vital exports, the loss of
which had seriously endangered Argentine security. Storni protested that
America's demand for an immediate, unprovoked severance of relations was
unreasonable. In the first place, the international situation could not be
abruptly changed by a government that was attempting to reconstruct a land
thoroughly corrupted in its educational, social, and political institutions by
the former administration. In the second place, a rupture without apparent
cause would recall Mussolini's dastardly attack on a prostrate France and
would therefore offend world opinion. The foreign minister concluded by
predicting dire consequences if the United States continued to deny material
and equipment to Argentine industry. Unless the United States made a
genuine gesture of friendship in the form of "airplanes, spare parts, armaments and machinery" and did everything in its power "to restore Argentina
to the position of equilibrium to which it is entitled with respect to other
South American countries," a wave of anti-United States opinion would
engulf Argentina and would poison Argentine-American relations for years
to come.69
Far from feeling threatened by Storni's charges, the internationalists,
Welles, and Armour (who with the Radicals was now thoroughly disillusioned with the general-president) believed that the incident presented a
unique opportunity to brand Argentina as a silent partner in the Axis conspiracy, to label the Ramfrez regime as a threat to the peace and safety of
the Americas, and to appeal to the Argentine people to rise up and restore
their nation to the paths of righteousness. 70
Hull's carefully prepared reply began with a review of the various interAmerican resolutions that Argentina had allegedly violated by continuing
to maintain relations with the Axis. He then cited statistics to prove that
Argentina was enjoying a level of prosperity that it had not reached for
twenty years. Wartime trade with the Allies in strategic materials and other
commodities was at least as beneficial to Argentina, if not more so, as it was
to Britain and the United States. Moreover, thanks to the efficiency of Allied
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military and naval operations, many of Argentina's markets remained open
during a war that had wreaked economic havoc throughout most of the rest
of the world. In a blatant appeal to the Argentine citizenry to repudiate
the Ramfrez regime and its policies, Hull asked rhetorically how long a
people as devoted to democracy as were the Argentineans could continue to
support a government that not only refused to recognize its hemispheric
commitments but even lent aid to the Axis. The State Department concluded its rebuttal by flatly rejecting Storni's bid for arms aid. Denying that
Washington had supplied Argentina's neighbors with arms for any other
reason than hemispheric defense, Hull observed facetiously that for the
United States to supply a neutral power such as Argentina with planes and
munitions would be inconsistent with the inter-American doctrine of peaceful settlement of disputes.71
Press reaction to the Hull-Storni exchange, which was made public on
September 7 simultaneously by the State Department and the Argentine
Foreign Office, more than fulfilled the hopes of the internationalists. In
Buenos Aires the great Argentine dailies blasted the Ramfrez government
for playing into Washington's hands and making the nation appear to be a
selfish, militaristic power.72 Indeed, so intense was domestic criticism that
the Casa Rosada closed down a number of papers, including N oticias
Graficas.73 Latin opinion outside of Argentina was no less distressing to
Buenos Aires. Some latinos sympathized with Argentina as being a victim
of Yankee imperialism, and some were even willing to tolerate Argentine
nonalignment; but Buenos Aires's public appeal for arms aid to "restore
Argentina to the position of equilibrium to which it is entitled" aroused
fears of Argentine expansionism and militarism, thus canceling much of
the sympathy that Ralll.lrez had previously enjoyed.74 Although Chile had
been one of Argentina's strongest supporters, La Hora and La Naci6n, both
of Santiago, attacked in no uncertain terms the Argentine position expressed
in Storni's note.75 El Tiempo and Ultimas N oticias of Caracas, which had
previously displayed a tolerant attitude toward Argentine neutrality, condemned Stomi's appeal and called upon the Ramfrez government to make a
full and immediate compliance with the Rio resolutions.76 Not surprisingly,
newspapers in Cuba and Panama, representing the two American republics
that were perhaps most committed to the Allied cause, were thunderous in
their denunciation.77
Response to the Hull-Storni affair north of the Rio Grande was even
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more critical of Argentina-a fact that was particularly gratifying to Hull,
who had writhed under charges of appeasement stemming from the State
Department's policies toward the Petain and Badoglio governments.78
Typical of the hundreds of laudatory telegrams that poured into the State
Department was one that praised Hull's denunciation of the "balance of
power concept" contained in Storni's appeal and declared that the exchange
had restored the people's faith in America. Another pronounced the State
Department's self-righteous rejoinder "one of the few real American statements that have come out of Washington in years." The Washington Post,
which ran a front-page headline on the exchange, expressed the widely held
view that Argentina was irrevocably committed to all inter-American resolutions and hence Washington should make no concessions whatever:
"General Ramfrez cannot expect the United States to kill any fatted calves
on his behalf, regardless of what he does. . . . There can be no deals with
him, as Secretary Hull's fine note makes clear."79
If the State Department's goals in the Hull-Storni affair were to further
isolate Argentina within the hemisphere and to create support in the United
States for a hard line toward the Ramfrez government, its policy was a
success. But if judged on its ability to produce an Argentine-Axis estrangement, arouse pro-Allied sentiment, and facilitate a return to constitutional
democracy in Argentina, American policy in the Hull-Storni affair was an
unqualified failure. United States intelligence reports had consistently indicated that Admiral Storni and Finance Minister Jorge Santamarina were
the only two pro-Allied figures in the cabinet.80 J. Edgar Hoover informed
Harry Hopkins on June 12 that Storni, who had formerly been chief of the
Argentine navy's general staff and who was an active Radical, was one of
the most liberal of the "Argentine Naval Caste." Santamarina, a former
director of the Banco de la Nacion and brother of the pro-Allied Senator
Antonio Santamarina, was reported to be definitely in the anti-Axis camp.81
In the wake of the storm of adverse publicity that broke after publication, Ramfrez made a scapegoat of Storni and, on the evening of September
7, forced him to resign. 82 Santamarina's resignation a few weeks later left
the integral-nationalist and anti-American elements within the cabinet virtually unopposed. Reflecting the changed situation within the cabinet and a
general sense of humiliation felt at all levels of government, the Ramfrez
regime became far less willing to cooperate with the Allies and to tolerate
domestic dissent than it had been during the first two months of its exist102
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ence. To FDR's public request that all neutrals refuse asylum to persons
accused of war crimes, the Argentine government responded that it reserved
its right "to consider each individual case on its merits in the event that any
fleeing Fascist or Nazi leader should seek sanctuary in Argentina."83 Mid
September saw the arrest of British and United States executives of the
American and Foreign Power Company, thus increasing fears in Allied
circles that restriction or even nationalization of foreign-owned businesses in
Argentina was imminent. Later, when a petition demanding "effective
democracy" and "loyal fulfillment of international obligation," which was
signed by one hundred fifty prominent Argentineans, appeared in forty
newspapers, Ramfrez not only branded the protest as Communist-inspired
and announced the discharge of all government and federal employees who
had signed it, but he also used the incident to launch an intensive campaign
to purge all antigovernment elements from Argentina's intellectual community.84 Perhaps most important to the State Department, Argentina's
position r~mained throughout the fall of 1943 one of unswerving neutrality.
"The Argentine people firmly desire victory for the countries fighting for
democracy," President Ramfrez declared in an interview with Mercurio of
Santiago, "but [they] do not want to break off with any nation in the world
unless Argentina is offended by that nation ... they are peace-loving people
with no directly effecting reasons moving the citizens toward conflict."85

By the fall of 1943 Sumner Welles's pos1t1on within the Roosevelt
foreign-policy establishment had become completely untenable, and on
September 16 the man who had been the principal architect of the Good
Neighbor Policy for over ten years submitted his resignation to the White
House. According to Hull, the undersecretary departed because the president
realized that the continued existence of an independent, irresponsible organization within the State Department was intolerable. By the summer of
1943, Hull writes in his Memoirs, FDR had recognized the "impossible
situation" that existed for the secretary of state and terminated it by forcing
Welles out of the department.86 The circumstances surrounding Welles's
ouster were uglier and far more complicated than the secretary's account
would indicate, however.
Sumner Welles was a man who made enemies easily. Aristocratic, acidtongued, completely intolerant of incompetence, he swept away or by-passed
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everything and everyone who stood in his path. His enormous effectiveness,
immense reputation, and particularly the power that Welles derived from
his special relationship with Roosevelt aroused the enmity and jealousy of a
host of lesser men. Perhaps the least of these was William C. Bullitt.
Wilson's envoy to Lenin during the Paris Peace Conference, Bullitt had also
been appointed by Roosevelt as the first American ambassador to the Soviet
Union (1933-36). Later he was ambassador to France (1936-41), and in
1941 he was ambassador at large, a post without any real responsibility.
Bullitt spent most of his time during the war years, in the words of John
Morton Blum, "contriving unsuccessfully to obtain high office in the State
Department and in gossiping with calculated malice about those whom he
would like to have replaced." 87 The man whom Bullitt most wanted to
supplant was Sumner Welles, and in the summer of 1943 he set about to do
just that.
The tale that Bullitt told to bring the undersecretary low concerned an
incident that allegedly took place in August 1940. According to Bullitt,
during a return trip from the funeral of Alabama Congressman John Bankhead, aboard a train jammed with dignitaries, Welles got very drunk and
repeatedly pulled the emergency cord in his sleeping compartment; and
when various porters came to investigate, he propositioned them.88 Welles
never admitted that the story was true, and his supporters contended that
it was a pure fabrication, manufactured by Bullitt with the aid of J. Edgar
Hoover.89
Bullitt told the story to all who would listen, including, of course,
Franklin Roosevelt and Cordell Hull.90 Hull denounced Welles's actions as
"worse than murder," but, typically, he refused to confront his rival with
the charge.91 Soon, however, the Bankhead story began to surface everywhere. Felix Belair, a friend of Henry Wallace's, told the vice-president
about the alleged incident and declared that the story had come to him from
the sleeping-car porters themselves. Various senators began to mutter about
moral decay in the State Department and the need of a full-scale investigation. Arthur Krock, an incorrigible gossip and a close ally of Hull's,
began to print stories in the New York Times about certain dark deeds
committed by the undersecretary, after which Tom Connally and James
Byrnes, those two untiring Democratic watchdogs, went to Roosevelt and
demanded that Welles be ousted.92 During the second week in August,
Breckinridge Long confronted the undersecretary-"something Hull would
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never do," Long wrote in his diary-and advised him to resign before the
Republicans got hold of the story. Welles denied Bullitt's accusation but
agreed to step down.98
Welles submitted his resignation to Roosevelt personally on Monday,
August 16.94 The president, who believed that Welles's departure was inevitable but who was immensely annoyed by it because of the undersecretary's enormous ability, accepted but asked him to head the American
delegation to the Moscow Conference. Welles rejected the post, however,
because, he said, he was leaving the department primarily at Hull's behest,
and he would undertake a task as important as the Moscow mission only
with the full support of the State Department. He wanted no repeat of the
Rio donnybrook.95
Berle was apparently the last person to see Welles before he left the
State Department's quarters at Foggy Bottom. On Saturday, August 21, a
despondent Welles phoned Berle and asked him to come to the department
the following afternoon at five o'clock. When Berle arrived, Welles was
cleaning out his desk; he appeared exhausted. He told Berle of his resignation and asked him to take charge of the department until Hull returned
the following Thursday. "And so I said farewell," Berle records in his diary,
"and left him in a dusty, sunlit office, in an empty building, finishing, as he
believed, his stormy but brilliant career.''9 6
Personal animosity was no doubt the key factor in the undersecretary's
denouement, but there were issues involved as well. Henry Wallace implies
in his diary that Welles's downfall was caused not only by Hull's jealousy
and Bullitt's innuendo but also by the undersecretary's position on RussianAmerican relations. To the dismay of Bullitt and other hard-line antiCommunists, Welles looked forward to Soviet-American cooperation in the
context of a postwar collective-security organization. He believed, moreover,
that Moscow would support the concept of regional organizations operating
within a larger world body. This attitude, coupled with his distrust of Great
Britain, which he identified with colonialism and the outdated "balance of
power approach," had as much to do with Welles's ouster as the bureaucratic
situation.97
Two final and often neglected factors that contributed to the undersecretary's departure were the "failure" of United States policy toward
Argentina and his increasing exclusion from the decision-making process.
At Rio he had won control of hemispheric policy for the Latin American
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coalition, but at the time it was clear to all concerned that the Latin Americanists' continued dominance depended upon their ability to secure a severance of relations between Argentina and the Axis. The policy of selective,
covert pressure pursued by Well es, Bonsal, Duggan, and their associates
during 1942 was designed to accomplish the primary goal without destroying
hemispheric unity or offending Argentine sensibilities. By the fall of 1942,
continued nonalignment by Argentina, together with mounting pressure
from the American people on the one hand and bureaucratic rivals on the
other, produced the Trade Convention speech. This tirade constituted a tacit
admission by Welles that he could not achieve an immediate change in
Argentine foreign policy within the framework of the Good Neighbor
Policy. By undercutting the position long held by himself, Duggan, Bonsal,
and the rest of the Latin Americanists, the undersecretary's new hard line
destroyed the prestige of the entire group and paved the way for the
ascendancy of the internationalists. Moreover, Welles's subsequent attempts
to regain his influence in hemispheric decision-making by adopting a position more aggressive than even that of the internationalists created an everwidening gulf between him and his colleagues in the Latin American
establishment.
Welles's resignation was a clear victory for Hull and the internationalists-on September 7 Secretary of War Henry Stimson congratulated Hull
on obtaining a "reorganization" of his department98-but the undersecretary's
forced retirement hardly ended the feud between him and Hull. By the
spring of 1943 the secretary of state was seeing potential rivals around every
corner. Berle was forced to call off a planned trip to England in June
because Hull became "very mournful" about it. "He is a little worried and
afraid when anyone gets active," Berle confided in his diary.99 During the
course of their prolonged feud, Welles and Hull had enlisted the aid of two
of the most famous and most feared members of the Washington press
corps-Arthur Krock, who served Hull, and Drew Pearson, who represented
Welles. As has been noted, Krock played no small role in the ouster of
Welles. In turn, shortly after Welles left the department, Pearson opened
up on Hull and the other "incompetents" and "reactionaries" in the State
Department. Pearson, who on one occasion told Henry Wallace that he had
coauthored the Good Neighbor Policy in 1932 along with Welles, even went
so far as to try to organize a massive Latin American protest over Welles's
departure. As the hated "left-wing press" also turned its guns on the depart-
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ment in connection with Welles's resignation, Hull and his colleagues convinced themselves that the undersecretary had become the head of the
Communist conspiracy that was out to discredit the department.100
The man who was chosen to replace Welles as undersecretary was
Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. Franklin Roosevelt's choice of this former GM
executive signaled a change in the president's administrative philosophy that
had been developing since the outbreak of World War II. Amid the stresses
and strains of global war, the White House began to crave order and stability within the federal bureaucracy, and by 1943 Roosevelt believed that
the country, the war effort, and his political reputation could not afford the
waste and confusion caused by continued organizational and personal rivalry
within the State Department. 101 In regard to this last consideration, Roosevelt
was already looking ahead to 1944. He planned to run for an unprecedented
fourth term, and he knew that he would need all the support he could get.
As a result he began to cultivate "the Morgan banking crowd," as VicePresident Wallace referred to Bernard Baruch, Will Clayton, and other
wealthy dollar-a-year men who had entered the federal bureaucracy in droves
after 1940.102 In short, the White House wanted to replace Welles with a
man who was not only a competent and experienced administrator, a bureaucrat unencumbered by excess ideological baggage, and a reliable observer
who would report to the White House everything that transpired at Foggy
Bottom, but who would be a political asset as well.1° 8
Born on 22 August 1900 in Chicago, Edward Stettinius, Jr., was the son
of a partner in the firm of J.P. Morgan and Company. Despite his father's
wealth and position, young Stettinius at first rejected a future in the business
world and decided to go into the ministry instead. His four years at the
University of Virginia were characterized by missionary work among the
"hillbillies," active participation in the YMCA, and failure to gain enough
credits for graduation. Sensing Stettinius's managerial ability, John Lee
Pratt, a vice-president of General Motors and a family friend, persuaded
him to reject the cloth and to carve out a business career on his own.
Beginning in a stockroom of the Hyatt Roller Bearing division of GM at
forty-four cents an hour in 1924, Stettinius rose to become chairman of the
board of directors of United States Steel by 1938, with an annual salary of
$100,000. Throughout his rapid climb to the top of the corporate heap,
Stettinius managed to retain a deep sense of mission toward his fellow men,
and as a result he was sympathetic to many of the Roosevelt administration's
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relief, recovery, and reform efforts. Due to his position in industry and his
work in behalf of the NRA program, Stettinius was named to the Business
Advisory Council (BAC), a group of businessmen who were not overtly
hostile to the New Deal and who served as advisors to Harry Hopkins while
he was secretary of commerce from 1938 to 1940.104 While serving on the
BAC, the thirty-eight-year-old executive caught Roosevelt's eye, and in 1939
he was brought to Washington to head the War Resources Board. In this
and subsequent jobs, "Stet," as he was known to his colleagues, so impressed
the White House, particularly Harry Hopkins, that he was named to head
lend-lease in 1941-the job he held prior to entering the State Department.
Because of Stettinius's gift for creating administrative efficiency and because
of his devotion to the establishment of an orderly, prosperous world community in the postwar era, he was, in the view of the White House, not only
a suitable replacement for Welles but the perfect heir apparent to Hull.1011
It was not until he actually became secretary of state in the fall of 1944
that the man who one White House staffer described as a "curious blend
of businessman and world reformer" left his mark on hemispheric affairs.
Both the internationalists and the Latin Americanists sought to draw Stettinius into their respective camps. The former lend-lease administrator had
settled into Welles's old office when Hull, who saw in the new undersecretary very little threat to his policy-making authority, warned him to
beware of Duggan, Bonsal, and their subordinates; for, being proteges of
Welles, they tended to operate "off the cuff."106 Simultaneously, the Latin
Americanists were working to commit Stettinius to their view of hemispheric
affairs. Laurence Duggan told the new undersecretary that for many latinos,
Welles had come to symbolize the Good Neighbor Policy, and naturally his
departure had caused a good deal of uneasiness south of the Rio Grande. A
word of reassurance to the American republics would be of inestimable
value. Already deeply concerned that the internationalists might run roughshod over the principle of hemispheric solidarity in their drive to force
Argentina to conform to the Rio resolutions, Duggan urged Stettinius to
consult the other American republics in all important decisions, particularly
those concerning postwar planning.
Stettinius was impressed with the Latin Americanists, especially A vra
Warren, who was later to figure prominently in the rapprochement with
Argentina, and he promised a continuance of the Good Neighbor Policy.107
Nevertheless, at this point the new number two man in the State Department
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had neither the desire nor the presidential mandate to challenge the internationalists for control of America's Argentine policy. Indeed, he chose
during his fourteen months as undersecretary to remain aloof from intradepartmental wars. Above all, this meant swimming with the tide on all
matters relating to Argentina.

In taking unilateral action in the T ransradio affair, in using the Montevideo Committee to depict Argentina as a tacit ally of the Nazis, and in
invoking hemispheric opinion against first Castillo and then Ramll'ez, the
State Department was reacting to public criticism that it was "soft on fascism"; to attempts by Treasury, BEW, and FEA to usurp its authority; to
the backlash following the revolution of June 1943; and to the internationalists' perception of inter-American affairs. Implementation of these policies
was made possible by ( and reflected) a marked loss of power within the
foreign-policy establishment on the part of the Latin Americanists. Welles's
defection to the hard-liners during the spring and summer of 1943 and his
subsequent resignation robbed the Latin Americanists of much of the leverage they had enjoyed during the previous decade. Although Duggan, Bonsal,
and their subordinates shared Welles's frustration, they had continued to
fight for a policy of selective coercion and struggle against those who advocated a direct frontal assault. 108 The latter course, they felt, would only
drive the sensitive Argentineans to support whatever government happened
to be in power. In addition, the Latin Americanists were fearful that the
increasingly hard-line tactics being pursued by the State Department would
rekindle Latin memories of the big stick and lead to the establishment of a
postwar Inter-American System that would be limited to the Latin republics.109 They urged the Roosevelt leadership to abandon divisive denunciations and blatant intervention and to rely on lend-lease aid to Argentina's
neighbors, subtle economic pressure through restriction of certain United
States exports, and selective distribution of newsprint. In virtually every
case, except where their arguments were useful in fending off a bureaucratic
challenger, the internationalists, with Welles in tow, dismissed their reservations and rejected their policy options. The Latin Americanists believed
for a time that Edward Stettinius might be converted to the cause and used
to regain lost leverage. When he rejected Duggan's and Bonsal's invitation
to replace Welles as a "symbol of the Good Neighbor Policy," they were left
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without a spokesman in the top echelon of the State Department-a situation
that augured ill for the Good Neighbor Policy and Argentine-American
relations.
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6
WILSONIAN DIPLOMACY
IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT

As the Roosevelt administration grappled with its personnel problems in
the State Department in the fall of 1943, the Argentine foreign-policy
establishment was itself undergoing a profound change, a change that produced a new, ominous set of objectives in the nation's foreign policy. From
the GOU's inception, that organization had refrained from adopting expansionist slogans. Shortly after the June revolution, however, the "colonels"
outlined their diplomatic goals in a public statement that seemed to bode ill
for the independence of Argentina's neighbors:
Once we have conquered power [in Argentina], it will be our
mission to be strong-stronger than all the other (South American)
countries together. We must arm ourselves and remain armed always, triumphing over difficulties, battling against internal and external conditions. Hitler's struggle in peace and in war will be our
guide.
Alliances will be the first step. We already have Paraguay; we
shall have Bolivia and Chile, and it will be easy for us to put
pressure on Uruguay. Then the five united nations will easily draw
in Brazil, because of its form of government and its great nuclei of
Germans. The South American continent will be ours when Brazil
falls.1
As has been noted, however, the integral-nationalist and pro-Axis groups
within the GOU constituted only one faction within the junta that overthrew Ramon Castillo. From June through September the pro-Allied clique
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-headed by Foreign Minister Storni-and a pro-Axis and sometimes expansionist cabal-headed by Colonel Gonzalez, Colonel Peron, and General
Farrell-struggled for control of the government and its policies.2 The HullStorni affair all but eliminated the pro-Allied faction from this political
equation and paved the way for the ascendancy of the integral nationalists.
Consequently, in the fall of 1943, the reorganized Ramfrez government inaugurated a campaign to actually fulfill the expansionist pledges made by
the GOU.8
The State Department responded to the attempts by Argentine ultranationalists to convert southern South America into an anti-American
neutralist bloc by wielding virtually every diplomatic weapon short of a
declaration of war with the object of forcing drastic changes in Argentine
policy. Pressure from Washington not only deflated the expansionists but
eventually produced the long-awaited severance of relations between Argentina and the Axis. Not satisfied with causing a basic reorientation in
Argentina's posture toward the war, the internationalists decided to withhold vital intelligence information from the Ramfrez regime, and in so
doing, they contributed to the downfall of that government in early 1944.
The department's tactics in this situation revealed a subtle shift in goals on
the part of the internationalists. During the fall of 1944 Hull, Long, and
their associates reached the conclusion that it was the duty of the United
States to secure not only a pro-Allied orientation in Argentine diplomacy
but a democratization of the Argentine political system as well. In pursuing
this new objective the State Department was responding to developments in
southern South America, to continuing attacks by Henry Morgenthau and
the Treasury Department, and to the weakened condition of the Latin
Americanists. The drive to restore representative government to Argentina
also stemmed from the dichotomy inherent in the internationalists' Wilsonian view of foreign affairs and their conviction that totalitarianism and
neutralism were but two sides of the same coin.
Hull, Long, and their associates were firmly committed to Wilsonian
internationalism-that is, to the creation of an association of nations that
would be dedicated to the eradication of aggression, the promotion of
national self-determination, and the elimination of economic exploitation.
Before a peaceful and law-abiding world community could emerge, however, democracy would have to prevail throughout the world. Thus, in the
Wilsonian scheme of things, America had two mutually reinforcing roles to
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play. The republic must work to establish an international concert of powers
devoted to the collective good and to foster democracy in every region of the
globe. To Hull, Long, and their subordinates, World War II was being
fought not only to preserve a balance of power in Europe and the Far East
and to prevent foreign domination of the Americas but also to make the
world safe for democracy. The internationalists disagreed violently with the
Latin Americanists' contention that the nations of the world could be judged
only on the basis of their international conduct. The Axis powers, for
example, were proper subjects of a United States declaration of war not only
because of their external aggression but because of the tyrannical and repressive nature of their domestic regimes. Like Wilson, Hull and his associates
adhered to the view that a particular government's domestic policies and its
foreign posture were inextricably intertwined. Argentine neutrality was both
a reflection and an inevitable product of the philosophy that prevailed m
domestic affairs.

Cordell Hull, taking full advantage of one of the few opportumt1es
available to him to participate in the diplomacy of the Grand Alliance, attended the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference from October 19 through
October 30. While he was absent, the State Department was innundated
with reports from the American embassy in Buenos Aires and from other
sources that the Ramirez government had become thoroughly Fascist and
had dedicated itself to establishing Argentine dominance in southern South
America. On the nineteenth, Ambassador Armour cabled Washington that
President Ranurez, through cowardice or calculation, had gone over completely to the pro-Axis camp and had named a new cabinet composed of all
the country's leading right-wingers. Gen. Alberto Gilbert was foreign minister, and Peron's stalking horse, General Farrell, assumed the vice-presidency.4 To the Interior Ministry, Ramfrez appointed the ultranationalist
Gen. Lu{s Perlinger, who immediately initiated an effective campaign of
political repression.5 On September 24 Col. Charles Deerwester, chief of the
United States Air Mission in Argentina, wrote his superiors in Washington:
"Things have really changed. . . . The government didn't turn out as we
thought it would. . . . The people are weary and sick of this government....
I can easily understand life in Germany now, for this country is just about
as totalitarian as it can be."6
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Only days later, American officials learned from the Polish governmentin--exile in London that those who now dominated the Ra1I11rez government
were intensely nervous over Argentina's increasing isolation and therefore
had established a secret fund within the Ministry of War to be used for the
overthrow of neighboring governments. Heading the list of priorities was a
plan to penetrate the Bolivian government and help Fascist elements stage
a right-wing insurrection in that country.7
So alarmed was the American embassy at the political situation in
Buenos Aires that on October 20 Armour cabled Washington, urging the
freezing of all Argentine assets in the United States. His proposal unwittingly opened the door for another major clash between the State and
Treasury departments for control of Argentine-American policy.8 When a
copy of Armour's advisory reached the Treasury Department on October 25,
Morgenthau was out of the country, touring military installations in North
Africa and Italy. His zealous subordinates-White, Randolph Paul, John
Pehle, and Herbert Gaston-believing that they could exploit Hull's absorption with the Moscow Conference and the recent shake-up in the leadership
of the State Department, decided to use the Armour recommendation to
press once again their antagonists at Foggy Bottom to support a freeze on
all Argentine funds in the United States. On the morning of the twentyfourth, officials of the State and Treasury departments held a lengthy meeting to discuss Armour's suggestion. White, Paul, and Pehle argued both on
economic and political grounds that freezing was essential. In the first place,
Argentina was commonly recognized as the "base from which the Axis
conducts its operations throughout the Western Hemisphere," and in the
second place the Ramfrez regime was thoroughly Fascist and a threat to
the peace and safety of surrounding republics. Stettinius, who admitted that
"he was just learning about such matters,"9 deferred to his subordinates,
who once again argued that freezing would be counterproductive both economically and politically. Emilio Collado and Dean Acheson, of the Division
of Economic Afliairs, pointed out that while such a move would have no
immediate impact on Argentina or on Axis activities there, it would threaten
the Allied procurement program, which was absolutely vital to the war
effort. Speaking for the Latin American establishment, Duggan and Bonsal
insisted that the matter be viewed from the perspective of the entire hemispheric community and that freezing be placed in the context of the Good
Neighbor Policy. Latinos everywhere, they declared, would regard freezing
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as designed to alter the domestic and foreign policies of the present government: "The foundation of hemispheric solidarity that has been achieved is
due to the conviction that we should not use our superior strength, political
or economic, no matter how plausible or noble the motive, to interfere with
the right of the peoples of the other American republics to enjoy or to suffer
any government which they might tolerate."10 White and his colleagues
were no more willing to accept this view than they had been in the summer
of 1942. The Treasury Department attributed Acheson's objections to his
well-known pro-British bias, and the Latin Americanists' objections to their
parochialism.11 Thus, the two groups of rival policy-makers found themselves at an impasse over Argentina for the second time, and as before, they
turned to the White House for a final decision.
The Treasury Department's bid for control of Argentine policy once
again drove the Latin Americanists and the internationalists into a momentary alliance. On the afternoon of the twenty-fourth, Stettinius cabled the
American embassy in Moscow to inform Hull of the Treasury Department's
new campaign in behalf of all-out economic coercion and to recount the
State Department's objections as articulated by the Latin Americanists. The
undersecretary's note stressed particularly that the Treasury Department's
goal was the overthrow of the Ramfrez government.12 However much Hull
may have hoped for just that event, he deeply resented the Treasury's intrusion into what he considered to be the State Department's area of responsibility. Therefore he cabled Stettinius, saying that he was as adamantly
opposed to freezing as ever and ordering him to communicate those views
to the president.
The following morning Stettinius made the trip to 1600 Pennsylvania
Avenue and laid the two diametrically opposed memoranda, one from the
State Department and one from the Treasury, together with Hull's cable, in
Roosevelt's lap. Once again, "the Great White Father,"13 as Morgenthau
frequently referred to him, ordered that the freezing idea be tabled.14
Hoping to appease Treasury Department officials, however, he suggested
that a story be leaked to the press to the effect that Washington was considering the idea of freezing controls.15
White, Paul, and Pehle saw in the president's suggestion more than a
compensatory crumb, because they perceived correctly that rumors of an
impending blockage would cause Argentina's financial community to panic
and to withdraw their assets from the United States. If they could prove that
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much of this money belonged to "pro-Axis" firms, they believed they could
use acts of withdrawal very effectively in arguing for an immediate freeze.
Consequently, on the twenty-sixth, not only did Treasury Department officials endorse Roosevelt's suggestion, but Paul and Gaston actually planted
the leak themselves. As a result, on the twenty-seventh the New York
Times, the New York Herald Tribune, the Washington Times-Herald, and
UPI in Buenos Aires carried stories to the effect that ,vashington was seriously considering freezing controls.16 The threat of seizure brought not only
the hoped-for withdrawals17 but a dividend in the form of a renewed plea
for freezing from Armour.18
The American embassy's insistent messages and the outflow of Argentine gold produced some concessions by the Latin Americanists. The State
Department agreed to the blockage of the funds of Banco de la Naci6n and
Banco de la Provincia on the twenty-eighth, but Stettinius, on the twentyninth, once again secured a thumbs-down decision from the White House
on general freezing. 19 Stettinius subsequently reported to Hull, who was
still in Moscow, that FDR was quite irritated at White and his colleagues
over the whole affair. According to the undersecretary, Roosevelt had labeled
the Treasury Department's recommendations as "imprudent" and had ordered him to keep a lid on things until Hull and Morgenthau could be
consulted.>?0
No one was more aware than Henry Morgenthau that power within the
federal bureaucracy depends on credibility. Upon his return to Washington
the secretary realized instantly that the State Department had used his subordinates' impetuosity to undermine the Treasury's influence in hemispheric
policy-making, and he was, to say the least, furious. The departmental meeting on November 2 was not a pleasant one for Paul, Pehle, and Gaston. "I
think the Treasury is in an absolutely false position," raged Morgenthau.
"We were outsmarted, or something." Whatever its political objectives in
Argentina, the secretary declared, the Treasury Department must not appear
to be concerned with the domestic policies of the ruling clique. The department would have to base is recommendations on economic-warfare grounds
only.21
Although stung by Hull's and Roosevelt's rebuff, Morgenthau by no
means believed that his department had lost the war for adoption of freezing
controls. On the same day that he berated his subordinates, the secretary
informed Stettinius that the Treasury Department continued to regard freez-
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ing as imperative.22 Morgenthau's persistence was to be rewarded more
quickly than he had dreamed. The growing threat of Argentine expansionism in southern South America, the internationalists' response to that threat,
and Morgenthau's personal influence with FDR led in late December to a
reversal of the State Department's position toward the ultimate economic
sanction.

Cordell Hull returned to Washington on November 12. His pleasure at
having bested Morgenthau in the latest bureaucratic encounter between the
State and Treasury departments was quickly replaced by concern over the
rapidly deteriorating political situation in southern South America. Continuing reports from the American embassy and from Polish operatives
concerning the imperialistic aims of the new Ramfrez cabinet were supplemented by complaints throughout November and December from Argentina's neighbors that Buenos Aires was employing a combination of material
concessions and economic coercion in order to maximize southern South
America's economic dependence on Argentina. In mid November the Paraguayan ambassador notified the State Department that a trade treaty had
been signed between his country and Argentina and that the Ramirez
government was pressing for creation of a customs union.23 Soon thereafter,
Argentine spokesmen announced the conclusion of such a pact and described
it as a step leading toward the establishment of a regional customs association that would be open to all South American countries.24 Finally, during
an interview with Ambassador Armour on December 18, former Argentine
Finance Minister Jorge Santamarina confirmed that Buenos Aires was
threatening neighboring capitals with economic sanctions and military intervention in order to mold them into an anti-United States bloc, and he urged
the State Department to take a much stronger line against the Ramfrez
government.25
Public utterances by various Argentine officials throughout the fall of
1943 only served to reinforce Washington's fears that the Ramfrez regime
was bent on absorbing Argentina's neighbors. In November, Ramfrez, in
an interview with El Mercurio of Santiago, and Peron and Gilbert, in similar
articles in La Hora, appealed to neighboring states, in the name of both
principle and self-interest, to align their foreign policies with that of Argentina by declaring neutrality. Reaffirming their country's intention to pursue
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an absolutely independent course in international affairs, all three made an
impassioned plea for Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, and other nearby states to
join with Argentina in combating North American imperialism.26
On 22 December 1943 right-wing revolutionaries in Bolivia overthrew
the pro-Allied government of Gen. Enrique Pefiaranda. Argentina watchers
in both the United States foreign-policy establishment and the press corps
immediately pointed an accusing finger and declared that Bolivia constituted
the first step in a chain reaction. There was evidence to indicate that the
revolutionaries had used Argentine arms and money and that Berlin had
encouraged the coup, but there was little to show that the new government
was Nazi- or GOU-dominated.27 Actually, the forces responsible for the
revolution were complex and had more to do with the domestic situation in
Bolivia than with international affairs. While the Pefiaranda government
had cooperated with the United States from 1941 through 1943 in supplying
tin and tungsten for the war effort, it had at the same time pursued an
increasingly repressive socioeconomic policy. Labor disturbances in the tin
mines had been crushed with ruthless brutality. Labor leaders had accused
the government of exploiting Bolivian workers for the benefit of the giant
tin companies. When, in December, Pefiaranda closed newspapers representing his political opposition-the Movimento Nacionalista Revolucionario
(MNR )-a group of young army officers together with the chief of the
MNR, Victor Paz Estenssoro, deposed the general and seized power.28
Despite the fact that various Bolivian labor leaders announced wholehearted support for the new government and despite the fact that Paz
Estenssoro, now minister of finance, assured Washington that Bolivia would
continue to honor the commitments made at Rio, the Roosevelt administration insisted on viewing the new government of Major Gualberto Villarroel
as Fascist, pro-Axis, and Argentine-dominated. Berle, for example, repeatedly referred to the MNR as "the Bolivian equivalent of the Nazi party."29
Writing in the Nation, Manuel Seaone declared: "What has happened in
Bolivia has been a triumph for Hitler and a defeat for the puerile policy
of 'non-intervention' of the United States State Department."80 While convinced that Paz Estenssoro was a "sincere friend of the workers in Bolivia,"
Henry Wallace had no doubt that the "Argentine Nazis" were behind the
coup.81 Indeed, Wallace viewed the Bolivian revolution as doubly alarming, because he believed that it indicated that the pro-Axis Fascists in Latin
America were successfully exploiting labor grievances. The really great dan-
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ger in Latin America was Argentina, Wallace told President Isaias Medina
Angarita of Venezuela. The situation in Bolivia was greatly confused, and
thus the most important thing was to pursue a strong policy toward
Argentina? 2
To the various groups within the Roosevelt foreign-policy establishment,
including the Latin Americanists,83 and to the vast majority of the American people,84 revelations concerning Argentina's plans to subvert the independence of her neighbors, in addition to the belief that Buenos Aires was
responsible for the Bolivian revolution, served once and for all to identify
the Ramfrez government with the Nazi and Fascist regimes that were then
enslaving Europe. Had not the military junta in Buenos Aires exhibited
each of the three faces of fascism-totalitarianism, racism, and, most recently, imperialism-since its takeover in June 1943? Reaction to the Bolivian coup and Argentina's alleged involvement in it was particularly strong,
moreover, because these developments were seen as part of a much broader
and far more ominous movement. By late 1943 and early 1944 both conservatives and liberals within the Roosevelt foreign-policy establishment
were articulating a strikingly similar world view. Men with very diverse
philosophies such as Henry Stimson, Adolf Berle, and Henry Wallace
agreed that world peace, democracy, and free enterprise were currently being
threatened by two rival totalitarian systems-fascism and communism-with
Berlin at the head of one and Moscow directing the operations of the other.
While the two competing ideologies warred openly in Europe, their representatives in Latin America were engaged in feverish preparations for the
ultimate takeover of the Western Hemisphere.315 The Bolivian revolution
was undoubtedly the work of the "Berlin-Buenos Aires Axis."36 Indeed,
many believed that the Bolivian uprising marked the beginning of a "year
of revolution" in Latin America which would pit the "Franco type South
American activities dictated from Berlin" (i.e., the Bolivian revolution)
against a "counter-0ffensive of Leftist forces dictated from Leftist Europe,"
whose New World center of operations would be in Mexico City. The
Communists might eventually pose the greatest threat to peace, democracy,
and free enterprise in the Western Hemisphere, but in 1943-44 the Fascists
were the most immediate, and hence most dangerous, enemy.37 Thus, virtually everyone in the State, Treasury, and War departments and in the
intelligence community agreed that the United States had to take immediate
steps to contain Argentine expansion.38 As Norman Armour put it, the
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question was no longer one of the relative dangers of neutrality but of the
absolute and unquestioned danger of direct Argentine aggression.89
The overthrow of the Pefiaranda government provided the State Department with the occasion to revive a coercive tactic pioneered by Woodrow
Wilson during his altercation with the Mexican government of Victoriano
Huerta in 1913. During the formative years of the Good Neighbor Policy,
the State Department had agreed to accept Latin America's contention that
the withholding of diplomatic recognition from a particular government on
the basis of its internal policies constituted a form of intervention, and it had
scrupulously refrained from passing judgment in this form on new administrations.40 Nevertheless, not only the internationalists but also the Latin
Americanists believed that the Bolivian coup would appear to Latin America
as a sufficient excuse for resurrecting nonrecognition as a pressure technique.
Not coincidentally, Dr. Alberto Guani, chairman of the Montevideo
Committee, notified Hull on December 24 that the delegates (the Argentine
member being absent) had voted to recommend that those American states
that had declared war on, or broken relations with, the Axis should consult
before recognizing any government instituted by force in order to determine
if it had complied with the inter-American agreements for defense of the
continent.41 Washington immediately made use of this resolution in an
attempt to secure hemispheric support for its nonrecognition policy. No
matter how the nations of Latin America felt about United States imperialism and insensitivity to their problems, at this point their fear of Axis subversion and Argentine expansion outweighed virtually every other consideration. Thus, when the State Department announced that it was not entering
into relations with the new regime in Bolivia, every American state except
Argentina either followed suit or announced its support of the United States
position.42 It should be noted that Hull, Long, Spaeth, and their colleagues
hoped to derive other benefits from hemispheric nonrecognition of the
Villaroel government. Once the Americas agreed to withhold recognition
from Bolivia because of its attitude toward the Rio and Washington resolutions, a precedent would have been established for possible use against
Argentina.
The State Department next moved to strengthen those governments in
Latin America that were most susceptible to Argentine pressure. In early
January the Brazilian ambassador called on the secretary of state to say that
he and his government were convinced that German money and the pro-
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Axis clique in Buenos Aires were responsible for the Bolivian coup d'etat.
He demanded increased military aid for Brazil and her neighbors, slyly
pointing out that it would be unfortunate if the Argentineans and Germans
were able to say that the United States was failing to support its ally. 43 The
secretary immediately had President Roosevelt approve increased arms shipments from lend-lease stocks to Brazil in order, as he said, to reassure Paraguay and Uruguay as well as Rio de Janeiro. The military "gang" in Buenos
Aires would understand this type of diplomacy.44 The final step in the plan
to quarantine Bolivia and Argentina consisted of the transfer of powerful
units of the South Atlantic Fleet, under Adm. Jonas Ingram, into the mouth
of the River Plata, just across the estuary from Buenos Aires.45
For the internationalists, diplomatic and military isolation was not
enough, however, because it posed no threat to Argentine neutrality or to
the Fascist government responsible for it. As Hull and his associates assembled the facts relating to Argentine imperialism in December 1943 and as
they gauged the temper of domestic opinion in the United States, they saw
an opportunity to move beyond the mere containment of Argentina and to
do nothing less than topple the government that had been responsible for
that nation's refusal to join with the Allies. In so doing, they once again
threw into sharp relief the differences between their approach to interAmerican affairs and that of the Latin Americanists. As previously noted,
both factions viewed the Ramfrez regime as thoroughly Fascist, and by the
closing weeks of 1943 both ardently hoped for its fall. The Latin Americanists believed, however, that given the Good Neighbor Policy and the United
States' long-range interests in the Western Hemisphere, Washington would
have to wait for the Argentine people to lose patience with their rulers and,
of their own volition, cleanse the Casa Rosada.46 Bonsal, Duggan, and Collado had even convinced themselves that a spontaneous revolution lay in the
not-too-distant future:
In recent months, the repressive measures of the government, including closing of universities, press and radio censorship, the ban
on certain Jewish newspapers, arrests of labor leaders and the cancellation of elections have alienated large sections of the Argentine
people. . . . There have been signs that the repressive measures
above described have tended to shake the prosperous apathy of the
Argentine people. Student riots have caused the closing of universities. Labor is unsettled with a general strike being agitated.47
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Long and Spaeth did not share their adversaries' optimism, however, and
they believed that it was Washington's duty to act upon the assumption that
a basic reorientation of Argentine foreign policy could be achieved only after
the democratization of its political system.
By late December, Hull and his hard-line assistants had concluded that
nonrecognition and military encirclement were tactics that would at best
only preserve the status quo and that, short of all-out war, the most promising methods for bringing about the collapse of the Ramkez regime, and
thus a pro-Allied change in Argentine foreign policy, lay in the economic
and propaganda fields: specifically a total embargo of Argentine trade and
a publicity campaign linking high-ranking Argentine officials with the
Bolivian coup.
In late December 1943 Hull asked the department's economic experts
for an analysis of the probable effect that an embargo would have on
Argentina and on United Nations' stockpiles of raw materials. E. G. Collado reported that: (1) assuming that the liberated areas of Europe made
no great new demands, the Allies could go for all of 1944 without Argentine
exports, provided Great Britain switched to pork and Brazil did without
wheat; (2) a continuance of the embargo for more than six months would
cause severe civilian rationing in the United States; (3) in view of these two
considerations, withholding purchases from Argentina for three to six
months would be admissible if Argentine supplies would then become fully
available. 48 Hull was certain that this was more than enough time for a
policy of economic constriction to destroy Argentine prosperity and provoke
the populace to replace the Ramfrez government with an administration that
would join wholeheartedly with the Allies.49 Hull's advisors had warned
him repeatedly, however, that any measure of economic warfare that did not
include Great Britain would be virtually worthless.50 Here too the secretary
was quite sanguine. If shown the moral and practical necessity for taking
economic measures against Argentina, the British would surely go along.
In view of past Anglo-American diplomacy, the secretary's optimism
was a bit unrealistic. In the fall of 1943 officials of the Treasury and State
departments had approached the British about cooperating in Washington's
plans to freeze the funds of Banco de la Nacion and Banco de la Provincia.
The British embassy rejected the suggestion out of hand, arguing that the
value of Argentine aid to the Allies far outweighed any possible danger
resulting from assistance which that country might be furnishing to the Axis.
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And too, as G. F. Theobald, counselor of the embassy, remarked, the British
"were not anxious to do anything which would decrease Argentine enthusiasm for sterling."111
As Hull quickly discovered, new revelations concerning Argentine expansionism had done nothing to alter Whitehalls' opinion. With evidence
of present and future Argentine aggression in hand, the secretary approached
Lord Halifax, the British ambassador to the United States, in late December
and requested cooperation in a drive to oust the reigning coterie in Buenos
Aires. He wanted the United Kingdom, he told Halifax, to move against
Argentina like a "battering ram," and he demanded that His Majesty's
government desist from all acts that would be helpful to the Ramfrez government. If Washington and London worked in harness, the militaristnationalists who were in control of Argentine foreign policy could be
brought down within thirty days.cs2
The British were convinced that the vital force behind America's animosity toward Argentina was Buenos Aires's challenge to United States
supremacy in the Western Hemisphere. Whitehall believed that it was
being asked to help restore Washington's authority in South America-a
cause that British diplomats were not at all sure was in their nation's interest.53 For one thing, despite the war in Europe, the economic rivalry in
Latin America between Britain and the United States intensified markedly
in 1943. Moreover, Britain was even more dependent on Argentine meat
than it had been in 1942. Consequently, in response to Hull's increasingly
insistent demands for support, Halifax replied that His Majesty's government would be more than willing to back the United States provided
Washington could explain how Britain was to replace foodstuffs that it
would lose in case of a breach with Argentina, foodstuffs amounting to onefourth of the nation's consumption.cs4 Whitehall also pointed out that because the British Ministry of Foods had been designated as the procurer of
meat for all Allied forces in Europe, the problem was not merely a domestic
one. In view of Argentina's agreement to sell virtually her entire meat
surplus to Great Britain on credit, the British government claimed to see
relatively little danger in either Argentine expansion or neutrality.1111
During discussions with the British in late 1943 and early 1944, Hull
was forced to stop using the war as justification for coercing the Ramfrez
government, and in offering new rationales, he provided further insight into
the assumptions that underlay the internationalists' view of "the Argentine
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problem." Whitehall rejected the secretary's contention that the ruling faction in Buenos Aires posed a threat to Allied military operations and argued
that the Bolivian coup was the work of a handful of misguided ultranationalists in Buenos Aires. Once Bolivia and Argentina had been isolated,
the threat to the South American members of the Grand Alliance, and thus
to the war effort, would be removed. Further intervention would be pointless and even dangerous, given Argentina's value as a supplier of raw materials.56 The Joint Army and Navy Advisory Board inadvertently supported
Britain's contention that Argentina was relatively harmless when, in late
December, it informed the State Department that under present strategic
conditions, the Axis threat to the security of the hemisphere had been largely
removed.57 For Hull, however, the Argentine affair was more than just a
matter of logistics, German espionage, or even Argentine expansion. Neither
Argentina's contribution to the Allied war machine in Europe nor reports
of a declining Axis threat to the Western Hemisphere could alter his conviction that the Ramfrez government, by rejecting United States leadership
as embodied in the various inter-American security pacts, was refusing to
reciprocate American "sacrifices" made during the 1930s.58 The secretary
more and more frequently expressed a view that he had held since 1942,
namely, that Argentine neutrality signified an affiliation with world fascism.59 The Ram1rez government's refusal to adhere to the Rio and Washington resolutions on combating Axis influences in the Western Hemisphere,
its policy of neutrality, and now its expansionism were all evidence that a
foreign ideology was flourishing in southern South America and was threatening to infect the entire hemisphere like a "cancerous growth." If the
United States failed to remove this malignancy (and to reconstruct Argentine
politics and diplomacy), Hull declared to Halifax, not only would the free
institutions of the New World be endangered but Washington would be
forever discredited in the eyes of its neighbors.60
Whitehall's rejection of Hull's plans for joint economic sanctions, plus
the internationalists' overriding determination to find a solution to the Argentine problem, led the Treasury Department leadership to believe that at
long last the State Department was prepared to endorse freezing as a coercive technique. And, indeed, these factors, coupled with renewed pressure
from Morgenthau, White, Pehle, and the vice-president, prompted the State
Department in late December to abandon its long-held opposition to a
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freeze and to make a general blocking order the key to the economic phase
of its anti-Argentine campaign.
Although Morgenthau continued to bombard the State Department with
demands for an immediate freeze, he decided, in the wake of the October
fiasco, that in order to avoid another presidential rebuff the Treasury
Department would have to apply both direct and indirect pressure on Hull
and his subordinates. Therefore, from early November to late December,
Treasury officials conducted a dual campaign in behalf of the freeze: one,
which was aimed at the State Department, based on the requirements of
economic warfare; the other, which was directed at the White House,
emphasizing the political situation in southern South America. After Hull
returned from Moscow on the twelfth, he and Stettinius received almost
daily memos from the Treasury Department, indicating that by December 9
the Banco Central would have withdrawn $10 million in gold from the
United States and thus would have removed the object of any freezing
order. According to Morgenthau, not only were these shipments eliminating
a potential source of leverage to be used against the Ramfrez government, but
much of the money being withdrawn belonged to Axis collaborators.
Meanwhile, Morgenthau, using information derived from an independent intelligence source, urged President Roosevelt to approve a general freeze
on the basis of the Fascist nature of the Argentine government and the
threat that Argentina posed to her neighbors. On December 21 he persuaded
FDR to convene a conference immediately at the White House, with Hull
and Gen. George Strong in attendance. Strong, chief of army intelligence
and the source of the Treasury Department's information on much of what
went on in Argentina, would naturally present a damning indictment of the
Ramfrez government, and this in turn, the Treasury Department hoped,
would prompt the president to call for a new, tougher line and to direct Hull
to consult with Morgenthau. "You know . . . on the Argentine thing,"
Morgenthau told Roosevelt during their conference on the twentieth, "Cordell is taking an interest but he's awful slow.... (It) looks as though there
had been an overthrow in Bolivia as a result of scheming from Argentina ....
If you want to get the lowdown on it, why don't you send for General
Strong and he will give it to you." 61 As he left, he asked the president to
"please use Bolivia as an excuse [for a meeting] so Hull won't smell Morgenthau."62 Later in the day, Strong called at the Treasury Department
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and notified Morgenthau that the briefing session with FDR had turned out
exactly as anticipated.
This elaborate maneuvering was largely unnecessary, for unbeknownst
to the Treasury, the State Department had come to the conclusion that
freezing was necessary, whatever the bureaucratic cost. In early January,
reports flowed into the department indicating that the Argentine cancer was
spreading. A distraught L. S. Rowe, head of the Pan American Union
(PAU), dropped by Foggy Bottom and told a group of officials that Argentina was doing everything in its power to destroy the Inter-American System.
The head of the Chilean Federation of Labor had informed the PAU that
Argentine officers were filtering into Chile in the guise of tourists. Rowe
declared that the time had come for the United States to take "drastic
action." 63 The internationalists agreed. "We are rapidly coming to grips
with Argentina," Berle recorded in his diary on January 10. "Evidence is
now conclusive that the Army crowd there headed by Peron financed and
handled the plot to take over the Bolivian government and proposes to
execute another, similar plot in Chile and Peru, and probably also in Paraguay and Uruguay .... They are working hand in glove with the Germans
in all this. We are convinced that the Argentine government does not
represent the bulk of the people and the problem is to stand up to the
Argentine buccaneers. . . . By consequence the Secretary is prepared to go
to the ultimate." 64 Two days earlier, Berle had notified FDR that Hull was
attempting to commit the British to a far-reaching program of sanctions
which had as its heart the freezing of all Argentine assets in the United
States.611
Seizure of Argentine holdings was to be only the economic phrase of
the broader offensive, however. Hull, Long, and Spaeth were well aware
that the State Department files contained numerous military intelligence
reports (furnished by both Polish sources and the FBI) linking certain
Argentine officials with the Bolivian uprising, and they believed that publication of these reports would further their objectives in two ways. Although
the Montevideo Committee's revelations on Axis espionage activities within
Argentina had had minimal effect on hemispheric opinion, Hull anticipated
that linking the Ramfrez government with the Bolivian uprising would
stimulate Latin fears of Argentine imperialism and hence would prompt the
republics to support a harsher line toward Argentina. Simultaneously the
Argentine citizenry would be so shamed, or outraged, or both, that they
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would purge the Fascist clique then ensconced in the Casa Rosada. After
outlining his plans to FDR, Hull in mid January prepared a press release
denouncing Argentina for enriching itself from World War II while subjecting its neighbors to the danger of Nazi enslavement. The statement
not only charged that Argentine had become a haven for Nazi agents but
explicitly accused Buenos Aires of playing a decisive role in the overthrow
of the pro-Allied government in Bolivia. The release was to be accompanied
by documentary evidence intended to prove these charges and by an announcement that all Argentine holdings in the United States were henceforth frozen.66
The British, who were as opposed to freezing as they were to an
embargo, joined with the Argentineans in an attempt to forestall Washington's offensive. On January 23, the day before the State Department was to
publish the incriminating documents and implement the freezing order,
Lord Halifax called on Hull and implored him to withhold sanctions
against Argentina. Simultaneously, Prime Minister Churchill cabled FDR in
connection with the Argentine affair: "Before we leap, we really must
look."67 Hull refused to change course, however, and was preparing to fire
his broadside, when, on the morning of the twenty-fourth, Argentine Foreign Minister Gilbert promised Armour that his country would break relations with the Axis nations. It seemed, said Gilbert, that the Ramfrez
government now had proof that Germany had grossly abused Argentine
hospitality by operating at least three spy rings within her borders. The
agitated foreign minister assured Armour that the break would come no
later than noon on Saturday, January 26, provided that there was no action
in the meantime that could be interpreted as external pressure.68 Roosevelt
and Hull decided, to the immense relief of both Britain and Argentina, that
they would issue, at a specially called press conference, a simple statement
announcing that the United States was withholding recognition from the
new regime in Bolivia.69 On January 26 Ramfrez proclaimed that in light
of the recent discovery that a widespread Axis espionage network headed by
the former naval attache to the German embassy was operating in Argentina,
his government was severing relations with Germany and Japan.70
It quickly became clear that the internationalists, unappeased by the
diplomatic rupture, intended to press their advantage and force the Ramfrez
government to assume the duties of a full-fledged member of the interAmerican collective-security community. On January 26 Ambassador Ar-
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mour cabled the department and asked for room to maneuver, declaring:
"I am optimistic. I have always felt that when we have once broken the dike
a lot of things might happen." He urged that the assets of Banco de la
Nacion and Banco de la Provincia be unfrozen at once so as to prevent the
forthcoming United States-Argentine discussions on the implementation of
the Rio and Washington agreements from beginning on a discordant note.71
But Hull refused, observing that past concessions had made not a dent in
Argentine neutrality; firmness alone would produce results. While expressing appreciation to Buenos Aires for its decision to break with Germany,
Japan, and Italy, Hull made it clear that he regarded this as merely a prelude to further action. Indeed, even before President Ramfrez officially
announced the severance of relations, the United States had begun prodding
the Argentine Foreign Office to conduct a complete housecleaning. On
Hull's instructions, on January 25 Armour informed Buenos Aires that it
could demonstrate a real reorientation of policy only by (1) eliminating
those influential groups within the government that had been active in
trying to establish pro-Axis regimes throughout the hemisphere; (2) turning
over all information relating to Axis espionage activities in the Wes tern
Hemisphere to United States intelligence; (3) living up to commitments
made at the Rio and Washington conferences; and (4) severing telecommunications with Germany and its allies.72
Ironically, the internationalists created pressures that contributed directly
to Argentina's rupture with the Axis and then rejected the severance of
relations as meaningless because it was the product of those outside pressures.
No sooner had Buenos Aires broken with the Axis, than Hull, Long, Spaeth,
and their associates began to question the integrity of the Ramfrez government's decision because it was not based on overall inter-American collectivesecurity agreements; 73 by severing relations over a specific offense committed
by Germany, Argentina was still denying its "pledges" and was implicitly
defying United States hemispheric leadership. To be redeemed, Argentina
would have to abandon neutrality and autocracy and accept belligerency and
democracy. It was a matter of principle.
Meanwhile the Rarnfrez government was in desperate straits; the threatened State Department revelations and the subsequent suspension of relations had placed it in an extremely vulnerable position. In breaking with
the Axis, the chief executive had alienated the integral nationalists within
the officer corps and thus knocked away his main political prop.74 Waiting
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in the wings were Farrell and Peron, who hoped to step into the breach
between the integral nationalists and the president and to form Argentina's
third wartime government.7'~ At this point it was to Ramirez's advantage to
reveal as much information about Axis activities within Argentina as possi•
ble so as to justify his new policy. Given the forces arrayed against him
within his own administration, the president's only hope for political survival
was to provoke a ground swell of anti-Axis feeling among the citizenry and
to link his enemies with German intelligence agents operating in Argentina.
In early February, official sources announced that the rupture was due solely
to Axis espionage within Argentina and denied that there had been any hint
of foreign (i.e. North American) pressure.76 The federal police submitted
a report confirming that German and Japanese rings were operating inside
Argentina.77 But due to the fact that all information-gathering agencies
were under the control of the ultranationalist minister of the interior, Gen.
Lufs Perlinger, those in the army and the government who had facilitated
Axis activities and who were now attempting to destroy Ramfrez politically
escaped the revelation unscathed. To ensure its own survival, the regime
had to make a clean sweep, but Ramfrez needed help in eliminating the
very elements that theretofore had formed his base of support. The Office of
Strategic Services and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as the United
States agencies most active in assembling data on Axis operations in Argentina, were in a position to furnish the Argentine government with invaluable
aid. In addition, the State Department could offer the Casa Rosada the
devastating material supplied by its Polish sources. When the Argentine
Foreign Office, in order to give a cutting edge to its disclosures, requested
the evidence held by the United States, Hull turned its request down flatly,
declaring that Washington had to protect its sources.78
Despite strenuous objections from Armour, who pointed out that the
Foreign Office was trying to gather as much material as possible in support
of a break and that Washington's refusal to help would defeat its own
objective, the secretary of state remained adamant. In February, Ramfrez
was still in control; he had no place to turn except to Washington, and he
was in a position to hold his enemies at bay with the aid of North American
intelligence. By the end of the month the president's position was untenable,
and he was ousted by a nationalist clique devoted to nonalignment with
the Allies.79

129

The Roosevelt Foreign-Policy Establishment
The expansionist schemes of the GOU provided the Hull internationalists with the opening for which they had been waiting, and in late 1943 and
early 1944 Washington acted first to halt Argentine aggression and then to
force abandonment of neutrality. Hull's decision to proceed with coercion
of the Ramfrez government-despite notification by the Joint Army and
Navy Advisory Board in December 1943 that the Axis had virtually ceased
to be a military threat in the Western Hemisphere and warnings by Whitehall that Argentine strategic materials were vital to the functioning of the
United Nations war machine-left little doubt as to his motives. Washington
moved beyond the eradication of pro-Axis activities in Argentina, not in
order to facilitate Allied military operations, but to destroy a government
that, to the internationalists' way of thinking at least, had become unalterably
tainted by its resistance to United States hemispheric leadership, its collaboration with international fascism, and its refusal to submit to constitutional
restraints.

130

7
THE POLITICS OF CONFRONTATION

Argentine-American wartime relations reached their nadir in 1944. When
the Ramrez government gave way to another clique of officer-politicians in
February 1944, Washington used the occasion to initiate a policy of unilateral
nonrecognition. In succeeding months, State Department officials denounced
the new government in ever-harsher terms, attempted to isolate Argentina
within the hemisphere, and steadfastly refused to state the terms by which
Argentina could rejoin the inter-American community. For their tactics as
well as their objectives during this the decisive year of World War II, Hull
and his associates continued to draw on their Wilsonian heritage. They refused to accept the severance of relations between Buenos Aires and the Axis
capitals as placing Argentina in compliance with the Pact of Rio, and they
remained convinced that only a fundamental reordering of Argentina's
political processes would produce solidarity with the Allies. Inevitably, the
result was blatant coercion of the Argentine government conducted in the
name of freedom, democracy, and the Argentine people. Although their
mental make-up determined the broad outlines of the internationalists'
policy, developments within the bureaucratic and international milieu often
determined the type of tactic selected as well as the timing of its implementation.
Contributing to the internationalists' intransigence and affecting the
formulation of their stratagems was the continuing rivalry with the Latin
Americanists, on the one hand, and the Treasury Department and its allies
on the other. While Hull and his colleagues managed during the year to
completely eliminate the first group from the formal decision-making
process, this group's sympathizers outside the governmental hierarchy, led
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by Sumner Welles, continued to hammer away at the hard-liners. Simultaneously, Henry Morgenthau and his aggressive underlings, aided and
abetted by Henry Wallace, used every device known in bureaucratic warfare
to gain control of Argentine policy through persuading the White House to
approve sweeping economic sanctions. All the while, Cordell Hull and the
State Department were being excluded from the decision-making process as
it related both to World War II and the postwar order. Their increasing
isolation within the administration and the continuing rivalry with the Latin
Americanists and the Treasury Department created intense pressure on the
internationalists to bring the Argentine affair to a "successful" conclusion.
It was inevitable, however, that the internationalists' attempts to bring
Buenos Aires to its knees would alienate groups whose power transcended
that of the Latin Americanists. By the end of the year a number of nations
and organizations that felt their interests threatened by the ArgentineAmerican feud began to challenge the validity of the policies being pursued
by Hull and his associates.

In Argentine politics the year 1944 began with the fall of Pedro Ramirez
and ended with the rise of Juan Per6n. Between October and December
1943 the Ramfrez regime had become increasingly autocratic and nationalistic. The general-president continued the state of martial law, which had
been proclaimed under Castillo, and erected an elaborate federal bureaucracy
dedicated to suppression of domestic dissent. This authoritarian trend culminated on 31 December 1943, when the Casa Rosada promulgated two decrees,
one establishing obligatory religious education and the other dissolving all
political parties "for not responding to the political reality of the nation."1
Despite the fact that the administration established a Secretariat of Labor
Planning, which Juan Per6n utilized to appeal to certain sectors of organized
labor, Ramirez did not look favorably upon the general objectives of
Argentine workers, and he was not tolerant of strikes and other directaction tactics.2
By January 1944 Ramfrez's domestic policies had created a ground swell
of public discontent among workers and middle-class Argentineans, while
his pursuit of neutrality in international affairs continued to alienate the
small but vocal group of interventionists centered in Buenos Aires. To undermine the rising tide of opposition, Ramfrez in January 1944 initiated a
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highly publicized program of reform. During the opening weeks of 1944,
Argentineans were deluged with so.me twenty thousand decrees designed,
according to the Casa Rosada, to achieve social and economic justice and to
pave the way for eventual return to constitutional govern.ment.3 Then, on
January 26, Ratn1rez made the decision to sever ties with the Axis (a stratagem that he apparently thought would win the support of the pro-Allied
element in Argentina), end the nation's growing isolation within the hemisphere, attract arms aid from the United States, and, as we have seen, forestall publication of information linking high-ranking Argentinean officials
with the Bolivian coup.4
Unfortunately for Ra.mfrez, the rupture with Germany, Italy, and Japan
alienated the one group in Argentina that was still firmly committed to
him-the integral nationalists. Many within the GOU were simply angry
because they believed that the Casa Rosada had buckled under to pressure
from Washington. Others, who looked to Nazi Germany for inspiration and
who had been responsible for Argentina's aborted program of expansion in
late 1943, feared that Ratn1rez had indeed turned the nation toward a prode.mocratic, pro-Allied course. Last, but most important, were the political
opportunists headed by Gen. Edel.miro Farrell and Col. Juan Peron. This
group was .motivated less by ideology and principle than by the desire to use
the resentment of other Argentineans in order to further their own political
ambitions.
As these diverse factions once again coalesced in opposition to the existing regime, Ratn1rez acted to preempt the coup that he knew was coming.
On 24 February 1944 he requested the resignation of General Farrell as
minister of war and vice-president.6 Farrell responded by summoning the
commanders of surrounding army installations and, of course, Peron to a
secret conference. Once assembled, the conspirators quickly agreed that
Ratn1rez must go, and they settled upon Farrell as their leader. That same
day the .minister of war, buoyed up by the vote of confidence from his fellow
officers, ordered units from the Campo de Mayo to surround the Casa
Rosada. Finding himself a virtual prisoner, Ramirez capitulated and subsequently submitted his resignation to the Supreme Court.6 The more astute
of Farrell's advisors quickly realized that a simple resignation carried with
it ample opportunity for nonrecognition by hostile nations. Thus, on February 25 the junta pressured the docile former president into changing his
resignation to a delegation of authority to the vice-president, thus, they
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hoped, ensuring the continuity of the existing government and thereby forestalling the question of recognition.7
It quickly became apparent that Edelmiro Farrell was but a figurehead
in his own government. The administration was dominated in its early
stages by a bitter struggle between the ultranationalists, headed by the minister of the interior, Lufs Perlinger, and the new minister of war, Juan
Per6n. Per6n's failure to use sufficient vigor in opposing Argentina's rupture
with the Axis had alienated the ultras and convinced them that the colonel
knew no god but ambition. 8 A number of factors, both historical and contemporary, combined to tip the balance of power in favor of Per6n during
the course of the year. Historian Joseph Barager has succinctly summarized
the forces and conditions that the young colonel was to parlay so brilliantly
into a nationalist dictatorship. Argentina's newest man on horseback was
able to profit from "a constitutional system tailored to exploitation by a
dynamic leader; a new class of economic interest groups and entrepreneurs
whose needs were ignored by the old power elite representing the great landholders; an amorphous lower class neglected by the existing labor organizations and political parties; a military establishment divided over its attitude
toward the world conflict whose final outcome was still in doubt; and a
middle class . . . which was resentful of more than a decade of corrupt,
reactionary rule, but whose elements showed little ability to subordinate
their individual group interests in a common effort."9 Soon after becoming
head of the nation's armed forces, Per6n assumed the duties of minister of
labor and then, in July, those of the vice-president.1 ° From this bureaucratic
vantage point he was able to utilize his luck, charisma, and incomparable
political sensibilities to become, by the fall of 1944, the dominant political
force in Argentina.11
Because the officers in charge of the February coup wanted to deflect
possible questions from the international community about the legality of its
succession to power, the new government immediately sought to reassure
the world as to its diplomatic posture. On February 28 the acting foreign
minister, Gen. Diego Mason, held a press conference and declared that there
was to be absolutely no change of foreign policies under General Farrell. As
always, the policy of the republic would be based on "loyalty and respect
towards the governments of friendly countries."12
American public opinion was far less favorably inclined toward the
February coup than it had been toward the revolution of June 1943. Con134
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tinuing reports of imperialism, pro-Axis activity, and totalitarianism-juxtaposed with news of the blood and treasure being expended by the Allies on
the battlefields of World War II-caused many Americans to demand nothing less than democratization of the Argentine political system and active
participation by that nation in the war against the Axis. Most journalists
saw the change of government in Buenos Aires as just a shift from one
group of power-hungry militarists to another. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
which had reacted to the Ramirez government's severance of relations with
the Axis by berating the State Department for "accepting Argentina's hasty
about face without applying pressure to bring about its downfall,"13 informed its readers that nothing had really happened in Buenos Aires in
February; the new regime, like the old one, was still "a gangster government
that must so rule to thwart the will of the people for membership in the
U.N."14 Others, instead of linking the Farrell government with its predecessors, regarded the new regime as a distinct turn for the worse. In the
aftermath of Ramirez's downfall the New York Times announced that the
president was forced to resign under extreme pressure by the ultranationalist
GOU, just as he was preparing to announce the formation of a liberal
government.15 An editorial, closer to the truth but equally as damning to
the new junta, contended that the coup had been staged in order to prevent
publication of the full details of German espionage in Argentina, a move
that would have implicated many high-ranking officials. Even conservative
oracles such as the Chicago Tribune, the Los Angeles Times, and the
Saturday Evening Post, which were usually opposed to interference in the
affairs of "stable" Latin republics, concluded that the United States had to he
increasingly concerned over internal developments in Argentina.16
Congressional opinion accurately reflected the prevailing mood. Congressman John Coffee of Washington berated the State Department for
pursuing much too soft a line toward Argentina. To America's shame, he
declared, Caribbean leaders had been far more outspoken on the matter than
had been the Roosevelt administration.17 In a major radio address, Congressman Emmanuel Celler of New York lashed out at the State Department's
handling of the Argentine affair: "You cannot confine or isolate fascism any
more than you can confine a stink in a closet. . . . Our own freedom is
correspondingly contaminated with Franco flourishing to our east and
Farrell to our south."18
A great many Americans demanded that the State Department wield
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one of the oldest diplomatic weapons known to the international community
-nonrecognition. Finding the Bolivian government a "paragon of virtue"
in comparison to Farrell and his colleagues, the Washington Post maintained that
there would seem to be no reason why the Farrell regime in Argentina should be recognized and every reason why recognition should
be withheld from it. The fresh coup gives this country a chance to
bail out of the recognition that was so hastily given to Ramfrez.19
The internationalists had no intention of struggling against the popular
demand for a severance of diplomatic ties. On the day following Farrell's
assumption of the presidency, Armour reported to the State Department that
Farrell and Peron had put pressure on Ramfrez to term his abdication a
delegation of power rather than an outright resignation. The new regime
had simultaneously ordered a series of nighttime police raids on various
newspapers to confiscate copies of the original resignation message. Armour
concluded that the whole thing was a poor attempt at forestalling the question of recognition. Armour, Hull, Long, and Spaeth all agreed that there
had been a coup d'etat and that Washington should call upon the Montevideo Committee to initiate the procedure that had been established in the
wake of the Bolivian coup for consultation in case of the forceful overthrow
of an American government.20

In spite of Washington's campaign to persuade the other hemispheric
republics to view the Farrell regime as pro-Axis and totalitarian and to
isolate Argentina as completely as possible, some Latin governments indicated that they intended to adhere strictly to a de facto recognition policy.
On March 3 the Chilean Foreign Office notified the United States that it
regarded Farrell's assumption of power as entirely legal and that, in view
of the new government's publicly announced policy of continental solidarity,
it would be impossible to delay a vote of recognition.21 That same day the
Paraguayan ambassador, stressing the danger to his nation's national existence if his government were to take any extreme measures against Argenc
tina, informed the department that Asuncion would continue its relations
with Argentina without interruption.22
On March 4, in the midst of the hemispheric discussions that it had
initiated, Washington subverted its attempts to multilateralize coercion of
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Argentina and prejudiced any further consultation by unilaterally announcing its position. At a specially called news conference Undersecretary
Stettinius informed reporters that because it appeared that a group not in
sympathy with President Ramfrez's policy of joining in the defense of the
hemisphere was now in control of Argentina, the State Department would
refrain from entering into relations with the new government. "In all matters relating to the security and defense of the Hemisphere," he declared,
"we must look to the substance rather than the form." 23 The United States
would not recognize the Argentine government, or any other for that matter,
as long as it contained elements inimicable to the United Nations. The
internationalists persuaded the White House to reinforce its proclamation of
nonrecognition by dispatching to Montevideo Adm. Jonas Ingram and a
naval squadron from the South Atlantic fleet.24
Unilateral nonrecognition promised to satisfy a number of needs for the
internationalists. First of all, it would vitiate some of the election-year criticism that was being leveled at the Roosevelt administration for its failure
to bring Argentina into line. Hull and his associates had become increasingly
despondent over the secretary's exclusion from the decision-making process
during 1943. By relieving pressure on the White House over the Argentine
affair, Hull hoped partially to regain the confidence of the president and to
become once again a member of FDR's inner circle. In addition, the internationalists were determined to facilitate a return to constitutional government in Argentina, a development that they viewed as a precondition for
Argentine-Allied solidarity.
In withholding vital intelligence data from the Ramfrez government,
the State Department believed that it was aiding a broad prodemocratic,
pro-Allied coalition which was headed by former finance minister Jorge
Santamarina and Gen. Arturo Rawson and which included the navy and the
Radical party. Reports from the FBI during February 1944 indicated that
Santamarina, Rawson, and their partisans were pressing the Casa Rosada
for free elections, a return to constitutional government, and complete cooperation with the Allied nations; and if the government did not comply,
a popular uprising would surely follow.25 When, instead, Ramfrez was
ousted via a coup engineered by Farrell and Peron, a man whom Adolf
Berle characterized at the time as "the particular and putative Mussolini"
within the GOU, Washington's disappointment was intense.26 The coup
merely hardened the internationalists' determination to restore the blessings
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of liberty and democracy to Argentina; they hoped that nonrecognition
would either bring down the Farrell government or force the president to
call elections. As the end of the war approached, democratization of the
Argentine political system assumed an even higher priority than before
because the hard-liners were determined that a totalitarian state not be
allowed to participate either in the Inter-American System or the proposed
worldwide collective-security organization.27
Because they were willing to settle for nothing less than the destruction
of the Farrell government, the internationalists refused to make explicit the
steps that Argentina must take to end her isolation. Thus, in one of the most
bizarre interludes in United States-Argentine relations, from March until
December 1944, Washington steadily increased pressure on Buenos Aires, all
the while refusing to state the grounds for reconciliation. At one point the
secretary advised Armour, in the strictest confidence, that recognition would
never be forthcoming until certain key cabinet changes were made. On
March 6 Armour rejected a proposal by the Argentine Foreign Office for a
secret meeting between him and Per6n to iron out the differences between
the two nations. After conferring with Washington the ambassador informed the Foreign Office that there was no need for a conference because
Argentina well knew what she had to do for recognition.28
Finally, nonrecognition appeared doubly attractive as a coercive technique to the internationalists in general and to Cordell Hull in particular
because it promised to alienate the Latin Americanists so completely that
they would leave the department. The secretary was convinced that Sumner
Welles, though he no longer held an official position in the diplomatic
·hierarchy, still commanded Duggan, Bonsal, and their associates and that
the entire group was plotting to replace the internationalists at the top of
the State Department hierarchy as soon as FDR was elected to a fourth
term.29 Consequently, early in 1944 Hull began to lay plans to force the
Latin Americanists out of the foreign-policy establishment altogether.30 The
internationalists were familiar enough with their adversaries' views to know
that a unilateral severance of relations with Argentina would more than
likely drive Duggan, Bonsal, Collado, and the other top men in American
Republic Affairs to resign.
The Latin Americanists were not long in assuming the position that
Hull had anticipated they would. On March 22 Bonsal suggested an "informal interview" between Hull and Argentine ambassador Adrian Escobar,
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during which the secretary could deliver a brief aide-memoire covering the
various Argentine activities that the United States considered inimicable to
hemispheric security. According to the director of ARA, Hull should limit
himself to activities that would help the Axis in the war and should exclude
"broad allegations as to what we think the GOU and other Argentine
nationalist groups believe should be Argentina's role in South America."
Such a move, Bonsal advised, "would produce an atmosphere in which the
friends of continental cooperation in Argentina would be assisted rather
than hindered by our attitude."31 In early June, Bonsal notified Hull through
Duggan that, in his opinion, nonrecognition was reducing the State Department's flexibility and was destroying its ability to influence events in Argentina. Moralistic denunciations only strengthened the hand of the rabidly
anti-American elements. If Washington continued on its present course, it
would have to rely on "good luck" rather than "good management" for
success. "We and the other United Nations need Argentina and she needs
us. Only Germany is the gainer from any real rift with us."32
It remained, however, for Laurence Duggan to render the definitive
criticism of diplomatic nonintercourse. On June 22, some three weeks before
his departure from the department, he submitted a long memorandum to
Hull in which he traced the internationalists' policy to its historical roots
and restated the basic assumptions behind the Good Neighbor Policy.
Terming the "reactionary political cycle that began in 1930" in Argentina an
aberration, Duggan insisted that "Argentine evolution has been towards
democracy" and not away from it. The United States should not expect a
sudden reversal in the political situation, however: "What is more likely is
the beginning of a gradual return to the country's democratic institutions ....
Several years, even a decade might be required." Arguing that "the present
Argentine military regime does not have its roots dug deep into Argentine
tradition and life" and that it faced increasing opposition from the liberal
middle class, the leader of the Latin American establishment concluded that
the Farrell government was holding its own by "waving the banner of
outside interference with Argentine sovereignty-in other words, nonrecognition."33
When these and numerous other remonstrances failed to alter American
policy, the Latin Americanists, as they had done so many times in the past,
cited the need to preserve the credibility of the Good Neighbor Policy. Quite
simply, if the State Department continued to repeat the mistakes of the past,
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it would destroy the rapprochement between the United States and Latin
America that Washington had worked so hard during the 1930s to create.
The United States, Duggan declared, had achieved the trust of the Americas
"by openly and frankly laying the Big Stick on the shelf and relying instead
upon the development of a community of interests that would produce common attitudes and unity of action." All the republics save one responded by
rushing to the defense of the United States after Pearl Harbor. If the United
States destroyed the good faith upon which the Good Neighbor Policy was
based, as it was doing by its unilateral policy toward Argentina, it could
not expect cooperation and support in any future crisis.34
Hull, Long, and Spaeth responded to these charges in two ways. Their
rhetorical rebuttal consisted of another attempt to link the Farrell regime
with the Axis. "It is a travesty on the doctrine of nonintervention," the
secretary declared during a heated interview with Duggan and the Chilean
ambassador, "for any Government or group of military officials who are the
real power behind it to deny all their sister nations the right of self-defense
by attempting to shield behind the doctrine of nonintervention a notorious
state of pro-Axis activities within their boundaries."311 Or as he put it in a
draft of a speech on the Argentine matter some two months later: "To aid
the Argentine government is to aid the Axis powers in the present war."36
As they rejected the Latin Americanists' arguments, the internationalists
simultaneously moved to eliminate their dependence on Duggan, Bonsal,
and their subordinates for information on day-to-day events in the hemisphere and for implementation of policy toward Latin America. To do so,
they by-passed the top echelon of the Latin American establishment and
worked through the Division of River Plata Affairs (RPA), a component of
ARA.87 The officials in RPA, which was headed by Eric Wendelin, did not
possess wide experience in hemispheric affairs, had not participated in the
development of the Good Neighbor Policy to any extent, and were used to
dealing with the Argentine problen1 to the exclusion of all others.38 Hull,
Long, Spaeth, and their associates were able to obtain all needed intelligence
and to enforce complete nonintercourse with Argentina without consulting
ARA.39 Because Duggan and Bonsal no longer wished to be associated with
a policy that they believed was destroying hemispheric solidarity and because
they were by now completely excluded from the decision-making process,
the two career diplomats resigned in mid July. From then until the close of
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the year there was not a significant dissenting voice left within the State
Department to challenge the internationalists.40
There was, nevertheless, continuing bureaucratic competition from the
other extreme. As with virtually every other coercive technique employed
by the State Department, unilateral nonrecognition did not go far enough
to satisfy the Treasury Department. It did not produce an instantaneous
change in Argentine domestic and foreign policies, and it did nothing to
increase the Treasury's control over Argentine-American relations. Convinced that the State Department was appeasing an obviously Fascist state
either out of sympathy with its anti-Semitic policies or out of simple weakness, Morgenthau, White, Paul, Pehle, and their associates not only redoubled their efforts to have FDR approve a comprehensive freeze of Argentine assets but demanded that the State Department institute an absolute
embargo. Hull chose once again to oppose a freeze, primarily because he
perceived this to be a threat to his and the State Department's position in
the bureaucratic hierarchy; but he decided to support commercial nonintercourse, a tactic that could be implemented with a minimum of Treasury
interference.
The Treasury Department's approval on January 14 of the decision to
suspend the order freezing Argentine assets in the United States did not
signal a reversal of its hard-line approach but rather a momentary hope that
the break with the Axis was a prelude to a declaration of war. On February
2, however, White and his subordinates informed the Economic Division of
the State Department that the Argentine decree severing financial relations
with the Axis was proving to be totally ineffective. When Armour requested
that the Banco de la Nacion and the Banco de la Provincia be taken off the
list of blocked nationals as a sign of good will toward Buenos Aires, the
Treasury Department refused to do so. J. K. Bacon, an officer in ARA,
reported to Duggan and Bonsal that the Treasury Department still had a
chip on its shoulder as far as Argentina was concerned and was not willing
to give an inch to demonstrate America's trust in the present Argentine
government.41
Just as the hard-liners within the State Department used the transfer of
power from Ramfrez to Farrell as an occasion to institute nonrecognition,
Treasury Department officials attempted to utilize the coup once again to
persuade Hull-and, failing that, Roosevelt-to impound all Argentine assets
in the United States. Through their confidential sources in military intelli141
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gence, the department was able to follow developments in Argentina quite
closely. Reports received from General Strong seemed to confirm the suspicions of Treasury officials that Argentina was a thoroughly Fascist state and
a potential successor to the Third Reich.42 By the first week in March, Morgenthau faced a virtual rebellion among his subordinates concerning his
inability to persuade Hull to approve a general freeze.43 As a result, Morgenthau brought up Argentina during a conversation with Roosevelt on March
7. "This [Argentine fascism] is going to spread all through South America
and what you have accomplished in the last eleven years is all going up in
thin smoke," Morgenthau declared. "Yes," Roosevelt replied, "but we can't
prove anything on the Argentines." Morgenthau was incredulous at the
response, but FDR refused to approve any further action.44 At a departmental meeting on the ninth the secretary tried to placate Pehle and White
by threatening to deliver a "show cause" order to the State Department as to
why freezing controls had not been imposed.45
The secretary's resort to legal action remained merely a threat, however,
and by late April, Morgenthau, stung by continued criticism both implicit
and explicit from his subordinates, decided that it was time once again to
force Hull to make a decision, even if that necessitated going directly to the
White House. Morgenthau was at first unsure as to exactly what approach
he should employ. On the twenty-seventh he called Dean Acheson, who was
in overall charge of financial and economic matters in the State Department,
and informed him that he was bringing Leo Crowley, head of the Foreign
Economic Administration, to the State Department within the next day or
two and that they would jointly recommend the freezing of Argentine
assets.46 "I've just gotten to the point," Morgenthau told Acheson, "where I
don't feel that I'm living up to my responsibility if I don't make a firm
recommendation."47 Later in the day, in consultation with his subordinates,
the secretary, obviously agitated, dropped the Crowley plan and briefly considered bureaucratic blackmail as a device to achieve his objectives. He proposed going to Hull with a copy of a memorandum containing a scathing
indictment of Argentine domestic and foreign policies and recommending a
freeze. At the projected confrontation, Morgenthau would tell Hull that
unless the State Department authorized a complete blockage of Argentine
funds, the Treasury would once again take the matter into the inner sanctum
of the Oval Office.48 The record is unclear as to whether Morgenthau
actually visited the State Department. Late on March 27 he did send a
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written note to Hull, citing numerous anti-Argentine statements made by
the secretary of state in the past and urging an immediate freeze. 49
As in the past, Treasury officials were aided and abetted in their struggle
with the State Department by Henry Wallace. Although BEW had been
abolished in July 1943, Wallace remained deeply interested in the Argentine
situation. He continued to refer to the Argentine government as a "nest of
fascists" and as a tool of Nazi foreign policy. The ultimate objective of
Argentine expansionism, he told President Alfonso Lopez of Colombia in
January 1944, was the acquisition of the raw materials of southern South
America for the Third Reich.51> Wallace and his advisors were convinced
that the State Department's soft line toward Argentina was due in part to
its sympathy with the military-Catholic-landowner coalition which dominated Latin American politics and which was now throwing its support to
Farrell and Peron, just as "conservative Germany and conservative Italy"
had opted for Hitler and Mussolini.51 Revelations in early 1944 that Breckinridge Long had been blocking efforts to rescue Jewish refugees from occupied Europe aroused suspicions that anti-Semitism might also have something to do with America's "appeasement" of Argentina.52 Thus, alarmed
at the state of affairs in South America, certain that the State Department
leadership was thoroughly reactionary, and still smarting over Jones's and
Hull's successful vendetta against BEW, Wallace throughout 1944 harangued
Chief of Staff George Marshall, President Roosevelt, and other administration figures about the dangers of Argentine expansionism, the impotency of
State Department policies, and the need for an immediate freeze. 5s
The most the State Department would agree to do was to invite an
opinion from Armour.54 The ambassador's views on freezing had changed
since 1943. Prompted in large part by continuing interference with embassy operations on the part of officials from the Treasury and FEA,
Armour was once again adamantly opposed to a total blockage of funds.
His views were, no doubt, well known to Hull and his associates. On May
5 the secretary cabled Buenos Aires "that the Secretary of the Treasury has
again urged, and I am seriously considering, the desirability of subjecting
Argentina to a general Treasury freeze similar to the one proposed last
January." 55 The next day, Armour flatly rejected the scheme, terming it
superficial and counterproductive.
Morgenthau brought the simmering feud between himself and Hull, the
Treasury and State departments, to a head on May 10 by announcing to
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Hull that he had a responsibility to communicate his views on freezing in
writing to the President. As Morgenthau put it in a subsequent conversation
with one of his subordinates, that "was like lighting a match to a powder
keg." 56 Freezing, declared Hull, who had for one of the few times in his
life lost complete control of himself, was an obsession with Morgenthau, an
obsession that had gotten the United States into trouble more than once in
the past:
That is the trouble with you. You always want that [freezing].
That is what you wanted in the case of Japan. You are completely
wrong. If we had followed what you had done, we would have
been in the war right away .... You wanted to freeze the Japanese.
It is going to come out in the future! You were all wrong. The
Army wasn't ready, and the Navy, and we have been called, and
that is going to come out.57
Morgenthau, who never needed an excuse to bait Hull, retorted by accusing
the State Department of supplying the Japanese with the scrap iron and
aviation fuel with which to fight the war.58 On the afternoon following this
stormy interview, the Treasury Department officially requested the White
House to intercede and to allow it to freeze Argentine assets in the United
States. "We can win the battle of Europe and the Pacific," Morgenthau
wrote to FDR, "and find that we have lost the war, or what we were fighting
for, in our own backyard, i.e., a Fascist Latin America."59
Roosevelt responded to the Treasury Department's request during the
cabinet meeting of May 18. To Morgenthau's chagrin, FDR rejected a
freezing order on the grounds that Argentine shipments of raw materials
were too vital to the war effort to endanger and that Brazil was strong
enough to contain Argentine expansionism. Humiliated, Morgenthau withdrew.60 This marked both the last attempt by the Treasury Department to
leapfrog the State Department and the last serious effort to obtain a comprehensive freezing order. From the summer of 1944 on, Morgenthau was
preoccupied with plans for postwar Germany, and he wanted to do nothing
that would reduce his .influence in this area. 61

Despite their adamant opposition to confiscation of Argentine assets in
the United States, the internationalists were not opposed to economic sane-
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tions per se. As has been noted, their objections to freezing stemmed both
from fear that, if implemented, it would give the Treasury Department a
large degree of control over Argentine policy and from resentment over the
fact that Morgenthau had twice gone over Hull to the White House.62 An
economic embargo of Argentina offered no such bureaucratic threat. Moreover, to their minds, economic nonintercourse appeared to be consistent with
nonrecognition; it promised to exert a great deal more pressure on the
Farrell regime than freezing would; and it enjoyed a precedent in the diplomacy of Woodrow Wilson.
In their attempt to interdict all Allied trade with the Argentine, the
internationalists enjoyed-perhaps "endured" would be more apt-the support of their principal bureaucratic rivals. The Treasury Department and
Vice-President Wallace were strong backers of an embargo. Wallace, who
had taken a much-publicized tour of Latin America in 1943, told Treasury
officials in March 1944 that, given the threat to peace and democracy in
Latin America posed by the Farrell-Peron regime, the Allies should make
whatever sacrifices were necessary in order to isolate Argentina economically .68 Morgenthau was in wholehearted agreement. Over lunch with
Marvin Jones, the war food administrator, who adamantly opposed sanctions
for fear they would eliminate Argentina as a source of food, and Wallace,
the secretary of the treasury expressed disgust with those who were not
willing to pull in "our protruding belt one little notch" and declared that if
"the President gave him the job of seeing this thing through [ the embargo]
he would see to it that the British stopped shipping food from Argentina,
even if he had to blockade Argentine ports."64 Jones, whose primary concern
was supply, was not enthusiastic. Shortly thereafter, the vice-president proposed buying up British investments in Argentina-all $1.3 billion worth
-and reselling them to the Argentineans in return for concessions in the
political and diplomatic sphere.65 Because they believed that Hull was dragging his feet on the matter of an embargo, Wallace and Morgenthau at one
point schemed to have Tom Connally, chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, "put a little heat on the Secretary of State."66
In addition, congressional and public support for sanctions increased
markedly during 1944. Emanuel Celler of New York proclaimed: "We
should blockade the ports of Argentina, embargo essential gasoline, and
terminate a most lucrative export trade of hides, corn, meat, and wheat. The
Farrell-Peron militarist-Fascist government would then collapse." Even the
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usually cautious New York Times was calling for all-out economic warfare
by July. Added belt-tightening, according to the editors, would surely result
in the calling of elections and the turning out of the Farrell government.67
In opposition, however, were a wide variety of organizations and agencies whose sole concern was Allied victory on the battlefield. Not the least
of these was the Combined Chiefs of Staff. As early as 1 February 1944,
this highest of Allied military bodies notified the State Department that the
cessation of purchases of meat, wheat, and leather from Argentina would
have "serious military implications." 68 Military authorities remained adamantly opposed to sanctions throughout the remainder of the war, and
despite Morgenthau's comment that the Chiefs of Staff were totally incompetent when it came to economic warfare, their views carried a great deal of
weight with FDR and Harry Hopkins.
Adding their voices to those of Allied military authorities were various
combined boards that were responsible for fueling the Allied war effort in
Europe. The State Department began a drive to gain the support of these
agencies as early as January 1944, when Hull and his associates were considering a cessation of trade in connection with the Bolivian coup. At that
point and periodically throughout the rest of the year, the State Department
asked what and how much the United Nations proposed to buy from
Argentina in 1944, how the liberated areas would figure in such purchases,
what foregoing Argentina as a source of raw materials would cost Allied
civilian populations and military forces, and how long the Allies could
endure without Argentine products.69
Replies from the combined boards gave no encouragement whatsoever
to advocates of an embargo. The United Nations' dependence on Argentina
was high, reported the Combined Food Board in January 1944, and of so
vital a nature that the Board "would regard with the gravest apprehension
the cessation of Argentine supplies." The agency's recommendation was
unambiguous: "We know of no political possibility of meeting the position
which would be created by their withdrawal." 70 Submitting a supplementary
report in April, the food authorities noted that two conditions had changed:
world food demands had increased, and the United Kingdom had undertaken new commitments to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces, General Eisenhower. As a result, (1) food consumption
was at a level in Great Britain below which the British government would
not allow it to fall; (2) there could be no further cuts in United Kingdom
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quotas if commitments to the Supreme Commander were to be met; and
(3) the United States members had received specific instructions from the
president to use the board's resources to meet the heavy relief demands from
devastated areas.71
The Combined Raw Materials Board was equally as pessimistic. Rationing of boots and shoes was in effect in both the United States and Great
Britain; loss of the Argentine supply would result in an end to domestic
supplies in both nations. The agency's objections to an embargo became
even more strident in March when the White House notified United States
delegates to the raw-materials agency that relief and rehabilitation requirements were to be regarded as equally important with maintaining the
economies of the other members of the United Nations and the Associated
Nations. 72
Shipping authorities asserted that the balance between the requirements
of the European theater and the tonnage that was available did not leave a
sufficient margin to take care of the increase in distances that would result
if purchases from the Argentineans were cut off. The board informed
Acheson that it refused to assume responsibility for any resulting shortages.73
All relevant inter-Allied agencies, in short, judged that Argentine exports were essential to the Anti-Axis Alliance's war effort, vital to the British
economy, and extremely important to United States consumers. With the
steady increase in wartime devastation and with the expansion of the area of
liberation, the situation could only worsen.
As in 1942 and 1943, however, Great Britain was the chief impediment
to the imposition of economic sanctions. Typical of British arguments in
favor of restraint toward Argentina was that put forward by Neville Butler,
undersecretary for North and South America, in a conversation with a
member of the United States embassy in London. Using language reminiscent of Welles and Duggan, Butler asserted that the current Argentine
regime was an extreme nationalistic-militaristic government rather than
Fascist in the commonly accepted sense. Extreme pressure from abroad
would only accentuate this nationalism and "make heroes of certain individuals." He predicted that if the Farrell regime were overthrown, it would
surely be replaced by a more intransigent one. 74 The British generally
agreed with this point of view. A July editorial in the Economist blasted the
idea of Anglo-American cooperation in economic sanctions. United StatesBritish collusion in a drive to topple the present Argentine regime would
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"greatly antagonize the Argentines who are rightly sensitive about their
sovereignty."75
The key commodity in Anglo-American discussions concerning economic sanctions was meat. Britain's desire to augment its political influence
in South America and a determination to protect British investments in
Argentina were the prime considerations behind British policy; but Whitehall, for obvious reasons, chose to center its arguments on the importance of
Argentine beef to the British public and to Allied armies in Europe. When
Whitehall was pleading with Washington to forego economic sanctions in
connection with the Bolivian coup, Churchill cabled Roosevelt: "I beg you
to look into the formidable consequences which would follow our losing
their hides, meats, and other supplies. We get from them one-third of our
meat supply. If this is cut out, how are we to feed ourselves plus the
American Army for Overlord?" 76
The internationalists accepted beef as the most important consideration
in any program of economic sanctions, not because of its importance to the
Allied war effort or to Britain's nutritional well-being, but because it was
Argentina's chief export. Hull, Long, Spaeth, and the other hard-liners
suspected throughout the war that Whitehall was overstressing Britain's
dependence on Argentine meat and that that nation was quite capable of
enduring any shortages that might result from a cessation of trade with
Argentina. In March 1944, officials of the United States Mission for Economic Affairs in London advised the secretary of state that Whitehall had
been underestimating its meat stockpiles to the amount of some 300,000 tons
and that, in their opinion, British attitudes toward a beef embargo were at
best "cautious."77 On March 5, Stettinius told Morgenthau that the State
Department had found that the statistics that the combined boards had
given to it regarding supply reserves were generally inaccurate.78 Thenceforth, the internationalists operated on the assumption that British representatives had hopelessly prejudiced the findings of the Combined Boards
and that the United Kingdom could reasonably be expected to forego Argentine meat for a period necessary to bring the Farrell government down.
Hull and his associates decided to use the Anglo-American diplomatic
conferences scheduled for April to approach the British once again. When,
at that conclave, Stettinius pressed Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden to commit the Churchill government to an embargo, Eden informed the undersecretary that the imposition of sanctions would be very difficult for his
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country but that Britain would go along if the United States would give the
proper guarantees on shipping and supply problems. These the State Department simply could not provide.79
Morgenthau and Wallace urged the State Department to appeal to FDR
to exert pressure on the British, but Hull, Stettinius, and their associates
believed that the opponents of an embargo both in London and Washington
were still too strong to risk a direct confrontation. The State Department's
estimate of the situation proved to be entirely correct. At the May 18 cabinet
meeting at which FDR quashed the Treasury Department's request for a
freeze, the president also shunted aside Morgenthau's demand for an embargo. "Henry wants to apply sanctions," Roosevelt told Stettinius, "but you
can't do that on account of the English, and the food. . . . Ed, you make a
bad face at the Argentineans once a week. You have to treat them like
children."80
By the summer of 1944, however, Hull and his colleagues believed it
was pointless to wait any longer. It was obvious that the British were not
going to accept Washington's view of the Argentine affair voluntarily. More
importantly, by mid 1944, State Department officials were convinced that
London was plotting to incorporate Latin America into its strategic defenses
as well as make it the cornerstone of its postwar economic empire. For
example, beginning in June, Washington frantically sought comprehensive
airbase agreements with the Vargas regime and other American governments. "The necessity for covering the situation," Berle told Hull, "is increased by the very active British operations now going forward for surveying bases and routes allegedly for use by the R.A.F. in transporting men
and material to the Far East after the war, but which are very obviously
undertaken with longer range objectives in mind." 81
In addition, Britain was in the midst of negotiating a long-term meat
contract with Argentina which, if concluded, would end any chance of instituting an effective program of economic nonintercourse. On July 15 the
secretary of state called at 1600 Pennsylvania A venue and urged Roosevelt
to persuade Churchill to use Britain's buying power in the Argentine export
market "to let Argentina know beyond a doubt that we are all fed up with
the pro-Axis sentiments and practices of her government."82 The president
refused to ask Churchill to forego a meat agreement 83 and would consent
only to requesi: the British to show their disfavor in some manner that would
not threaten the Allied war effort or Anglo-American consumers.84
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In frustration the internationalists decided to implement a unilateral
intensification of economic warfare against the Farrell-Peron government.
In August, Hull ordered a reduction of forty to sixty-five percent in all
United States imports from Argentina. At the same time he refused a request from the Caribbean Defense Command that United States export
policy toward Argentina be revised in order to allow airplane parts to be
shipped to that country. Later in the month the State Department established the Inter-Departmental Economic Committee on Argentina, which
had as its primary objective the coordination of economic sanctions against
that country.85 Protests from sectors of the American business community
that were dependent on Argentine trade had no impact whatsoever on Hull
and his colleagues. As a memorandum from Spaeth to Long on the subject
clearly indicates,86 preservation of America's economic empire in Latin
America did not at that point top the State Department's list of priorities:
There is a disposition to resist an affirmative stand, to seek to carry
on "business as usual," and to be governed primarily by the possibility of postwar trade benefits in Argentina. Such thinking recalls
only too clearly the attitude toward Germany and Italy in the
months before the War. 87
Unilateral attempts at economic constriction proved as fruitless as they
had in 1942 and 1943. Argentina continued to prosper. Consequently, as
Anglo-Argentine meat negotiations drew ever closer to a successful completion, Hull became desperate. In mid September he informed Lord Halifax
that if the Fascist threat in Argentina grew and began to threaten the rest
of Latin America, the repercussions could be quite severe for Great Britain.
If worst came to worst, the United States would feel compelled to publish
all the facts about Britain's reluctance to cooperate in bringing Argentina
into line. FDR, Hull informed the ambassador, felt that His Majesty's government could furnish full cooperation without endangering their meat
supply and that they could exert great influence as the purchasing party in
a buyer's market. He concluded the talk with the gratuitous observation
that British officials were unduly apprehensive about the lpss of Argentine
beef because they had made only a superficial study of the matter.88 Shortly
thereafter, the United States embassy in London informed Whitehall that
until the United States could discern more clearly Britain's export-import
policy toward Argentina, the State Department would feel obligated to with-
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hold equipment needed to facilitate Argentine exports to the United Kingdom.89 Finally, on October 10, Hull instructed Ambassador Winant to
make it clear to Eden that the United Kingdom was contributing to the
survival of a state that was "working feverishly" to subvert the independence
of its neighbors, while at the same time it served as a New World refuge for
Nazi technicians, economists, and military personnel.90
At the last possible moment an extremely annoyed Churchill capitulated
by agreeing to delay six months before signing a comprehensive meat contract with Argentina. Nevertheless, he warned Roosevelt and Hull, Whitehall would honor this pledge only on the condition that the United States
keep all other buyers out of the Argentine meat market.91
Actually, Churchill's pledge was meaningless, because British purchases
in Argentina not only continued but increased. Moreover, London let Buenos Aires know that it would resume negotiations on a comprehensive agreement at the earliest possible date. 92 As a result, phase two of Washington's
trade-restriction offensive was no more effective than the 1943 campaign had
been. The Wall Street Journal ran an extensive survey of South America in
late 1944 which reported that Argentina was the best-fed country in the
world. Clothing was plentiful, housing was adequate, transportation was
good, and prices were low. "There have been fewer interferences with the
individual's freedom to move from place to place," the Journal reported, "to
buy what he wants when he wants it; to work when and as he pleases....
There has been less interference in the conduct of private business, and there
have been fewer labor altercations and disturbances." 93 Argentina was definitely not in a revolutionary state of mind.
In retrospect, one of the key factors in the State Department's failure
to persuade Britain to cooperate in economic sanctions was Roosevelt's consistent refusal to make up Britain's loss of meat supplies out of stockpiles
earmarked for consumption in the United States. Nineteen forty-four was
an election year, and the White House was convinced that the electorate
would retaliate against the administration at the polls for the ten percent cut
in meat rations which any diversion to England would necessitate. Ironically,
the internationalists' program of economic coercion against Argentina, motivated in part by a desire to reduce domestic criticism of the White House,
was sabotaged by a president who was convinced that the political cost of
such a program would be prohibitive.
All the while that Hull, Long, Spaeth, and Wendelin were maneuvering
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to avoid one kind of economic sanction and to implement another, the State
Department continued to avoid formal diplomatic contact with the Farrell
government. As the Latin Americanists had predicted, nonrecognition did
not weaken the Farrell regime in Argentina, and more importantly, it
hindered Washington in its pursuit of America's long-range goals in the
hemisphere. The internationalists believed that in announcing nonrecognition on March 4, they would create irresistible pressure on the other states
of the hemisphere to join in isolating Buenos Aires. It quickly became
apparent that Hull and his colleagues had sadly miscalculated. By March 9
Chile, Paraguay, and Bolivia had established relations with Argentina. Of
those who agreed to support the North American position, only Costa Rica,
the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Panama assented to Washington's request that they make public statements denouncing
the Farrell regime. Uruguay, the object of intense pressure from her neighbor across the Plata, notified the State Department that she could not hold
out for long.94 Brazil, which welcomed as a sign of weakness every new
change of government in Buenos Aires, perceived no threat in the Farrell
regime. While Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha fended off United States
demands that Rio join the nonrecognition front, leading Brazilian newspapers abounded with expressions of friendship for Argentina.95 Typical of
these journals was O Globo, which repeatedly voiced its desire that the
"recent misunderstanding" between the United States and Argentina could
soon be resolved. 96 Even Mexico, certainly one of America's staunchest
wartime supporters, refused to lend unconditional support. On March 7
Foreign Minister Ezequiel Padilla informed Washington that because of a
lack of information, he could not make a public statement denouncing the
Farrell government. The longer the difficulties with Argentina dragged on,
he warned the United States ambassador, George Messersmith, the harder
they would be to resolve.97
Argentine propagandists proved quite successful in 1943--44 in exploiting
popular discontent within various pro-Allied republics that resulted from
rationing, shortages, and various other material discomforts caused by the
war. Argentine prosperity was much on the minds of his countrymen,
Brazil's Ambassador Carlos Martins told Berle in January 1944. Argentines
had made steady capital out of the "ease and luxury of their own life ...
and ascribed it to the fact that they were neutral while others had been
fools enough to join the war effort." Martins complained bitterly that Wash-
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ington was taking its Latin allies for granted. The United States was refusing to provide the steel, tin plate, and machinery necessary to maintain
Brazil's economy at merely prewar levels and, in so doing, was contributing
to Argentina's drive to win the hemisphere to neutrality. During 1944, then,
the Vargas regime and a number of other Latin governments were beginning to question whether blind acquiescence in Washington's anti-Argentine
campaign really served their interests. A more "independent" course might
compel the Roosevelt administration to be more sensitive to the needs of its
cobelligerents.98
Too, many latinos believed that both the objectives and the tactics of
America's Argentine policy represented a throwback to the not-so-distant
past, when the United States treated the hemispheric republics as retarded
wards. In the first place, Latin America had historically defined the withholding of recognition from an existing government as diplomatic intervention into the affairs of another state. In 1930 Mexico's foreign minister,
Manuel Estrada, announced that henceforth Mexico would simply "maintain
or recall, when it is deemed appropriate, its diplomatic officials in other
countries, and accept ... the diplomatic officials accredited in Mexico, without passing judgment ... on the right which other nations have to accept,
maintain, or replace their government or authorities." 99 The Estrada Doctrine was, of course, a reaction to the then prevailing United States policy
of refusing to recognize other American governments which, in its opinion,
were not legally constituted, and it was designed to provoke Washington
into foreswearing the use of such a coercive tactic. After the inauguration
of the Good Neighbor Policy, New Deal diplomats accepted the Estrada
interpretation and assured the hemispheric community that henceforth
America would recognize New World governments purely on a de facto
basis.100 Not surprisingly, a number of Latin states believed that Washington's nonrecognition of the Farrell regime constituted a repudiation of the
Estrada Doctrine, a change of policy that was not justified by a threat to
the peace and security of the hemisphere. Perhaps even more offensive to the
latinos than the policy of nonintercourse was the fact that Washington had
proceeded unilaterally, thus vitiating the principle of consultation upon
which the Inter-American System rested. Finally, during 1944 most Latin
Americans came to the conclusion that the Farrell government posed no
threat to the Allied war effort and that the State Department's primary
objective was democratization of the Argentine political system, a goal that
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they believed to be beyond the proper scope of United States foreign policy.
Increasingly, the Latin republics saw in North America's coercion of Argentina the setting of a number of precedents that would pose a potential
threat to their own national sovereignty. 1O1 These considerations, voiced
frequently by prominent latinos and, before their departure in July, the
Latin Americanists, had no impact on the State Department's leadership.

In view of the pervasiveness of Argentine nationalism and the presence
of such ultranationalists as Perlinger in the cabinet, Farrell and Peron could
hardly have moved toward a more conciliatory position after the State
Department instituted its policy of denunciation and nonrecognition, even if
they had wished to do so. Instead, Argentina began to retaliate. In early
March the minister of the interior demanded of All-America Cables-the
Anglo-American company that provided Argentina with international cable
service- that all communiques from the United States embassy be delivered
first to the Argentine Foreign Office. When the company refused, the government closed All-America for twenty-four hours and imposed an embargo
on AP and UPI for sending uncensored dispatches.102 The government
began disseminating rumors that it was going to nationalize foreign interests as a penalty for nonrecognition, rumors that soon became reality.108
After expropriating a portion of the American and Foreign Power Co.,
Perlinger ordered seizure of the East Argentine Electric Company.104 By
preying on unprotected American and British interests, the government
hoped to bring home to the State Department the disadvantages of nonrecognition.
Instead, these and other acts of economic retribution, coupled with two
events that transpired in June, prompted the State Department to withdraw
its ambassador from Buenos Aires, further reducing the opportunity for
communication and thus reconciliation. The first of these events concerned
a secret meeting between Armour and key figures in the Farrell regime. By
mid May the Latin American states within the nonrecognition camp began
to grow extremely restive. A number of republics let the State Department
know that they wanted to establish relations with the Farrell government
before May 25, Argentine National Independence Day.rn 5 Pointing out that
the United States still recognized such neutrals as Iceland, Switzerland, and
Spain, they questioned the validity of continued nonintercourse with the
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Farrell government and warned that it would be a grave insult to the Argentine people not to attend the official functions scheduled in connection
with the nation's birthday. The State Department's refusal to consent intensified hemispheric demands for a rapprochement. Complaining that pressure from the other American representatives in Buenos Aires was growing
stronger, Armour cabled Hull on June 16, asking for permission, for appearance's sake if nothing else, to enter into secret talks with Orlando Peluffo,
the Argentine foreign minister. When Hull reluctantly agreed, Armour
proceeded with the covert conference.106 The ambassador was received not
only by Peluffo but by Peron and the former ambassador to the United
States., Felipe Espil, as well. The Argentineans opened the discussion by
accusing the United States of employing crude pressure tactics, citing Admiral Ingram's trip to Montevideo as an example, and they warned that the
government could cope with any economic sanctions that Britain and the
United States might impose. On the positive side, Peron, Peluffo, and Espil
promised that in return for normalization of relations, the Casa Rosada
would cut off all aid to pro-Axis firms and newspapers and would fully
implement a break in relations with the Axis.107 The meeting came to an
abrupt halt, however, when Peluffo informed Armour that to avoid the
appearance of foreign pressure, the United States would have to recognize
Argentina before Argentina would take any further steps to comply with
Washington's wishes.108 The entire episode infuriated the State Department,
which regarded it as a ploy designed to create the appearance of recognition.
No less upsetting to the internationalists than the Armour-Peluffo encounter was a highly publicized, ultrachauvinistic speech delivered by Juan
Peron at the University of La Plata on June 10. Although it did not become
apparent until late 1944, Peron favored a rapprochement with the United
States. As World War II ground toward a successful conclusion, the colonel
saw that if the nation were to break out of its existing isolation and were to
play an active role in the postwar world, Buenos Aires would have to seek
accommodation with Washington. 109 In June, however, the man who was
to dominate Argentina politics for a generation had not yet regained the
confidence of the integral nationalists, a group that he felt he had to win
over before he could embark on any new, dramatic schemes or international
initiatives. Many of his former colleagues in the GOU distrusted his ties
with organized labor and his views on international affairs. Argentina, he
proclaimed to the graduating class at La Plata, had to rededicate itself to the
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principle of national defense. The victorious powers in the present conflict,
whoever they might be, would surely fall out among themselves and would
probably "attempt to establish in the world an odious imperialism which
will obligate the oppressed to rebel." The power of Argentina's armed forces
must be increased, he asserted, "in order to ensure the respect and consideration it [Argentina] deserves in the world concert and in the family of
nations."110 He called for long-range planning and total mobilization to
prepare the nation for the coming struggle. The speech was a political
gambit. Industrial and military leaders welcomed Peron's theme of ensuring
peace by preparing for war, while the integral nationalists were gleeful over
what they perceived to be a veiled threat to the United States.111
Analyses of the address by military intelligence, as well as the speech
itself, confirmed the Hull group's conviction that the Farrell government
represented the same faction that had plotted the overthrow of the Bolivian
government in the last days of 1943. A report from the Office of Strategic
Services entitled "The Significance of Peron's Speech of June 10" stated that
the minister of war and labor had called for
the scrapping of the present hemispheric system of peaceful consultation and the substitution of power politics based on armed
force. It also confirms ... that the guiding principle and major
factor holding the Farrell regime together had been preparation for
military action in support of a program of economic and territorial
expansion aimed at giving Argentina political and economic control
of its neighbors and eventual hegemony over the entire South
American continent.11 2
This document, given wide credence by the internationalists, even hinted
that the author of the La Plata address was not Peron but a highly placed
Nazi official.113
In response to the abortive Pelu.ffo-Armour talks, to Peron's speech, 114
and to the demands made by Morgenthau, Wallace, and Crowley, the State
Department persuaded the White House to recall Armour, pressured the
British into withdrawing their ambassador from Buenos Aires, 115 and delivered the tirade against Argentina that had been planned for release on
January 25. On June 22 the secretary of state announced to all diplomatic
representatives of the United States in the Western Hemisphere that since
the Farrell government had continually denied the relevance of hemispheric
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defense commitments and since, by repeatedly insisting that the rupture was
due to foreign pressure, it had implicitly disavowed any intention to honor
its obligations, Ambassador Norman Armour was being recalled.U 6 Meanwhile, the president, at the behest of the State Department, ordered the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to make all necessary preparations to defend Paraguay,
Uruguay, or any other state that was vulnerable to an attack by Argentina.117 On July 26 the secretary of state delivered one of the strongest verbal
blasts ever leveled at a nation with which the United States was not at war.
It was abundantly clear, he proclaimed in a press release, that Argentina
"has deliberately violated the pledge taken jointly with its sister republics to
cooperate in support of the war against the Axis . . . and has openly and
notoriously been giving affirmative assistance to the declared enemies of the
United Nations." Turning to United States policy, he declared that to recognize Argentina then would be "seriously to damage the Allied cause" and
would undermine hemispheric and wartime principles. What was more, the
pro-Axis and totalitarian elements that dominated Argentina had thoroughly
suppressed the basic civil rights of the Argentine citizenry. On the basis of
both its domestic and foreign policies, therefore, the clique then holding
forth in Buenos Aires was beyond the pale.11 8
As had been true so often in the past, those in control of Argentine
affairs were able to use the State Department's intemperate blasts to rally
public support for the government and to create a ground swell of antiAmericanism. Government censors permitted domestic papers to carry full
texts of the press release, while Buenos Aires recalled Ambassador Escobar
from Washington.119 La Naci6n and El Mundo ran editorials on June 27
in support of the government in general and Per6n in particular. Claiming
that Argentina had steadfastly supported the Allies, they argued that their
country, by standing up to the United States, was defending not only its
own sovereignty but that of free states everywhere.120 La Prensa, the great
prodemocratic and pro-Allied daily of Buenos Aires, scored Hull's indictments as unfounded and denounced his habit of discussing weighty international problems in "impromptu declarations to the press." With America's
entire policy of nonintercourse no doubt in mind, the editors advised Washington that diplomacy should be conducted by direct personal contact between diplomats, not by means of news releases.121 Not since the war began
had the Argentine nation been so unified.
Increasingly convinced that the Argentine problem was simply a bi-
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lateral squabble between Washington and Buenos Aires, a number of Latin
American states attempted during the summer and fall of 1944 to mediate between the two. In July the Paraguayan and Uruguayan ambassadors called
on Hull and urged him to outline publicly the steps that Argentina must
take in order to elicit recognition.122 Shortly thereafter, the Peruvian representative in Washington arranged an interview at the State Department,
during which he asked what he and his country could do to bring Buenos
Aires and Washington closer together.123 In early September the foreign
minister of the Dominican Republic, a nation that was virtually immune to
direct pressure from Argentine, called on Breckinridge Long and pushed
for the presentation of specific terms to Buenos Aires. The present situation,
he declared, was only strengthening the hand of the extreme nationalists
within Argentina.124
Although it did not dare offer its services as an intermediary, Whitehall
tacitly supported the Latin drive to break the Argentine-American impasse.
The British had agreed to withdraw their representative from Buenos Aires,
but they did so grudgingly. United States policy had caused great "anxiety"
in the War Cabinet and the Foreign Office, Churchill wrote Roosevelt after
an appeal for Ambassador Kelly's recall. Asserting that he could not see
where United States tactics were leading or what Washington hoped to
gain, the prime minister expressed the hope that coercion of Argentina
would not injure either vital Anglo-American interests in Argentina or the
war effort in Europe. What was more, he complained, "This American
decision [has] placed us in an invidious position, having been taken without
consultation with us .... We were faced with a fdit accompli."125
Latinos who were disgusted with the State Department's hard-line
approach to inter-American affairs also received vigorous support from
Sumner Welles. By January 1944 the former undersecretary's columns on
foreign affairs were appearing not only in papers across the United States
but in journals throughout Latin America, including La Nacion of Buenos
Aires.126 In late May he came out strongly for recognition of the Farrell
regime and told his readers that attempts to change existing Latin governments through nonrecognition would inevitably stimulate the nationalist
movements that were already burgeoning south of the Rio Grande. The
State Department's attempts to establish a pro-United States puppet regime
in Buenos Aires, he warned, would only earn the unremitting hostility of
the Argentine people.127 As of 25 June 1944, the Casa Rosada required all
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federally subsidized newspapers and radio stations to carry Welles's remarks.128 In September the former undersecretary presided over a secret
meeting of Latin American officials at his home in Bar Harbor, Maine. The
discussion centered on the need for an inter-American conference on postwar
problems and on the state of Argentine-American relations. News of the
conclave prompted Hull to complain bitterly to Stimson and Morgenthau
that Welles "seemed to be operating a second State Department."129
In the face of this criticism and the attempts by various Latin republics
to mediate, Hull and his associates clung ever more firmly to nonrecognition
and attempted to coerce into submission those states that objected to Washington's tactics.130 Both the pressure applied to dissenting members of the
hemispheric community and the rhetoric that accompanied it once again
revealed the degree to which the Argentine problem had come to overshadow all other considerations. Chile, which had steadfastly refused to sever
relations with the Farrell government, hoped, despite its refusal to join in
the nonrecognition front, to improve relations with the United States during
1944. The State Department responded to Chilean initiatives by denouncing
that nation's "collaboration" with Buenos Aires. When, in March, Chilean
officials inquired about the possibility of having President Rios visit the
United States, Hull indicated that he would be welcome only after his
country had reversed itself on the Argentine matter. Shortly thereafter the
secretary confided to the United States ambassador to Chile: "While the
Chilean people have given constant indications of their wholehearted sympathy for our cause ... I cannot honestly say that the record of the Chilean
government impresses me in an equally favorable light." 181
Other states that urged Washington to settle its differences with Buenos
Aires encountered threats of economic coercion. When on July 12 the
Bolivian charge d'affaires, whose government still maintained relations with
the Farrell regime, offered Bolivia's services as mediator, Hull blew up. If
La Paz equivocated much longer, the secretary declared, the United States
would make permanent arrangements for acquiring its tin supplies from
Indochina rather than from the mines of Bolivia.182
Just as they had come to equate Argentine neutrality with a pro-Axis
posture, the internationalists in the summer and fall of 1944 began to view
diplomatic intercourse with the Farrell government as a form of aid to the
Rome-Berlin-Tokyo coalition. On July 1, State Department officials told the
Chilean representative in Washington that if the republics then abjuring
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relations with Buenos Aires were to reverse themselves and recognize the
Farrell regime, then they would be "paying her a premium for her desertion
and treason." "It is manifestly impossible," he continued, "to give full support to the Allied cause while at the same time giving strength and vigor to
the Argentine Government while it supports the cause of Hitler and Germany.... Thus to aid the Argentine Government is to aid the Axis powers
in the present War."133 Moreover, Washington argued that to enter into
diplomatic relations with Argentina would be to reward a state for violating
its international obligations and thus would undermine the principle of
collective security upon which the peace and security of the postwar world
was to rest. Now was the time, Hull told Halifax in late August, "to
develop a tradition of respect for such obligations among civilized nations ....
Only by persisting in a firm collective policy can we develop a real and
practical sense of international responsibility, not only among governments
but also among peoples."134

The Argentine-American dispute was only one of a number of problems
that Latin diplomats believed the hemisphere needed to solve before the
end of World War II. The Latin American republics were disturbed about
being excluded from the major diplomatic conferences of the war, particularly the meeting held at Dumbarton Oaks in the fall of 1944 to discuss the
creation of a world organization.135 An increasing number of latinos hoped
to strengthen the Inter-American System in order that it might serve as a
bastion against communism,136 a restraint on North American imperialism,
and a device for enhancing the hemisphere's unity and influence within the
new world organization.13 7 In addition, a majority wanted to commit the
United States to a transition from wartime to peacetime purchasing programs
in Latin America that would not disrupt the fragile economies of the region.
As always, they looked to North American capital and technical assistance
to facilitate industrialization and thus to drive living standards upward.138
The desire south of the Rio Grande for a general inter-American conference
to solve these and related problems was, by late 1944, virtually universal.
Hoping to take advantage of the rising discontent in Latin America
and the widespread desire for a hemispheric conference, on October 30 the
Farrell-Peron government officially requested the Governing Board of the
Pan American Union to hold an inter-American meeting in order to con-
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sider Argentina's situation in relation to the rest of the hemisphere. While
emphasizing the righteousness of its cause, Buenos Aires proclaimed that
Argentina was willing to go an extra mile to achieve reconciliation. The
Farrell government maintained that the systematic consultation outside a
formal conference engaged in by the rest of the hemisphere in connection
with nonrecognition would constitute a violation of Pan-Americanism as
defined at Lima, and it argued that only a full-dress consultative meeting
of the PAU was qualified to formulate policy for all the Americas. The only
reason that Argentina was so unselfishly submitting her international conduct to Pan-American scrutiny, declared the Foreign Office, was a desire to
see that the postwar world would be established on a foundation of unity
and harmony.139
As Buenos Aires had hoped, a number of Latin American states literally
leapt to the support of the Argentine proposal. Several governments, including those of Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador, indicated their immediate approval of Argentina's request, arguing that Argentina could not
really be denied such a meeting under the rules of the PAU.140 Venezuela
declared that Argentina was sincerely trying to make honorable amends
and should be respected for subjecting itself to the judgment of the other
American republics. 141 On November 6 Ezequiel Padilla of Mexico pressed
the attack by suggesting to Washington that when Argentina's request came
before the Governing Board, the Mexican ambassador would propose a foreign ministers' meeting to discuss general subjects. At the same time he
would also move a delay of two or three months during which Argentina
would have an opportunity to reincorporate itself into the hemispheric family. Asserting that he was speaking not only for his own government but
for the ambassadors of Brazil, Cuba, and Uruguay, the Mexican foreign
minister implied that reincorporation of Argentina into the hemispheric fold
should be the goal of each member of the American community. He made
it clear that if Buenos Aires were to comply with conditions to be established
by the nonrecognizing governments, then the Farrell government should be
accorded recognition and a seat at the forthcoming meeting of foreign
ministers.142
The Argentine initiative and Latin America's response threw the State
Department into a momentary state of confusion. There was no question
as to what attitude to adopt toward the Farrell government's proposal.
Throughout 1944 the internationalists had adamantly opposed the calling of
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an inter-American meeting. Not only had it been a pet project of the
Welles-Duggan-Bonsal group,143 but more importantly, Hull and his associates feared that Argentina would be able to use any such conclave to
escape from its diplomatic isolation without having to institute the proper
"reforms."144 Furthermore, the internationalists, in addition to a number of
others within the Roosevelt foreign-policy establishment, opposed the holding of a hemispheric conference prior to the United Nations Conference of
International Organization (UNCIO), scheduled for April 1945, for fear
that the Latin American republics would insist on amending the Dumbarton
Oaks proposals so as to preserve the sanctity of regional arrangements such
as the Inter-American System.145 Such reservations would, United States
diplomats feared, hamstring the unborn world organization by making it
less than a collective-security system or by alienating the Russians, or both.
The way in which the State Department reacted to the Argentine request
indicates that of these factors the most important to the internationalists was
the possibility that Argentina might secure readmittance as a full-fledged
member of the hemispheric community.146 Hull was absent from the State
Department due to illness-the secretary was sick and away from the department between 30 and 40 percent of the time in 1943 and 1944-when
Padilla's suggestion was received.147 Nevertheless, Long, Spaeth, and Wendelin were present to combat any attempt at "appeasement."
The State Department sought to foil the Farrell government's machination by first giving way on the issue of a foreign ministers' meeting to
discuss general problems and then holding fast against reincorporation of
Argentina into the hemispheric fold. The immediate problem, however,
was to prevent any additional Latin American republics from publicly declaring their support for the Argentine proposition. On October 28 Washington reminded the Latin American governments that the states of the
hemisphere must reach a consensus before an answer could be given to the
Farrell government. 148 The next day the internationalists expressed their
view of the Argentine initiative in no uncertain terms. "It is our judgment,"
RPA informed the United States charge d'affaires in Mexico City, "that the
Argentine proposal is a brazen and insincere move which does not deserve
consideration on its merits." The Farrell regime was well aware of what it
needed to do to regain grace. A conference on Argentina would only provide Buenos Aires with another opportunity to make mec}ningless pledges,
and "the American republics would certainly not accord recognition at a
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meeting on the basis of a mere promise of future performance."149 By
November 11, however, Stettinius, Long, Spaeth, Armour, and their subordinates had decided that they were going to have to make some concessions lest a full-scale revolt should erupt.150 After Padilla put forth his proposal on November 6 and again on the ninth, Breckinridge Long, with
White House approval, suggested to the foreign minister that he push for a
consultative meeting on war and postwar problems, including the creation
of a hemispheric collective-security organization. If they wished to do so,
the Argentineans could send a representative to appear at the conclusion of
the regular meeting and to present the Farrell-Per6n government's case for
the holding of a conference to hear its problems. Under no circumstances,
however, would the United States consent to the creation of a formula by
which Buenos Aires could gain recognition.151 "There is grave danger,"
Stettinius asserted, "in the creation of a fa!?de of unity behind which hostile forces can work to undermine and destroy everything for which we have
been fighting."152
Latin America was hardly placated by Washington's "compromise"
plan. On November 14 Padilla called a meeting of the American ambassadors in Mexico City to discuss the Argentine situation. Ambassador Messersmith was conspicuously absent from the conference. In his report to the
Latin American diplomatic corps, Padilla termed the State Department's
reply to the Latin American proposals "a harsh and peremptory repetition
of the irreconcilable United States position." The Peruvian ambassador spoke
for many of his colleagues when he remarked that it was all very well for
the United States to treat Argentina as it had, but Latin America would
have to live with the Argentineans after the war was over. The group,
clearly in a rebellious mood, decided that the best approach would be to take
the position that the Argentine problem was a "temporary divergence"
within the hemisphere and to try to solve the matter with the help of Buenos
Aires.153 Later that same day, acting as spokesman for the insurgent republics, Padilla relayed the views of his colleagues to Messersmith. There were
those in the hemisphere, he declared, who felt that the United States might
not be really interested in bringing Argentina back into the American fold.
When the ambassador denied that such was the case, Padilla retorted that
Washington could hardly object, then, to a procedure that would end
Argentina's isolation.154
To compound the State Department's problems, the Farrell government
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initiated an intensive public-relations campaign both inside and outside
Argentina in behalf of ending its quarantine. Government propagandists
did an excellent job of creating the impression that United States attempts
to exclude the Argentine from any inter-American meeting was destroying
"continental solidarity."155
As consultations concerning the Argentine initiative proceeded during
November, it became increasingly clear to all concerned that the State Department viewed the ouster of the Farrell-Peron government as an absolute
prerequisite to recognition. On the seventeenth, Padilla suggested two
sweeping conditions, which, if met to the satisfaction of the nonrecognizing
American republics, would lead to the reincorporation of Argentina into the
hemispheric fold. They were, simply: "l. The fulfilling of the commitments
by the Argentine not complied with, and 2. The calling of elections." Even
though the latter point would create an opportunity for a return of constitutional government to Argentina, Messersmith, reflecting the views of the
hard-liners and not his own, rejected the foreign minister's terms out of
hand. The United States, announced the ambassador, would insist on the
holding of a foreign ministers' meeting without Argentina "as long as the
present people remained in control of the government."156 On November
21 Spaeth reiterated this view. Once again describing the Argentine government as Fascist, pro-Nazi, anti-United Nations, and expansionist, he declared that the United States would never accredit an ambassador to Buenos
Aires and that it would prevent all Argentine-American commercial intercourse as long as the Farrell-Peron regime remained in power. Diplomatic
and economic sanctions had "hurt and hurt badly." Recognition would only
solidify the domestic power of this odious regime, and readmission to the
Inter-American System would provide it a fa1rade of unity behind which it
could proceed with its plans to dominate South America. Buenos Aires,
according to Spaeth and his colleagues, was trying to engineer "a Western
Hemisphere Munich" and had to be stopped at all costs.157
Washington's unwillingness to support a hemispheric conference on war
and postwar problems before the convening of the UNCIO and to at least
discuss the Argentine matter at such a meeting finally persuaded the insurgent Latin American states to drop their demand for a procedure that
could lead to the immediate recognition of Argentina. Colombia and
Ecuador informed the State Department that while they favored a prompt
public hearing for Argentina, they would gladly go along with the majority
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of republics which had declared in favor of the American plan.158 Padilla,
suddenly compliant again, told Messersmith that his country would formally
issue a call for a conference based on the United States agenda.1159
Although they had staved off open rebellion within the Latin American
community for the moment, the hard-liners still faced a procedural problem
that, if not solved, threatened to lead to inadvertent recognition of the
Farrell regime. Those who had framed the charter of the Pan American
Union had operated on the belief that while administrations were transitory,
peoples were not. Thus, they had established a community of nations, not
of governments. It was commonly accepted among experts on inter-American law that because the Union was composed of Brazilians, Mexicans,
Guatemalans, and other national groups, membership was permanent and
could not be affected by the policies of particular governments that might
rule the peoples of the hemisphere.160 Argentina, which was well aware of
the terms of the charter, had deliberately applied to the Governing Board
for a hearing, knowing that it could not refuse and that Argentina would
have to be seated as a full member at any conference of Union members.
Washington, however, managed to shunt Argentina's initiative aside and to
turn the procedure for the calling and holding of an inter-American meeting
into another channel. Conforming closely to the "suggestions" of Carl
Spaeth, the Governing Board, which met on December 6, chose to defer
action on the Argentine question to a later date, citing the small number of
replies that had been received from the other republics. On December 11
the United States suggested to the hemispheric states that the meeting of
foreign ministers be called through regular diplomatic channels, rather than
by the Governing Board, so that there would be no juridical requirement
that Argentina be present throughout the meeting.161 The Latin American
republics proved to be amenable, and as a result, Foreign Minister Padilla
formally issued invitations to the Inter-American Conference on Problems
of War and Peace to he held in Mexico City in February 1945. The Argentine request for a hearing was to be discussed under the last point on the
agenda, entitled "Other Matters of General and Immediate Concern."162

The internationalists succeeded during 1944 in eliminating their arch
rivals from the State Department, in fending off the threat to their control
of policy mounted by the Morgenthau-Wallace group, and in implementing
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an ever-tougher approach toward Argentina. Their victories, as it turned
out, were pyrrhic. Preoccupation with the Argentine affair on the part of
Hull and his colleagues both reflected and contributed to their isolation
within the Roosevelt foreign-policy establishment. That the internationalists
would agree to an inter-American conference, which they believed to be a
potential threat to the UNCIO, in return for the continued diplomatic isolation of Argentina indicated the degree to which the Argentine problem
had come to dominate their thoughts. By the end of the year, Hull and his
associates were completely cut off from policy-planning for Europe and the
Far East. Meanwhile, the period of unilateral nonrecognition left the Americas divided and uncertain as to the direction that the hemispheric policy of
the United States would take in the postwar world. Nor did Washington's
Argentine policy contribute to Anglo-American cooperation. The Churchill
government viewed nonrecognition and coercion as needless threats to the
war effort and to Britain's ravaged economy. Finally, the diplomatic and
economic policies of the hard-liners produced a reaction against United
States policy toward Argentina among important groups both inside and
outside the foreign-policy establishment, a reaction that, in conjunction with
the advent of a new group of policy-makers in the State Department, led
to a redefinition of the Good Neighbor Policy and to a sharp reversal in
Argentine-American relations.
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TWO CONCEPTS OF COMMUNITY:
THE ARGENTINE-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT

For America, 1945 was simultaneously a year of triumph and tribulation.
Allied air attacks and amphibious assaults steadily eroded Japan's vast Far
Eastern empire. By June the lightning thrusts of Patton's armored units in
the west and the relentless pressure of the Red Army in the east had reduced
the legions of the Third Reich to impotency. While the warriors of the
Grand Alliance struggled to bring hostilities to a successful close, the Big
Three met first at Yalta and then at Potsdam to hammer out the shape of
the postwar world. In May, representatives of the United Nations convened
in San Francisco and attempted once again to breathe life into Woodrow
Wilson's dream of a world organization. Despite the illusion of unity
created by the impending victory over the Axis and by the various conferences, Russia, Britain, and the United States were deeply divided over the
shape of the postwar world, and they maneuvered throughout the closing
months of the war to advance their respective economic and strategic interests.1 In the midst of these momentous events there occurred a dramatic
reversal in Argentine-American relations, during the course of which the
United States agreed to Argentina's reincorporation into the hemispheric
community and supported her bid for a seat at the United Nations Conference on International Organization.
In essence the rapprochement between Washington and Buenos Aires
was the result of collaboration between a new group of Latin Americanists
who assumed control of hemispheric policy during the last days of 1944 and
a new coterie of internationalists that was brought together by the White
House to supervise implementation of America's United Nations policy.
The hemispheric experts who took over ARA during the closing days of
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1944 were convinced that the Good Neighbor Policy as defined by Welles,
Duggan, and Bonsal was the best possible method for achieving the traditional goals of the Latin American policy of the United States-stability,
security, and commercial intercourse. As a result they attempted to reintroduce the principles of nonintervention and consultation into hemispheric
matters in general and Argentine-American relations in particular. In their
drive to reverse the policies of the Hull group, this new contingent of
decision-makers enjoyed the support of several powerful organizations and
pressure groups within the Roosevelt foreign-policy establishment, most notably the United States military and a portion of the American business
community. Far more important to the eventual success of the Latin Americanists than these allies, however, was a new clique of internationalists
brought into the State Department by the White House to preside over the
creation of a world organization. Because the new leadership in the State
Department eventually concluded that Argentine-American rapprochement
would facilitate the establishment of a viable, effective United Nationswhich was regarded by both Presidents Roosevelt and Truman as the key
to peace and security in the postwar era-they supported the Latin Americanists' drive to normalize relations with Buenos Aires.
By the end of 1944 Cordell Hull's physical and emotional resources
were virtually exhausted. His dozen years as secretary of state had taken a
toll on his health, especially in light of his advancing age. Contributing to
Hull's physical decline was the mental anguish produced by the rivalries
with Welles and Morganthau and the ever-wideing gulf between him and
the president.2 When in November 1944 Morgenthau asked his colleague
what he was going to do about the "State of Germany," by far the most
compelling diplomatic question of the day, Hull replied: "I don't have any
chance to do anything. . . . I am not told what is going on. . . . That's on
a higher level. . . . I have consultations with the War Department every
day on the immediate objectives, but when they talk about the State of
Germany I am not even consulted."3 Hull was particularly upset by White
House neglect in connection with the Quebec Conference held in October
1944. After assuring the secretary that he would call on the State Department if political questions arose, FDR instead summoned Morgenthau to
Canada, accepted his plan for postwar Germany, and, in so doing, completely undercut Hull and the State Department.4 Moreover, Hull was not
at all sure that his exclusion from the circle of postwar policy-planners did
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not portend his ouster in favor of Sumner Welles after the November presidential election. Embittered, Hull submitted his resignation on December
2, and the president accepted it the following day. 11
Hull's departure precipitated a wholesale personnel change in the State
Department, which placed the Latin American policy of the United States
in the hands of an organization whose techniques and goals differed radically from those of the Hull internationalists. To fill the newly created post
of Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, Roosevelt chose Nelson
Rockefeller, who in turn brought with him virtually all of his top advisors
in the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. The young New
Yorker and his subordinates had been .fighting for organizational survival
since early 1944, when Henry Morgenthau and a number of other veteran
bureaucrats had attacked the OCIAA as a "functional mishmash" and had
demanded that it be dismantled. 6 Although many of the economic functions
of the agency had gone to the Foreign Economic Administration in mid
1944, it had managed to stay afloat largely because of Rockefeller's success
in building a personal reputation as a skilled administrator and a devotee
of the Good Neighbor Policy.7 After his appointment as assistant secretary
on December 5 and his subsequent confirmation by the Senate, Rockefeller
named John McClintock, one of his trusted OCIAA lieutenants, as special
advisor on economic matters to the assistant secretary. John Lockwood, who
had formerly been the general counsel of OCIAA, became deputy director
of ARA. There were, however, two significant individuals in the new Latin
American establishment who had not been connected with the OCIAA.
Avra Warren, Armour's replacement as chief of ARA, was a career foreignservice officer and a veteran Latin Americanist. A disciple of Welles, the
new chief of the Latin American desk had presided over the normalization
of relations with Bolivia in June 1944.8 The second, another old Latin
Americanist, was Dudley Bonsal, veteran diplomat and brother of Philip
Bonsal.9
Rockefeller's selection of Warren to command the Division of American
Republic Affairs and of Bonsal to be a special assistant to the assistant
secretary was not an aberration but rather a culmination, for ties between
the old Latin American establishment and the new were quite close. The
OCIAA had been created under Welles's auspices and was designed to forge
cultural and economic links between the United States and Latin America
and generally to undo the damage done to hemispheric relations during the
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first quarter of the twentieth century. Rockefeller and Duggan corresponded
frequently, even after the latter's influence had all but evaporated in the
State Department. Both agreed that the Latin American policy of the United
States must be based on nonintervention and recognition of the juridical
equality of all states.10 The new group of Latin Americanists, like the old,
recognized how sensitive latinos were concerning even the hint of North
American coercion. In March, Rockefeller wrote Duggan: "In a sense the
Western Hemisphere has been a laboratory for possible world collaboration. . . . It would help to reassure our neighbors of the permanence of our
Good Neighbor Policy, not as a wartime measure alone but as a continuing
factor in our foreign policy."11 Throughout its existence the OCIAA went
to great lengths to assure the Latin American republics that the Good
Neighbor Policy would indeed survive World \Var II. "None of the transitions from war to peace will be easy," proclaimed Rockefeller in an article
that appeared in the Saturday Evening Post in November 1943, "but they
will be much less difficult if we keep in mind that the problem of one is
the problem of all, if we attempt to solve each in the spirit of mutual selfinterest and hemisphere co-operation, if we give practical proof that we
mean what we say when we speak of the Good Neighbor Policy."12 Franklin Roosevelt clearly perceived an ideological affinity between Welles and
Rockefeller. This perception, together with the president's conviction that
Rockefeller was the only man in Washington who could match the former
undersecretary's knowledge of Latin America and his skill in handling Latin
American diplomats, was primarily responsible for his appointment.13
Rockefeller, Warren, and Lockwood, like Duggan, Welles, and Bonsal, believed that consultation was essential to the maintenance of good relations
between Washington and capitals of the other American republics. They
were ardent advocates of an inter-American conference to deal with war
and postwar problems.
The neo-Latin Americanists emphasized to a much greater extent than
their predecessors, however, the economic phase of the Good Neighbor
Policy: that is, the assumption that not only the United States business community but the hemisphere as a whole would benefit from the freest and
fullest exchange of goods and industrial technology. That the new group in
charge of hemispheric affairs should view economic aid, both public and
private, and unlimited commercial intercourse as the most effective means
of promoting hemispheric harmony and of furthering United States interests
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south of the Rio Grande is not surprising, given their backgrounds. Rockefeller, McClintock, and Lockwood, like Stettinius, were corporate executives
who had proved themselves acceptable to the Roosevelt administration by
combining faith in capitalism with a social conscience. Moreover, the
coordinator's office had been created for the express purpose of implementing
the economic facet of the Good Neighbor Policy. The primary function of
the OCIAA, wrote Lockwood to D. B. Johnstone in 1944, was "to formulate,
recommend, and execute programs in the commercial and economic fields
which, by effective use of government and private facilities, will further the
commercial and economic well-being of the Western Hemisphere." 14 That
the advent of industrialization, mass production, and free trade in Latin
America would put an end to class warfare, political polarization, and antiAmericanism seemed self-evident to the New Deal businessmen within the
State Department.115 As David Green points out in The Containment of
Latin America, Rockefeller and his associates were fearful that south of the
Rio Grande there would be a trend toward economic nationalism.16 But
their anxieties stemmed not only from a desire to maintain an open door for
American goods and capital, as Green implies, but from a belief, shared by
liberals and conservatives alike, that economic nationalism in the form of
high tariff barriers, refusal to share technology, and a dearth of foreign investment had been prime causes of both the Depression and World War II.17
While the neo-Latin Americanists had no sympathy whatsoever with
Argentina's diplomatic posture during the war or with the repressive tactics
of her several military governments, they were convinced that further attempts at coercion would not only be futile but, in terms of America's
long-range interests, counterproductive. Rockefeller had concluded, before
assuming his new post, that even if one shared Hull's assumptions and
objectives, further coercion was pointless in view of the United States' demonstrated inability to bring effective economic pressure to bear on Argentina.
He was well aware of Britain's opposition to sanctions of any type, of the
views of the combined boards, and of the political impossibility of diverting
United States meat and leather supplies to Great Britain. "By condemning
Argentina and doing nothing," he later wrote, "we were losing the respect
of the other American republics and her power and influence were growing
in the southern part of the hemisphere."18 More importantly, the new group
in charge of hemispheric affairs rejected Hull's intransigent policies because
they had destroyed the trust built up in Latin America from 1933 to 1941,
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had aided Argentina in her desire to create an anti-United States bloc in
southern South America, and had immeasurably strengthened Great Britain's influence in Argentina and throughout the Western Hemisphere.
In seeking a rapprochement with Buenos Aires, Rockefeller, Warren,
McClintock, and Lockwood were able to count on the support of perhaps
the most influential organization in the Roosevelt foreign-policy establishment-the United States military. Attempts to coerce Argentina into the
proper diplomatic and political posture had encountered stiff resistance from
virtually every branch of the armed services, particularly when the techniques employed bore directly on relations between the American and Argentine armed services.19 Throughout the period from 1942 to 1945, United
States military planners had opposed the withholding of military hardware
as a coercive technique.20 During the Argentine-American staff talks that
took place in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, military negotiators stubbornly
resisted the State Department's attempts to intervene and use essential war
materials to bargain for a softening of Argentina's position toward the
United States. The officers in question demanded the right to be free from
outside pressure while negotiating agreements, which they would then submit to the State Department for approval or disapproval.21 Despite the
determination of the hard-liners to block the shipment of as many strategic
items as possible to Argentina, the navy and the air force insisted in December 1943 that the United States provide replacement parts to their
corresponding services in Argentina. What is more, the Caribbean Defense
Command successfully resisted the efforts of the hard-liners during 1943 and
1944 to have the United States Air Mission in Argentina withdrawn.22
Not only did the army, the navy, and the air force seek to be free from
diplomatic interference while continuing their relations with their Argentine
counterparts, but various representatives of the military establishment argued
throughout the war that America's get-tough posture was politically and
strategically impolitic. Gen. George Brett and his subordinates in the Caribbean Defense Command (CDC) steadfastly maintained that the primary
goal of the Argentine people was to remain neutral and that Washington's
antagonism of the Castillo, Ramfrez, and Farrell governments was not only
pointless but counterproductive.23 Economic sanctions, both actual and proposed, drew the fire of the CDC and particularly the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
who feared that retaliation by Argentina would leave Eisenhower without
the supplies needed to bring the war in Europe to a successful conclusion.24
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Finally, American military planners argued that needless coercion of Argentina was undercutting the Good Neighbor Policy and destroying hemispheric solidarity. In late 1944 the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a comprehensive memorandum to the State Department, expressing their views on
Argentine-American relations. The "political moral" to be drawn from the
whole situation, declared America's top military planners, was that the
stamping-out of minor enemy activity in Argentina must not take priority
over the Good Neighbor Policy. After all, the Latin American republics had
supported the United States during the war not because Washington had
raised a menacing fist but because these countries felt it in their national
interest to do so. "We have, beginning with the Rio Conference, created an
Argentine bogey," warned America's military leaders, "which is now returning to haunt us. . . . If we are not careful we will dissipate our energies
in chasing this phantom and thereby waste our strength needed in the
creation of a decent postwar order." Their policy paper concluded by advising the State Department to call immediately a conference on postwar
problems and to include Argentina in such a conclave. Such a step would
restore Latin America's faith in the Good Neighbor Policy and would
assuage the feelings of those who felt that the United States was ignoring
the other American republics in the formulation of plans for the postwar
world.211
The American military welcomed the changes that took place within
the State Department in December 1944. During a luncheon conversation
with Henry Wallace, Gen. George Marshall, chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, had expressed the utmost confidence in Nelson Rockefeller. Rockefeller's appointment, he said, would immediately straighten out the Latin
American situation.26
Joining the military in urging a thaw in Argentine-American relations
were those American investors and traders who had real or potential interests in South America. 27 United States firms, including such giants as
International Harvester, Ford, Armour, Swift, and International Telephone
and Telegraph, had invested over $570 million in Argentina prior to 1942.28
After every blast at Buenos Aires by the State Department, the Treasury,
BEW, or FEA, these companies had faced the threat of expropriation.
American exporters and importers who traded with Argentina were hurt by
Washington's hard-line policies no less than were those with direct investments. The State Department's various attempts to strangle first the Ramf-
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rez and then the Farrell government by forbidding the issuance of export
licenses to United States shippers caused them to add their voices to those
of Armour, ITT, and Ford in insisting on a normalization of relations
between the two nations.
Originally, among United States businessmen there were two sets of
opinion regarding Argentine-American affairs. One group, probably the
larger, equated Argentina with Nazi Germany and argued for vigorous
sanctions against the recalcitrant republic. 29 In April 1942, Armand May,
president of the American Associated Companies and American Factors
Company, commended the State Department's stand against Argentina and
advocated an even harder line in the future. A pro-Allied posture by Buenos
Aires would surely emerge, he proclaimed, "if we and the balance of the
United Nations refuse to support Argentina in her every day Iife."30 Another
sector of the business world believed that the matter was simply a dispute
between two headstrong groups of officials and claimed that a dynamic
American executive could settle the dispute in a matter of days. 31 In May
1943 Alfred H. Benjamin, an official of the Anglo-American Trading
Corporation and a close friend of FDR's, wrote to the president, warning
that Argentine-American relations were getting out of hand. Requesting
prompt action by the White House to end discrimination by the Export
Control Division of the State Department in the granting of export licenses
for steel, tinplate, and other products that were vital to the Argentine economy, he argued that America's present course would cut off the Allies from
their best source of strategic raw materials, would alienate all of Latin
America, would deprive Great Britain of her beef supply, and would drive
Argentina into the hands of the Nazis.82
As it became obvious that the United Kingdom would not participate
in sanctions against Argentina and that the State and Treasury departments'
campaign of economic coercion was not affecting either Argentina's prosperity or its policies, the hard-liners began to defect to the group that was
urging detente. In late 1943, officials of Buenos Aires branches of the
National City Bank of New York and the First National Bank of Boston
called on the American embassy to protest the freezing of the assets of
Banco de la Naci6n and Banco de la Provincia. Arguing that Argentina
was actually providing as much support for the war effort as were such
nations as Bolivia or Peru, they suggested that sanctions against Argentina
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would only be justified if they were total and if they were supported by
the British.33
Great Britain's attempts to use the Argentine-American rift to improve
their economic position in southern South America were particularly important in crystallizing sentiment within the business community for a
rapprochement. The continuance of British commercial activity in Argentina produced a wave of protest that swelled into a mighty flood by the end
of the year.34 By July, PEA and the State Department were being swamped
with bitter complaints from United States businessmen who felt that they
were losing their competitive advantage in Argentina to the British.36
Typical were the officials of Gilbarco, a subsidiary of Standard Oil that
manufactured gasoline pumps. They informed the department that because
export licenses had been denied to them for two and a half years, the State
Petroleum Monopoly in Argentina was buying large quantities of British
pumps at about one-third more than the American price.86 One group of
United States exporters became so angered at what they considered the irrationality of Hull's policies that in the summer of 1944 they urged the State
Department to dispatch an unofficial yet authoritative mission of businessmen to Buenos Aires to seek a complete understanding with the Farrell
government. Charging that Washington's approach had been at best mud-dling, the would-be diplomats maintained that they could achieve complete
inter-American unity if authorized to "in a business-like way talk over
advantages that would accrue to both sides if Argentina were to take a few
more steps away from the Axis."87
So that United States exporters and investors would increase their pressure on the State Department, the Farrell-Peron government shrewdly
tempted American businessmen with visions of an enormous postwar market in Argentina. Officials in Buenos Aires let North American manufacturers know that the government was establishing a National Council of
Postwar Planning to conduct a complete survey of Argentine needs for replacement, renovation, and extension of industry, agrictulture, and transportation services during the first five postwar years; and they implied that
United States businessmen would have an excellent chance of satisfying
those needs if there were a normalization in relations between the two
countries.38 American businessmen could discern the economic opportunities
present in Argentina even without the aid of the Casa Rosada, however. 39
In February 1945 the Wall Street Journal published the first in a series of
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front-page promotional pieces on Argentina which depicted an investment
area that was attractive almost beyond belief:
Argentina needs immediately some $1.2 billion of automobiles, machinery, electrical equipment, and other durable goods to bring her
economy up to pre-war functioning standards and to provide for
normal growth. . . . This calculation does not include rehabilitation
or extension of the Argentine Railways, which require a minimum
of $200,000,000 or direly needed materials .... This together with
consumer demands indicates the staggering size of the potential
market ... viewed in terms of need and the desire to buy.40
Armed with itemized five-year requirements, $478 million in balances, and
an impeccable credit rating, Argentina constituted an almost irresistible area
for investment. Lest American businessmen become overconfident, however,
Buenos Aires was careful to let them know that there were other interested
sellers. In March the Argentine government announced that Peron, as head
of the Council on Postwar Planning, was meeting with representatives of
the British Chamber of Commerce to clarify Argentina's future needs, especially in the area of transportation, industrial machinery, and armaments.
Actually, the Farrell-Peron government was quite candid with the State
Department about its intention to use the American trading community to
facilitate de-isolation.41 In November 1944 Alejandro Shaw, a prominent
Argentine industrialist who was frequently employed as an unofficial emissary by Buenos Aires, informed Norman Armour that Peron firmly believed
that, once the war was over, United States exporters would force Washington
to change its policy toward Argentina.42
By early 1945 United States business and financial chronicles were engaged in a continuous diatribe against Washington's Argentine policies.
Business Week denounced Hull's coercive tactics and called for a rapprochement to protect United States economic interests.43 The Wall Street fournal,
declaring that Argentina had the right to choose her own political forms
and diplomatic policies, called for a resumption of relations. The United
States, declared the fournal, must always realize that North and South
America emanated from two different cultures, each with separate traditions.
"Our neighbors do not conceive 'liberty' and 'democracy' in quite the same
terms as we do." 44 The conservative Saturday Evening Post proved to be
equally understanding. John Lear, in an article entitled "The Truth about
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Argentina," argued that if the Good Neighbor Policy were amended to
allow the United States to intervene to establish democracy, Washington
would have to begin with Brazil. Why couldn't we be practical like the
British, he pleaded. Argentina was going to have millions in credit in the
United States after the war, and it would want, above all, industrial
machinery. This was just what we would want to sell to keep our factories
going and our people at work.45 The message to the Roosevelt foreign-policy
establishment concerning Argentina was quite clear. Accept that nation for
what it was, and get down to business.
Most of the business figures arguing in behalf of a rapprochement were
internationalists, men who believed that their own economic interests, as
well as the peace and security of the world, would be served by lowered
trade barriers and increased United States investment, both public and private, in the developing areas of the world.46 This philosophy and the trading
community's specific views on the Argentine matter corresponded quite
closely with those of the neo-Latin Americanists.47 Thus, business pressure
in the winter and spring of 1945 impelled Rockefeller, Warren, and their
subordinates in the direction that they were already headed.
Even more important to the fulfillment of the Latin Americanists' goals
than support from the military and business communities was the fact that
their desire for rapprochement complemented the objectives of a new group
of internationalists which was in charge of America's United Nations policy.
According to historian Thomas Campbell, Presidents Roosevelt and Truman
were both committed to the creation of a viable international collectivesecurity organization that would prevent future wars, raise living standards,
and facilitate the spread of democracy. So great was their faith that such a
body could solve most major international problems that Roosevelt, and to
a lesser extent Truman, postponed pressing political and economic questions
in 1944-45 until the world organization could get off the ground.
The man who was chosen to oversee America's United Nations policy
was Edward Stettinius, Jr. FDR, after consultation with Harry Hopkins,
decided to promote Stettinius to secretary of state in December 1944, not
only because of his administrative ability and political clout among conservatives, but also because his one identifiable principle was Wilsonian
internationalism. One of the new secretary's first duties was to oversee creation of a task force on "International Organization and Security Affairs"
within the department, under Leo Pasvolsky.48 Like Hull and Long, mem-
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hers of this new group of internationalists were not experts on Latin American politics and culture, nor did preservation and perfection of the InterAmerican System top their list of priorities. Theirs was a world view, and
they were determined to subsume all other considerations to the triumph of
Wilsonian internationalism.
Although this new group of internationalists was at first mildly negative
about rapprochement with Argentina, it became increasingly apparent to
them that Argentina's reincorporation into the hemispheric family and her
participation in the UNCIO were vitally important to the success of America's postwar policy.49
To the neo-Latin Americanists, the first logical step toward the solution
of the Argentine problem was to articulate the terms by which that nation
might be readmitted to the hemispheric family of nations-a step that was
bitterly opposed by the residue of hard-liners remaining in the State Department.50 Rockefeller and Warren believed that a return to constitutional
government, elimination of Axis influences, and a declaration of war were
real possibilities. Reports from the United States embassy in Buenos Aires
during the fall and winter of 1944 indicated a growing split in the Argentine
government between Peron and the other leaders of integral nationalism, as
well as mounting dissatisfaction among the populace with Argentina's international position. On October 7, in a comprehensive analysis of the political
situation in Buenos Aires, the United States charge d'affaires reported that
Peron appeared to have broken the extremists' power within the government,
and as a result the prospect for a return to constitutional normality and
international cooperation was within sight.51 As Peron sought during November and December to augment his support among Argentine civilians,
rumors abounded that a return to constitutional procedures, specifically
presidential elections, was imminent.52 On December 11 Stettinius ordered
the Latin American section to prepare a comprehensive memo for FDR on
the Argentine situation "in view of Mr. Peron's recent speeches ... and the
indication that there had been a change of sentiment recently." 53 The note,
which reached the White House on January 2, envisioned two possible
courses of action by Argentina: (1) aggression against the other nations of
southern South America or (2) a drastic change in internal policy, followed
by steps by Argentina to reintroduce itself into the American community.
Rockefeller and his colleagues proposed that if the Farrell-Peron regime
were to pursue the first option, the United States should be prepared to
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render all necessary aid to Argentina's neighbors. If, however, Buenos Aires
were to adopt the second, Washington should initiate consultations with the
other American republics, looking toward recognition. If matters were to
reach this point, it would be Washington's position that Argentina could
achieve recognition by reaffirming the rupture with the Axis, ridding Argentina of all Axis organizations and influences, abolishing the state of
siege, calling general elections, and guaranteeing full exchange of information with the other American republics concerning Axis espionage activity.54
Although Spaeth and Wendelin, who were still ensconced in the Division of
River Plata Affairs, denounced the proposal as the beginning of a sellout
and refused to initial it, Stettinius forwarded the memo to FDR, who endorsed it enthusiastically.55 The schedule of demands to be made on Buenos
Aires differed little from those made by Hull and his associates in 1943, even
to the point of requiring elections, but it was highly significant that the State
Department had agreed to lay down conditions-a step that Latin America
had been urging on the State Department unsuccessfully throughout 1944.
As the opening date of the Mexico City Conference approached, however, it became obvious to Stettinius and the Latin Americanists that normalization of relations with Argentina would be far from a simple matter.
Despite their desire for a rapprochement, both the internationalists on the
one hand and Rockefeller, Warren, and their colleagues on the other were
determined to secure complete Argentine solidarity with the Allies and, if
possible, a modification of the totalitarianism that had gripped the nation
since the proclamation of the state of siege in 1942.56 The signs from Buenos
Aires were difficult to interpret. Hoping to make as favorable an impression
as possible before representatives of the other American republics who were
gathered at Chapultepec Castle, Peron, using the Chilean charge d'affaires
as an intermediary, contacted the American embassy in mid January and
submitted a comprehensive report on the state of Argentine affairs. Through
his emissary, the vice-president advised the United States that, among other
things, his government had eliminated all pro-Axis personnel from the administration, had closed permanently El Cabildo and El Federal, and had
established supervision over all important German firms. Peron politely but
firmly rejected American demands concerning democratization of the Argentine political system. While attributing Washington's concern over the
state of political and personal liberty in Argentina to the best of motives, he
asserted that the matter of elections was entirely an internal affair. 57 (The
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Casa Rosada subsequently announced, however, that the republic had entered a preelection phase.) 118 Yet information from other quarters seemed
to indicate that conditions in Argentina had not really changed at all.59 The
American embassy reported in mid January that despite official assurances to
the contrary, the press continued to labor under censorship and that real
freedom of expression was nonexistent. 60
Then, during the first week in February, news reached the State Department that Peron had finally and completely resolved a power struggle
within the Argentine government between himself and a virulently antiAmerican clique headed by Foreign Minister Orlando Peluffo. This resolution, coupled with a growing realization that Peron would be able to win
any national election that might be held and would probably dominate
Argentina for years to come, did much to convince the leadership in the
State Department that the charismatic young colonel was the best that could
be had. Unless the United States wished to resort to massive intervention,
it would have to work with the existing regime. Military intelligence and
FBI reports had consistently portrayed Peluffo as the most anti-American
and pro-Fascist member of the Farrell administration. In early January 1945
the foreign minister attempted to blame Peron for Argentina's failure during the previous fall to break the nonrecognition front. The vice-president's
bellicose speeches and armaments program had frightened away nearly all
of Argentina's potential Latin allies. Peron responded to this attack by
seeking and gaining the personal allegiance of Gen. Eduardo Avalos, the
powerful commander of the Campo de Mayo garrison, and then forcing
Farrell to choose between him (Peron) and Peluffo. Farrell deferred to
Peron. The foreign minister's subsequent resignation in the last part of
January was viewed by Washington as a qualified victory for the Allies.61
Shortly after Peluffo's ouster on February 7, Peron and Avalos held a highly
secret interview with a member of Adolf Berle's staff. (Berle had become
ambassador to Brazil on 23 December 1944.) 62 Peron insisted that Washington no longer needed to distrust Argentina. Peluffo and his satellites were
gone forever. "In October at the latest we shall call the people to democratic,
honest elections .... We have sworn to return this republic to its constitutional and democratic life, and we will do it. . . . The United States and
other sister nations of America can depend on that." Regarding collaboration
with the United States and the other republics on war and postwar matters,
Buenos Aires, Peron announced, was ready to do everything needed or
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desired, provided that there was no attempt to humiliate the government
or the nation. Argentina's "friends" in the United States Army knew that
well. Argentina's alleged expansionist program was a pure myth. Deprived
of nickel, steel, and aluminum, the armament industry was at a standstill.
"All we can do and must do now is to train future pilots and equip decently
our army which has been for years in a state of complete neglect." 63
The American embassy in Rio was impressed with the aura of permanency if not sincerity that infused the interview. In their report to the State
Department, Berle and his staff concluded that "hopes expressed by some
people in Buenos Aires that something is brewing that will finally oust the
present government are entirely unfounded." Peron and Avalos had gained
complete control, even winning the grudging support of the conservative,
landed classes. Elections would soon be held in which the vice-president
would be chosen president for a six-year term. "It is important," Berle's
report advised, "to be realistic about this well-defined situation." 64
In developing a rational, "realistic" policy toward Argentina during the
opening weeks of 1945, the State Department had to maneuver between two
conflicting bodies of opinion concerning Argentina's fitness to reenter the
hemispheric family. There was in the United States a large degree of residual hostility against Argentina which prevented any abrupt change in
American policy whatever the department's conciliatory intentions. America's sense of moral outrage was well expressed by the New York Times:
A Government that has sinned as grievously as has that of Argentina
against the spirit, if not all the letters, of previous Pan-American
commitments and certainly has been the major disruptive element
in hemisphere understanding and solidarity, hardly can expect to
regain good standing merely by asking for it.65

In the House of Representatives, Congressman Jack Z. Anderson of California urged that the Americas take strong action at the Mexico City Conference to bring Argentina into line. Arguing that "nonrecognition by the
United States and verbal brickbats" were not enough, he addressed a public
letter to Stettinius, demanding an immediate embargo. In his reply, Stettinius felt compelled to assure the congressman that the administration
would take no action to benefit or strengthen the Farrell-Peron regime "until
it is conclusively demonstrated by unequivocal acts that there has been a
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fundamental change of Argentine policy in favor of the cause against the
Axis and in support of inter-American unity and common action." 66
At the same time, editorial opinion throughout Latin America was
demanding, in ever-more-strident tones, that Argentina be reincorporated
into the Inter-American System immediately. Expressing its hope that the
blunders of Secretary Hull would be rectified under Stettinius, La Noche of
La Paz asserted that nonrecognition and other coercive policies directed
against Argentina, however justifiable during the previous year, were now
indefensible and repugnant to all South America.67 La Raz6n and El
Tiempv noted that it would be impossible to exclude Argentina from the
postwar world, and they urged the hemispheric nations to permit the Farrell
government to state its case.68 0 Clabo, Diario Carioca, and A Manha of
Rio de Janeiro lamented the fact that Argentina would be absent from the
forthcoming conference and predicted her quick return to the fold as a result
of consultation.69 El Mercurio of Santiago challenged Washington to show
its good faith in the Argentine matter by scheduling a discussion of the
problem at the beginning of the conference.70 On January 15 La Noche
issued an eloquent plea in behalf of a hearing for Argentina:
Even those of us who believe that Argentina's international policy
is erroneous have an obligation to listen to her representatives, and
to bend all of our energies to free that government from its error,
if they are proved to be such. The exclusion of Argentina does not
appear to us to be a good step toward complete reestablishment of
concord and unification. 71
The American republics had pressed for the holding of an inter-American conference on war and postwar problems in part to ensure the survival
of a strong Inter-American System that would provide the hemisphere with
a voice in the postwar order .72 Still chafing at their exclusion from the
Dumbarton Oaks Conference, they were not at all sure that Washington
would not sacrifice the Inter-American System on the altar of internationalism.73 Those Latin American diplomats who were anxious over the question
of what role the Americas would play in the postwar world believed that
any effective hemispheric organization must include Argentina, one of the
strongest and most influential of the Latin American republics.74 Representatives of the Lopez government in Colombia told the United States ambassador in Bogota that Colombia considered it extremely important to draw
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Argentina back into the hemispheric family in order to preserve solidarity
and increase American effectiveness in the proposed world organization. It
was undeniable, they asserted, that the Latin American bloc would be immeasurably stronger with Argentina than without her. 75
Argentina's inclusion in a regional collective-security system would not
only strengthen the hand of the Western Hemisphere in its struggle to be
heard in the postwar world but would also calm the fears of those Latin
American states that were anxious about future Argentine aggression. A
number of governments were convinced that Buenos Aires would prove
more tractable inside rather than outside a strong collective-security organization. The Bolivian, Paraguayan, and Uruguayan foreign offices informed
Washington that in their opinion the best way to control Argentina was to
bind her tightly to the hemispheric system and then develop effective peacekeeping machinery within that context.76 In early February, Getulio Vargas
of Brazil pressed the United States to allow Buenos Aires to send an official
delegation to Mexico City. This, in his opinion, would be the best possible
method of suppressing latent Argentine aggression.77 Shortly before the
opening of the Chapultepec Conference, former President Eduardo Santos
of Colombia visited the United States and met with FDR. In a lengthy
interview the former chief executive first described a widespread fear of
aggression in South America which had led to a monumental arms race,
some nations allocating up to one-third of their budget for arms, and then
he pressed Roosevelt to support a strong collective-security pact that would
put an end to such waste and to the fears that were responsible for it.78
Finally, as mentioned previously, not a few Latin Americans viewed
Washington's willingness to halt its coercion of the Farrell-Per6n government and to negotiate with Argentina concerning recognition as a test of
the Good Neighbor Policy. Quite simply, latinos demanded that Rockefeller,
Warren, Bonsal, and Lockwood match their rhetoric with action.79
Caught between a continuing ground swell of anti-Argentine feeling in
the United States and increasingly insistent demands from Latin America
for an immediate rapprochement, the Latin Americanists rightly perceived
that they would have to walk a tightrope at Mexico City. The problem was
how to negotiate with Buenos Aires for proper guarantees without, on the
one hand, giving the appearance of undue haste or, on the other, seeming
to be unreasonable.80
The State Department's strategy for Mexico City, developed primarily

183

The Roosevelt Foreign-Policy Establishment

by Stettinius and Rockefeller, was an attempt to satisfy simultaneously all
the various forces and groups that were seeking to shape American policy.81
As to economic matters, it was decided that United States representatives
would work for the adoption of resolutions that would reassure Latin
America regarding Washington's interest in its economic well-being. Specifically, United States officials envisioned agreements that would provide
for a gradual end to huge American purchasing programs in South America
rather than an abrupt halt, which would disrupt the region's war-inflated
economies. In addition, the United States would promise long-term credits
through the International Monetary Fund and would work for lower tariffs
in order to stimulate inter-American trade.82 Secondly, American diplomats
would advocate a mutual guarantee of boundaries and would seek, as they
had throughout the 1930s, to formalize the process of consultation. Indeed,
the United States had already put Latin America on notice that it would
once again seek to multilateralize the Monroe Doctrine. During the SantosRoosevelt talks, the president had urged Colombia to propose a collective
guarantee of borders and had promised that the United States would support such a guarantee even to the point of a treaty .88 Not only would such
a move placate the Western Hemisphere's fears of being ignored by the
great powers in the postwar period and of being submerged in the United
Nations, but it was hoped that it would mollify anti-Argentine opinion
within the United States if rapprochement became a reality. The State Department could argue, as many Latin American nations had already done,
that an aggressive, Fascist Argentina would be easier to control inside a
collective-security organization.84 Thirdly, in regard to the Argentine question per se, Stettinius and Rockefeller decided to respond to Latin American
pressure grudgingly, to secure the most far-reaching pledges possible from
Buenos Aires, but above all, to preserve inter-American unity on the matter.
At the very least, American officials hoped to put off settlement of the
Argentine question until the end of the conference.811
No sooner had President Manuel Avila Camacho of Mexico delivered
his welcoming address to the delegates gathered at Chapultepec Castle than
various Latin American delegations launched a campaign to have the Argentine problem settled immediately. Their objective was nothing less than
full Argentine participation in the meeting. When the chiefs of delegation
met to organize the conference, the United States was barely able to defeat
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a Paraguayan motion to have the delegations deal with the Argentine
problem at once.86
It was not Paraguay but Colombia, however, that was to be Argentina's
chief advocate at Mexico City. As the Chapultepec Conference opened,
officials of the Lopez government in Bogota informed the United States
ambassador that Buenos Aires had reexamined its position and that all it
desired was a formula whereby Argentina could obtain recognition. Simultaneously, at Mexico City, members of the Colombian delegation apprised
United States representatives that Peron had notified their government that
Argentina was willing to accept any conditions without restriction in order
to be reconciled with the United States, "provided only that Argentine
decorum was protected." If "decorum" were violated, the Colombians recalled Peron as saying, then the world would see "his comrades from the
Campo de Mayo marching in and cutting him to pieces." In urging the
United States to back an immediate hearing for Argentina, the Colombians
declared that chaos would be the inevitable result in Argentina if its case
were not settled at Mexico City, chaos that would result in a Communist
takeover and in Argentina's becoming a base for the subversion of the
entire hemisphere. Although the North Americans continually rejected
Colombian arguments, that nation served throughout the remainder of the
conference as "Godfather to the Argentine attempt at rehabilitation."87
Stettinius and Rockefeller quickly concluded that if the United States
were to avert a premature discussion on the Argentine situation, it would,
unofficially at least, have to lay down the conditions upon which Washington
would agree to reincorporation of Argentina into the hemispheric family.
Consequently, on February 22 Stettinius cabled the White House, asking in
effect for permission to come to terms. He reported that upon his arrival
in Mexico City, he had found the mood within the nonrecognition camp to
be quite volatile, and it was becoming more so every day as agents of the
Farrell-Peron government spread the word that Argentina was prepared to
desert the Axis. Although the United States delegation had managed,
despite Latin American support for Argentine maneuvering, to hold the
line, it was imperative that it take the initiative. On behalf of himself,
Rockefeller, and Warren, the secretary strongly suggestd that as Argentina
met certain conditions to be agreed upon at Mexico City, it should be readmitted to the American family. Otherwise, any unity achieved at Chapultepec would be superficial, and the lack of real cohesion would undermine
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Washington's position within both the hemispheric and the world communities. Actually, a careful review of the department's records had revealed
that there was little substance to the Argentine-Axis relationship. Such
connections had been largely imagined and were, according to the secretary,
due more to "an emotional feeling on the part of the American people and
within our own government" than to a rational evaluation of the situation.
In view of the facts that the current government showed no signs of collapsing and that Argentina was likely to legitimately elect Peron president,
"much on the Vargas pattern," the secretary requested White House approval of the following formula: Argentina should (1) immediately declare
war on the Axis; (2) announce its desire for the formation of an interAmerican committee with United States and Argentine membership to design practical measures of continental defense, including control of subversive activities; (3) reduce troop concentrations along the Chilean and
Brazilian borders; and (4) adhere to all resolutions passed at Mexico City.
After these conditions had been fulfilled, the head of each American delegation could announce recognition. Stettinius pressed Roosevelt to reply
quickly, as the Argentine government was moving swiftly to condition its
people for a declaration of war on Germany. If this should happen before
the Mexico City Conference could take action on the problem, the Farrell
government might elicit public support from various European nations, thus
drastically reducing Washington's control over the Argentine matter.88
White House approval of the memorandum the following day substantially lessened pressure on the United States from the Latin American
community.89 Although Peron subsequently refused to declare war and
although Argentine agents worked assiduously from February 24 through
February 26 to splinter the nonrecognition front, the lines held firm.90
Washington's willingness to establish terms and to refrain from commenting
on the domestic political situation in Argentina momentarily restored Latin
American confidence in the Roosevelt administration.91
Meanwhile, the United States contingent had joined with the delegations of the other republics to implement the Roosevelt-Santos agreement
concerning a collective-security pact. Although the internationalists and the
Latin Americanists had previously agreed to support a mutual guarantee of
boundaries, they had not come to terms on the question of the relationship
between a hemispheric security organization and the proposed world body .92
Pasvolsky and his subordinates took the position that an American collective-
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~ecurity organization operating independently of the United Nations not
only would violate the Yalta and Dumbarton Oaks accords but would hamstring any global government that might be created. They demanded that
all sanctions voted by the inter-American community be subject to approval
by the "world council," as they referred to the organ that subsequently became the United Nations Security Council.93 Rockefeller and his associates
were sympathetic not only to Latin America's desire for an ironclad security
pact but also to its wish to create an inter-American body that would be
free from outside interference. Joined by the delegation's military advisors
and by Adolf Berle and George Messersmith, the new Latin Americanists
argued that nothing less than the Monroe Doctrine and United States
leadership in the hemisphere were at stake. It was obvious that the other
republics were united in their desire for establishment of a tightly knit organization.94 If Washington completely rejected this "outstretched hand,"95
then Latin America would form its own union, possibly with one of the
European powers as sponsor. If the United States agreed to join a hemispheric organization but insisted on subsuming it to the world council, then
Britain and Russia would be able to interject themselves into every interAmerican dispute. Either course would open up the New World to European interference and would jeopardize the United States' ability to protect
itself and its neighbors from the forces of international fascism and world
communism. And, of course, there was the matter of containing Argentina.96
Pasvolsky, with half-hearted support from Stettinius, attempted to use
the two congressional representatives on the delegation, Senators Warren
Austin and Tom Connally, to block approval of a strong agreement. The
internationalists argued with some success to the two politicians that the
Senate would never agree to a pact providing for the commitment of American troops unless it had congressional approval.97 They withdrew, however,
when the Latin Americanists persuaded Walter Lippmann and other members of the press to write a series of articles strongly supporting hemispheric
collective security and attacking those within the United States delegation
who opposed it. When Austin framed a provision that would allow President
Roosevelt to authorize United States adherence to the Act of Chapultepec
based solely on his wartime power as commander-in-chief, thus vitiating the
necessity of Senate ratification, the American delegation unanimously voted
its approval.98
The Act of Chapultepec was designed to protect all American states
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from aggression of any sort, whether continental or extracontinental in
origin. The key provision, which was authored jointly by the Americans
and the Colombians, defined aggression as the invasion of one state by the
armed forces of another and stipulated that an act of aggression against one
American state would be considered an act against all. The signatories
agreed that when violation of territorial boundaries occurred, they would
consult in order to settle on appropriate measures of retaliation. In addition,
the contracting parties proclaimed that they would regard such acts perpetrated during the remainder of World War II as interference with the
United Nations war effort, and as such, these acts would elicit responses
ranging from the recall of diplomatic chiefs to the use of force.99 A concluding clause recommended that upon the termination of World War II,
the states of the hemisphere convene in order to translate the agreement
into a treaty.100
With the conclusion of the Act of Chapultepec, both those Latin
American states that feared Argentine expansionism and those American
officials who feared anti-Argentine sentiment in the United States felt free
to turn to the question of the status of the Farrell-Peron government within
the American community. On March 6 Stettinius, Rockefeller, and Warren
presented to Argentina the plan that Roosevelt had earlier approved. When
Peron rejected the United States conditions for readmission to the hemispheric system, Stettinius cabled the White House that the American delegation would now opt for a resolution regretting the unfortunate but necessary absence of Argentina and urging it to implement the declarations of
Mexico City "while qualifying for membership in the United Nations."101
The efforts of those who were seeking an Argentine-American rapprochement culminated on the last day of the meeting when the delegates
unanimously adopted a resolution that threatened, on the one hand, and
cajoled on the other. The declaration, while it recognized the indivisible
unity of the American people and the continuity of Argentine membership
in the PAU, "deplored" that Argentina had not taken the steps that would
have allowed it to participate in the Inter-American Conference. In the
strained prose of yet another inter-American compromise agreement, the
declaration expressed the wish of the delegates that Argentina "may put herself in a position to express her conformity with and adherence to" the
principles of Chapultepec. After reaffirming inter-American solidarity in the
event of aggression "by any state," the conference invited Argentina to
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"implement a policy of co-operative action with the other American Nations
... so that she may achieve her incorporation into the United Nations as a
signatory to the joint declaration entered into by them." 102
With the final business of Chapultepec completed, the secretary set
about telling each group that had divergent views on the Argentine matter
what they wanted to hear. The non-State Department members of the
American delegation, who had not even been told of the Roosevelt-Stettinius
interchange of February 23/24, had bridled at the fact that the Argentine
resolution did not contain, as a sine qua non, an Argentine declaration of
war. Rockefeller barely averted a rebellion by arguing that it would be
unfair and inconsistent to require an immediate declaration by Buenos Aires,
since there were a number of other American nations that were simply in a
state of belligerency. In his opinion the final statement on Argentina should
be firm but not so harsh as to preclude her joining the inter-American
fold. 103 On the final day of the meeting, Stettinius congratulated the delegation on its firmness in the Argentine matter and promised that "we should
not even open the door a crack" until Argentina declared war and lived up
to her obligations. By contrast, his concluding statement to the conference
itself lauded the Argentine resolution as one of the six major achievements
of the meeting. "It is our common desire," he proclaimed to the weary
delegates, "that Argentina be able to resume her traditional place in the
family of the American nations and restore in full measure the solidarity of
this hemisphere."104
Reaction to the achievements of the Mexico City Conference proved
extremely gratifying to Stettinius and the Latin Americanists.1015 In the first
place, there was good reason to think that their diplomacy had restored
Latin America's faith in the United States. The Colombian foreign minister
heaped praise on the United States delegation for its willingness to cooperate
with the other American republics, while Uruguay expressed its pleasure
over the Act 0£ Chapultepec. El Mercurio and La N aci6n of Santiago de~
scribed the Argentine resolutions as the first great step toward the restoration
of continental unity.106 Even the anti-Argentine Central American states
were optimistic. The Star and Herald of Panama termed the chances for
Argentina's quick return to the fold quite good. In view of this resurgence
of good neighborly spirit, the United States felt assured of Latin American
support at San Francisco and beyond.107 In the second place, newspaper
reaction and official statements emanating from Buenos Aires seemed to
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indicate that Argentina was ready to put itself "in a position to express her
conformity with and adherence to" the principles of Chapultepec. Such
barometers of public opinion as La Naci6n and El Mundo of Buenos Aires
commented favorably on both the Final Act and the Argentine resolution
and pressed for Argentina's adherence.108 Acting Foreign Minister Cesar
Ameghino congratulated the Mexico City meeting for its very important
and necessary work. In keeping with Argentina's traditions, he declared in
a March 7 press release, Argentina categorically rejected aggression as an
instrument of national policy or of territorial expansion and reaffirmed its
determination to maintain itself within the continental solidarity, repudiating any ideology that was foreign to republican and democratic traditions
of the American nations.109
In the days following the Mexico City Conference it quickly became
apparent that the chief obstacle to diplomatic recognition was Argentina's
stubborn refusal to declare war. It was this issue that had prevented Peron
from accepting the plan designed by Stettinius, Rockefeller, and Warren
and approved by FDR. The Brazilians, who believed that Buenos Aires
would never concede the issue, tried to force the State Department's hand.
On March 10, two days after the close of the Chapultepec meeting, Foreign
Minister Pedro Velloso announced to reporters that "adherence by Argentina
to the Act of Chapultepec will result in reopening diplomatic relations with
all American nations in the near future . . . a declaration of war will be
unnecessary to gain this recognition."110 Rockefeller, who had learned as
much in his dealings with the American delegation at Mexico City, realized
that a declaration of war was imperative if the American people were to
accept a normalization of relations. Moreover, as the Latin Americanists
subsequently informed their latino colleagues, under the Yalta accords a
declaration was required for membership in the United Nations and for
participation in the UNCIO. On March 26 Velloso, now in Washington,
joined with Rockefeller in calling a meeting at Blair House of representatives
of twelve "leading" American republics to work out "an exact formula for
the de-isolation of Argentina."
After a brief period of deliberation the group decided that Argentina
would have accepted the invitation and fulfilled the conditions proffered at
Mexico City when she had (1) declared war on the Axis, (2) expressed
conformity to and complied with the Final Act, and (3) signed the Final
Act. The twelve decreed that after the Farrell government had taken these
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steps, the entire hemisphere would extend recognition and that the United
States, as depository nation, would request that Argentina be invited to sign
the United Nations Declaration.111
Meanwhile, in Buenos Aires, Colonel Peron, who had resigned himself
to the necessity of such a move, was busy preparing military and civilian
opinion for a declaration of war. While the public generally regarded belligerency as inevitable, the vice-president encountered a good deal of opposition from those younger nationalists in the army who were determined to
brook no sniveling subservience to the United States and no alteration in
Argentine foreign policy. In his search for concessions that might reconcile
the integral nationalists to detente, the resourceful Peron turned to British
and American circles in the Argentine capital and intimated that if he were
going to participate in the war, someone would have to make up the nation's
deficiencies in fuel, construction material, replacement parts, and armaments.
After obtaining unofficial assurances that such aid would be forthcoming, he
was able to erode opposition to rapprochement among his ultranationalist
associates by holding out the promise of acquisition of all these materials,
especially munitions.112
On March 27 Buenos Aires formally declared war on Germany, Italy,
and Japan, and immediately thereafter Nelson Rockefeller called for consultation among the republics. Later in the day he held a press conference
to announce that the signing of the Final Act by Argentina would not
guarantee recognition but would be a significant move toward that goal.
Leaving little doubt as to the final outcome, the assistant secretary expressed
the view that the United States had never really broken relations with
Argentina but had only withdrawn its ambassador.
Reactions in the United States to Argentina's declaration of war were
mixed. Some hailed it as better late than never, but others, while calling the
move a step in the right direction, proclaimed the announcement worthless
since it was unaccompanied by additional measures. Official opinion in
Latin America was overwhelmingly favorable, especially among Argentina's
closest neighbors, who were obviously relieved at the development.U 3
The few remaining hard-liners within the department tried unsuccessfully to stem the tide. Eric Wendelin submitted a long memorandum to
ARA, outlining the history of United States nonrecognition policy, repeating
statements castigating Argentina that Stettinius had made in the past, reiterating Hull's views, and reaffirming his belief in unconditional nonrecog-
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muon. But like Bonsal and the ARA in 1943-44, Wendelin and Spaeth were
well outside the decision-making circle of the State Department.114
On March 31 the Pan-American Union approved Argentina's request to
sign the Final Act of Chapultepec. Simultaneously, in a meeting of the State
Department's policy-planning staff, Dean Acheson certified that Argentina
had declared war on the Axis, adhered to the Final Act, suspended pro-Axis
newspapers, frozen Axis funds, and seized the assets of Axis firms. The
department then decided that if all the nations of the hemisphere agreed,
the American states would extend recognition on April 9.1111 On the evening
of the thirty-first, Rockefeller and Warren went on the radio to explain the
Argentine situation to the American public. Declaring that the ultranationalists in that country were on the run, Rockefeller announced that to date,
Argentina had thoroughly mended her ways as far as the war and the InterAmerican System were concerned. To those who believed in America's duty
to rescue Argentina from totalitarianism he declared that the nature of the
Argentine political system was not a proper matter of concern to the United
States: "A policy of intervention may be necessary in war-torn Europe....
In the Western Hemisphere we have developed other methods of encouraging democracy ... you can't superimpose democracy from the outside."116
From this point it was merely a matter of time. On April 4 Washington
informed its envoys to the American republics of Acheson's report. On
April 7 Stettinius received approval from FDR for recognition and for the
appointment of Spruille Braden as ambassador to Argentina.11 7 When on
April 9 the twenty American republics simultaneously recognized the
Farrell-Peron government, Argentina's year-old isolation within the hemisphere came to an end.

The extension of diplomatic recognition to the Farrell-Peron government was overshadowed by the death on April 12 of Franklin D. Roosevelt.
His departure and Harry S. Truman's succession to the presidency, however,
in no way altered the goals of American foreign policy. Like Roosevelt's,
Truman's answer to the political and economic problems resulting from
World War II, particularly the growing rivalry between members of the Big
Three, was the creation of a viable international organization which could
prevent aggression and facilitate material progress throughout the world.
"The paramount significance for U.S. policy of Truman's accession to the
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presidency," wrote Thomas Campbell in Masquerade Peace, "was his decision to continue implementation of the UN policy. His first act was to
announce that the San Francisco conference would meet on schedule.
Through the next two months Truman constantly stressed avoiding any
showdown with the Soviets until the Americans knew the outcome of the
UN conference."118 The Latin Americanists within the State Department,
whose control over hemispheric affairs was not affected by the changing of
the guard, were as intent as ever on reestablishing an inter-American community that would be united in its commitment to nonintervention, consultation, and commercial intercourse.119
The Latin Americanists and, to a certain extent, Stettinius were convinced that, given the identity of principles guiding each community, the
two organizations, one global and one regional, could exist side by side.
Indeed, like Welles, they believed that the two complemented rather than
contradicted each other. Other State Department officials, led by Pasvolsky,
continued to argue, as they had at Mexico City, that regionalism in the guise
of an autonomous hemispheric organization made a viable world government impossible. They were originally opposed to American sponsorship of
Argentine membership in the United Nations because they feared that such
support would be interpreted by Russia and other powers as a vote by
Washington for regionalism over internationalism. A series of events that
transpired in April and May, however, served to convince the internationalists that Argentina's admission was essential to the very existence of the
world organization. Thus, in the end, they joined forces with the Latin
Americanists and worked to secure an invitation to the UNCIO for the
Farrell-Per6n regime.
In order to ensure that the Casa Rosada was eliminating the last vestiges
of Axis influence from Argentine society, that the Farrell-Per6n government
was fully prepared to participate in the joint defense of the hemisphere, and
that Argentina would not exclude United States businessmen from its postwar market, the Latin Americanists on April 17 sent to Buenos Aires a joint
diplomatic-military mission headed by Avra Warren. Accompanying the
chief of ARA were Generals G. H. Brett and I. H. Edwards of the Caribbean
Defense Command, Brig. Gen. L. A. Walton of the War Department, and
Adm. William Munroe, representing the navy. Thus did the Warren group
represent four of the factions that were most ardently in favor of rapprochement: Warren, the old Latin Americanists; McClintock, the new Latin
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Americanists and the business community; and Brett, Edwards, Walton, and
Munroe, the military.1 20
Early reports to the State Department from the Warren Mission indicated that, above all else, the Casa Rosada wanted an invitation to the San
Francisco Conference and would leave no stone unturned to obtain it. Peron
decided to head the enthusiastic welcoming committee that greeted Warren
and his colleagues at the airport. During the preliminary discussions that
followed, the vice-president declared that his government was very desirous
of working with Washington "in the interest of the Americas," and he
requested that his guests frankly suggest the bases for such cooperation.
Peron confided to Warren that he hoped rapprochement could proceed as
rapidly as possible, and alluding to the question of Argentina's presence at
the UNCIO, he declared that Buenos Aires understood clearly that there
were "mutual commitments" as a result of Mexico City. When the chief of
ARA suggested that anti-Argentine opinion in the United States placed
certain limitations on what the State Department could do, Peron promised
that his government was taking steps to win the North American press over
to Argentina's side.121
After a huge memorial service for FDR, which was held in Metropolitan Cathedral on April 19, the Argentineans and their guests broke up
into groups for talks on specific economic and military subjects. Elimination
of pro-Axis activities and economic collaboration headed the list of topics.
The Argentine secretary of commerce, Gen. Julio Cheici, assured Warren
and McClintock that he was prepared to take whatever action was necessary
to close down or establish governmental control over Axis firms. Moreover,
he promised that rubber and other strategic materials would not be used to
build up the army and navy but to facilitate production of materials essential
to the Allied war effort. Later in the day, Warren and his military colleagues called at the Casa Rosada and, after exchanging pleasantries with
Farrell, retired to the vice-president's offices and settled down to prolonged
discussions. Peron immediately launched into an exposition of his political
and social philosophy in which he emphasized the need to raise the Argentine standard of living through the development of industry, stimulation of
agricultural production, and a more equitable distribution of wealth. The
help of North American businessmen, he declared, would be essential to the
fulfillment of these goals. With such aid, Argentina would be able to make
available to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA)
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"all materials necessary for relief and rehabilitation" in the war-devastated
areas of the world.122
On April 21 the Argentine minister of marine accepted Admiral Munroe's proposal for collaboration between the Argentine and American navies,
including the exchange of bases and technical information. The minister of
war subsequently requested of Generals Brett and Edwards that they render
all possible aid in instituting Argentine-American staff talks.123
There is no record of specific promises made by the Americans to the
Argentineans concerning attendance at the UNCIO, but the State Department was obviously pleased with the Argentine position. When asked by
Arnaldo Cortesi, veteran Latin American correspondent of the New York
Times, to give his views on the state of Argentina, Warren replied that he
had encountered a sincere public and official desire in Buenos Aires to fulfill
the provisions of the Mexico City resolutions.124 Upon his arrival in the
United States on April 24, the head of ARA announced to newsmen that in
view of the fact that Argentina had agreed to cooperate closely with the
Allies in military, naval, and economic matters, Argentina might still have
a chance to attend the San Francisco Conference after having signed the
United Nations Declaration.1211
Despite the Warren Mission, the Latin Americanists' ability to secure a
place at the UNCIO for the Farrell-Peron government depended upon the
belief by the internationalists and the White House that such a move would
facilitate the establishment of the United Nations. To the distress of Rockefeller and his subordinates, the internationalists in mid April withdrew
support from this the last step in rapprochement. Stettinius, at the direction
of the White House, let it be known that diplomatic recognition of the
Farrell-Peron government in no way committed the United States to sponsoring Argentina's adherence to the United Nations Declaration or its admittance to the UNCIO. There would be no commitment, the secretary
pi•oclaimed, until agreement was forthcoming "that from a world, as well as
a hemispheric point of view, it was warranted."126
The reason for Truman's and Stettinius's change of heart surfaced
during a meeting between the secretary of state and the British foreign
secretary, Anthony Eden, in April. When, in the course of their discussions,
Eden declared that Great Britain had no objection to Argentina's signing
the United Nations Declaration and becoming a member of the United
Nations, Stettinius replied that neither did the United States, but he was sure
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that Russia was adamantly opposed.127 A new ingredient was thus added to
an already complicated problem.
The Soviet Union not only vigorously objected to the inclusion of
Argentina in the United Nations, but favored punishing the Argentineans
for their "pro-Axis" stand during the war. In December 1944, in a violent
front-page attack, Pravda had warned that after having supplied the Nazis
with thousands of tons of war materials worth millions of dollars, Argentina
was currently becoming an "asylum of Hitlerites."128 In mid March the
United States ambassador to Mexico, George Messersmith, began supplying
Washington with lengthy reports that further clarified Soviet attitudes. The
Russian charge d'affaires in Mexico City began to leak stories to the local
press to the effect that the Soviet Union would refuse to participate in the
San Francisco Conference if the other powers permitted the Farrell-Peron
government to attend. In April the Kremlin removed all doubt as to its
position when Red Star, voice of the Soviet military establishment, warned
that the USSR would boycott the San Francisco meeting if Argentina were
included.129
In its attacks, the Soviet Union repeatedly emphasized Argentina's
failure to sever relations with the Axis until 1944, its toleration of German
espionage, and its domination since 1942 by two autocratic military governments. In a sense these self-righteous pronouncements ( not unlike those of
the United States through 1944) were disingenuous; Soviet opposition to
Argentine membership was primarily motivated by a desire to weaken the
Latin American bloc in the United Nations, a coalition that Moscow anticipated would be vehemently anti-Communist. At the Yalta Conference in
February 1945, the Russians, concerned over their distinct numerical disadvantage in the proposed world organization, attempted to increase their
membership while reducing the support of their two principal allies. Stalin
initially insisted that all sixteen Soviet republics be accorded a vote as a
means of balancing the British Commonwealth nations and Latin American
support for the United States. In the end, Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt
agreed to original membership for White Russia and the Ukraine. The
Russians then pointed out that six Latin American states had not yet declared
war on the Axis and hence would not be eligible to join the United Nations.
The Big Three subsequently decided that all nonbelligerents would be
allowed until March 1 to formalize hostilities.130 Buenos Aires, however, did
not declare war until March 28, and this fact, along with Argentina's war196

Two Concepts of Community

time record, provided the Soviets with ample grounds for blocking the entrance into the UNCIO of a powerful and potentially hostile state.

On the eve of the San Francisco Conference, American policy-makers
confronted an extremely delicate situation. Key states in the Latin American
community had made it clear to the Latin Americanists that they would
accept nothing less than original membership for the Argentineans.131 At
the same time, Stettinius, Pasvolsky, and their colleagues were fearful that
if they forced Russia to accept Argentine participation in the UNCIO, the
Soviets would boycott the meeting, thus destroying this new venture in collective security before it had been given a fair trial.182 At that point neither
group could have realized that an East-West split over multiple membership
for the Soviet Union and the status of Poland would enable Latin America
and its spokesmen in the State Department to secure an invitation for
Argentina.
When the United States delegation-composed of Senators Tom Connally and Arthur Vandenberg, Congressmen Sol Bloom and Charles Eaton,
Dr. Virginia Gildersleeve, Comdr. Harold Stassen, and Secretary Stettinius
-met in San Francisco during the last week in April, one of the first questions they had to deal with concerned Russia's demand that the Ukraine and
White Russia be seated at the conference. Speaking for the administration,
Stettinius and Assistant Secretary James Dunn advised the group that at
Yalta, Roosevelt had approved membership for the two Soviet republics.
They strongly maintained that the United States should not antagonize the
Soviet Union by failing to live up to this obligation. The United States
ambassador to the Soviet Union, Averell Harriman, who was already consistently advocating a strong anti-Communist stand within administration
councils, advised the delegates to support the seating of the Soviet republics
in order to avoid providing Stalin with a pretext for evading his Yalta
commitments regarding eastern Europe.133 Already Washington and London
were extremely concerned over what they considered to be Soviet subversion
and encroachments in Poland and the Balkans.134
Latin America and the Latin Americanists within the State Department,
meanwhile, had grasped the issue of membership for White Russia and the
Ukraine as a lever to force the United States, and perhaps the Soviet Union,
to support Argentine membership. On April 25 Nelson Rockefeller was in-
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structed to "get your people [ the American republics] lined up right away"
in favor of multiple membership for the Soviet Union. He quickly returned
and informed his colleagues that Latin Amercia would not vote for White
Russia and the Ukraine unless the Big Three backed membership for Argentina. In the course of the ensuing discussion, Rockefeller took the position
that at Mexico City the United States had assumed the responsibility for
sponsoring the Farrell-Peron government and should now live up to its
commitment.1311
As it turned out, however, the United States delegation was as divided
over the seating of Argentina as it was over the two Soviet republics.
Arguing that the American people would be bitterly disillusioned if Argentina were allowed to sign the United Nations Declaration or to attend the
San Francisco Conference, Senator Connally declared that he was definitely
opposed to Argentine membership. 136 This view was enhanced by support
from the White House. Truman had already informed Stettinius that, in his
opinion, Argentina did not yet warrant the trust and support of the Allies.
It was too soon, he argued, to say whether a "Johnny-come-lately" such as
Argentina was in accord with Allied war aims or not.137 Pasvolsky and his
associates were certainly not anxious to take any action that would strengthen
the hemispheric bloc. Not surprisingly, Cordell Hull, delegate in absentia,
was at first adamantly opposed to admission.138
The danger was that if the United States did not back Argentine
membership, the other nations of the Western Hemisphere might retaliate
by blocking the seating of the Ukraine and White Russia. If they succeeded,
then, as John Foster Dulles, the ranking Republican among the delegation's
foreign-policy advisors, pointed out, the Russians could accuse the United
States of using Latin American opposition as a stalking horse for Washington's attempts to limit Soviet influence in the United Nations. Moreover,
Stalin, in the event that the two Russian states did not receive representation,
could charge the United States and Great Britain with not having honored
their Yalta pledges and thus furnish the Soviet Union with justification for
not fulfilling its obligations in eastern Europe.139 Tom Connally, Arthur
Vandenberg, Averell Harriman, and James Dunn adopted this view and
supported Argentine membership as a stratagem for preventing Russian
domination in Poland and the Balkans.140 In their minds, the overriding
consideration was the hope that in arranging for the two extra votes for the
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Soviet Union, the United States could induce Stalin to fulfill his pledges to
broaden eastern European governments by holding free elections.141
At this point the task that faced American diplomats at San Francisco
seemed impossible. At the risk of offending both public opinion and the
president, they had to see the Farrell-Peron government seated in order to
ensure that the western Hemisphere would support multiple membership
for the Soviet Union. Given Latin America's pledge not to vote for admission of the two Soviet republics if Argentina were not seated, the
UNCIO could conceivably reject the Ukraine and White Russia, possibly
causing the Soviet Union to bolt the United Nations or, escaping that,
providing it with an excuse for not honoring its Yalta pledges.
On April 26 the Latin Americanists, the internationalists, and the nonState Department representatives at San Francisco agreed upon a formula
for compromise: Argentina could attend the United Nations Conference as
an original member but would not be allowed to become a partner in the
wartime alliance (i.e., not sign the United Nations Declaration). This approach would save appearances so far as the American public was concerned,
while Argentina's presence at San Francisco would satisfy diplomatic requirements. The next step was to win Truman to the plan. On April 27
Stettinius phoned the White House to inform the president that the conference was on the verge of breaking up. Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, the
secretary reported, had delivered an ultimatum to the effect that the Russians
would leave unless the Soviet republics were seated. He then offered the
delegation's plan as the only solution. Truman still had serious misgivings,
declaring that the steps that Argentina had taken seemed purely of the
"bandwagon variety." Yet in the name of America's United Nations policy,
he reluctantly acquiesced.142
With their schisms apparently healed, the United States delegates turned
to the bizarre task of forcing Argentine membership on the Soviet Union in
order that the two Soviet republics might be seated. Several members of the
American delegation anticipated that Molotov would insist that the conference settle the matter of membership for White Russia and the Ukraine
before turning to Argentina. The Russians, by separating the two problems,
could possibly force the United States to align the other American nations
behind multiple membership for the Soviet Union and then be free to
obstruct the admission of Argentina. Consequently, James Dunn button-
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holed Andrei Gromyko and informed him that the Argentine question was
inseparably linked with the problem of the two Soviet republics.143
At a Big Four meeting called for the purpose of conferring with Latin
American representatives, the Russians switched to a new approach. After
Mexico's Ezequiel Padilla declared that Latin America would agree to membership for the Russian states only if the Big Four admitted Argentina,
Molotov broke in and berated those present for daring to consider an invitation for Argentina while Poland remained outside the gate. Pointing out
that Poland had been the first country invaded by the Nazi hordes and one
of the hardest hit by the war, Molotov proclaimed that the Soviet Union
would never stand by and see the UNCIO exclude Poland while it admitted
a Fascist state such as Argentina.144
In a sentence the Russians had seized the initiative from the AngloAmericans. With the Red Army in control of Poland, the Russians had
transported the Polish Communist government-in-exile from Lublin to Warsaw and had proclaimed it as both the de facto and the de jure government.
Inviting the Lublin regime to San Francisco would constitute tacit recognition by the Western powers, something that the United States and Great
Britain were far from ready to grant. American and British diplomats at
Yalta had insisted on the inclusion of "other Polish democratic leaders from
within Poland and from abroad" in the Provisional (Lublin) Government,
and they were not going to admit Poland until this had been accomplished.1411 The meeting ended with the Latin Americans threatening to
withdraw support from White Russia and the Ukraine, the English warning
that they would never agree to the seating of the Lublin government, and
Molotov comparing the wartime records of Argentina and Poland.
In order for White Russia and the Ukraine to be admitted, and thus for
the United States to live up to its Yalta commitment, the votes of the Latin
American representatives were critical. But the price for gaining these votes
was support for the admission of Argentina. Ironically, in order to bring
pressure on Russia to fulfill its part of the Yalta bargain in regard to eastern
Europe, the United States would have to guarantee Argentine membership
over vociferous Soviet opposition. But in declaring that Russia would block
Argentina's entry so long as Great Britain and the United States opposed
the Polish Provisional Government, Molotov seemed to have undercut one
of the reasons that the United States was urging the UNCIO to invite
Argentina. Hard-line anti-Communists such as Vandenberg had agreed to
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the admission of Argentina primarily in order to curb Soviet influence in
Europe. There was no question about Anglo-American opposition to the
seating of Poland. When informed of the new Russian tactic, Truman
instructed Stettinius to withdraw support from the Soviet republics if Molotov continued to insist on an invitation being issued to Poland.146
Meanwhile, the goals of the United States were advanced when the
Latin American nations voted in the meeting of the Steering Committee
on April 27 to seat the Soviet republics before they had received a commitment from Russia with regard to Argentina. After this display of Latin
American good faith, Stettinius, Rockefeller, and Eden definitely decided
that when the Executive Committee ( composed of representatives of the Big
Four and of delegates representing various global regions) met on April 30,
the American and Commonwealth members, who together would constitute
a majority, would seek to eliminate the Polish dimension from the White
Russian-Ukranian- Argentinean matter by carefully separating the three issues. As they envisioned it, the meeting would (1) vote to seat the Soviet
republics, (2) vote to invite Argentina to the UNCIO, and (3) defeat the
Russians' proposal to seat the existing Polish government.147
The Anglo-American plan worked perfectly. The executive body quickly
and unanimously voted to seat the Soviet republics. When the Argentine
matter then came up, Molotov made good on his threat to break great-power
unity. But the Commonwealth and Western Hemisphere nations were too
numerous; Argentina was not to be denied. After the Russians decided not
to bring up the Polish question, the only hurdle left for the three prospective
new members was a final vote in the general meeting of the UNCIO.148
With Anthony Eden presiding, the plenary session convened on the
following day and adopted a resolution that expanded the voting powers of
the Soviet Union from one to three. When the Latin American delegates
launched their drive in behalf of Argentina, Molotov rose to propose a postponement of the issue. To the extreme discomfort of the American republics, he pointed out that Argentina's past actions certainly had not conformed
to the principles and objectives of the Grand Alliance. Had not "Secretary
of State Hull yesterday branded Argentina as headquarters for a Fascist
movement in this hemisphere and a potential source of infection for the rest
of the Americas"? After making a case for Polish membership, he observed
that thus far, unity had been preserved on all matters; it would be a shame
to ruin this record because of a stampede on behalf of Argentina.149
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Latin America was fully prepared. The republics were convinced that
they had paid their dues to both Russia and the United States in voting for
White Russia and the Ukraine, and they were determined to collect their
reward. Colombia's Foreign Minister Alberto Lleras Camargo implored the
delegates not to begin the United Nations experiment with an act that was
in violation of the organization's basic principles by denying admission to a
country because of disapproval of its internal affairs. Argentina's international conduct, which had been unswervingly correct, should be the only
criterion for judging its admission. Latin American representatives again
contended that because Argentina had declared war on the Axis, the Allies
had an obligation to see that Argentina be seated. Glancing at the United
States delegation, the Peruvian chairman asserted that the real questions involved in the Argentine matter were intervention in the affairs of a sovereign
nation and, as he turned to look at the Russians, whether the American
nations constituted a judicial and moral unity.150
For the United States the time had come to make its position absolutely
clear. Stettinius took the floor to assert that the United States government
was in entire accord with the view of the American republics that the
Farrell-Peron regime had complied with the Mexico City Resolution and
that therefore Argentina should be invited to San Francisco. After the Russians were able to muster only seven votes for postponement, the plenary
session voted 31 to 4 to seat Argentina.151

The deterioration in Argentine-American relations and the concomitant
decline of the Good Neighbor Policy that occurred from 1942 through 1944
had been the result in part of the bureaucratic conflict between the Welles
Latin Americanists and the Hull internationalists. It was ironic, to say the
least, that Argentina's reincorporation into the hemispheric fold and its
admission into the United Nations were the product of cooperation between
a new group of Latin Americanists and a new group of Wilsonian internationalists. For the new Latin American establishment in the State Department, the decision to invite the Farrell-Peron government to San Francisco
marked the culmination of a campaign to alleviate apprehension south of
the Rio Grande which had been caused by wartime intervention into Argentine affairs. Believing that the welfare of the United States and the entire
hemisphere depended on the maintenance of an Inter-American System
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based on nonintervention, consultation, and economic interdependence,
Rockefeller and his associates first secured Argentina's readmission to the
American community and then maneuvered successfully to obtain a seat for
it at the UNCIO. At the same time, the White House and many within
the United States delegation, including Stettinius, Pasvolsky, and Hull, had
accepted Argentina in order to maintain the integrity of the United Nations.
Reflecting the widespread belief in America that an effective world organization was the only alternative to aggression and depression, these policymakers had agreed to the seating of Argentina in order to prevent a bolt by
the Communist bloc that would have destroyed the United Nations at its
inception.
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9
POSTSCRIPT TO DETENTE

Although Argentina's admission to the United Nations marked the successful culmination of an attempt by groups in the United States and various
Latin American governments to normalize Argentine-American relations
and to resurrect the Good Neighbor Policy, complete rapprochement and reestablishment of the principles of nonintervention and noninterference would
require another two years. In many respects the period from 1945 through
1947 in Argentine-American relations was a replay of the 1941 through 1945
era. Continuing resentment in the United States over Buenos Aires' neutralist policies during the war, plus instability within the foreign-policy establishment, led to a brief revival of moral imperialism. In turn, essentially the
same forces and groups that had been responsible for rapprochement in 1945
emerged in 1947 to force detente and the restoration of hemispheric solidarity.
The State Department's choice of an ambassador to restore formal diplomatic relations with Argentina was the veteran foreign-service officer and
wartime ambassador to Colombia and Chile, Spruille Braden. As events
were to reveal, Braden's views on the meaning of nonintervention and
respect for the sovereignty of all nations differed drastically from those of
Welles, Rockefeller, and Stettinius. With advocates of rapprochement neutralized by the flood tide of domestic criticism that came in the wake of
Argentina's admission to the United Nations, Braden joined battle with the
Farrell-Peron regime and worked openly for the return of democracy to
Argentina.1
Braden's arrival in Buenos Aires coincided with a new wave of domestic
repression. Using the recent declaration of war against the Axis as a pretext,
Peron moved to end criticism of government policies and to hamstring his
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personal enemies. During the ensuing campaign to "preserve public order,"
federal police jailed Gen. Arturo Rawson and some seventy other antigovernment figures, banned public meetings, and installed censorship of the
press.2 Indicating that he intended to be a positive force for democracy in
Argentina, Braden attacked the Farrell-Peron government directly for not
expelling Axis-controlled firms from the country and indirectly for blocking
the nation's return to constitutionalism.3
The ambassador's criticism brought an immediate though rather paradoxical reaction from Farrell and Peron. On the one hand, Farrell announced that elections would be held by early 1946, and he lifted the state
of siege for the first time in three years. On the other, Peron launched a
carefully orchestrated attack on Braden, branding him as but another agent
of North American imperialism.4
Meanwhile, in Washington, a shake-up in the State Department paved
the way for the ascendancy of Braden and his policy of revolutionary democracy within the foreign-policy establishment. James Byrnes replaced
Edward Stettinius, Jr., as secretary of state in July 1945. America's new chief
diplomat immediately announced that in view of his ignorance of Latin
American affairs, he was going to appoint an able subordinate to manage
hemispheric problems. That subordinate was Spruille Braden.5 In August,
Nelson Rockefeller, openly confessing the failure of his soft-line policy toward Argentina, resigned to make way for Braden as assistant secretary of
state for Latin American affairs. 6 Rockefeller, and to some extent Stettinius,
had succumbed to public outrage over Argentina's being admitted to the
United Nations, outrage that had only increased as the Farrell-Peron government continued to persecute its political opponents and suspend the right to
free speech and assembly.
There were, however, those who dared to speak out against Braden and
his attempt to return Argentina to the paths of constitutional democracy.
Sumner Welles recited his Good Neighbor litany and blamed the State
Department's hard-line policies on two groups: old Hull supporters within
the department, who were intent on vindicating their mentor, and the Committee on Latin American Affairs within the CIO, which had called for
Washington to prevent the spread of Argentine fascism to neighboring
republics.7 Joining Welles were Senators Tom Connally and Arthur Vandenberg, both of whom had been delegates to the Mexico City and the San
Francisco conferences. During Senate confirmation hearings they repeatedly
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castigated Braden for endangering hemispheric solidarity. Connally and
Vandenberg, like Welles, were committed to the concept of regional collective-security organizations working within the context of a world body,
although the senators were concerned primarily with containing Soviet expansion, while Welles was preoccupied with preserving the Inter-American
System.8 Not surprisingly, this anti-Braden coalition represented some of the
views and assumptions of those who had been responsible for Argentina's
admission to the United Nations.
Despite this criticism, Braden was confirmed as assistant secretary, and
from his new post he continued his war with Peron and Argentine fascism.
In so doing, he shook the very foundations of inter-American solidarity. In
early October, the State Department announced that because of the totalitarian and pro-Axis policies of the Farrell-Peron government, the United
States could not conclude a treaty of military assistance with Argentina. In
so doing, Washington scuttled the Foreign Ministers Meeting scheduled for
October 20, which was to complete the work of the Chapultepec Conference
by converting the Inter-American System into a collective-security organization. Even more damaging to Argentine-American relations and to the
Good Neighbor Policy was the State Department's decision to publish its
"Blue Book on Argentina," which claimed to prove conclusively that a tacit
alliance had existed between the Farrell-Peron government and the Axis.
What appalled so many latinos was the timing of the release. In October
1945 Peron had announced as a presidential candidate for the general elections to be held in February 1946. In an unmistakable effort to stop the
Peron bandwagon, the United States published the Blue Book just one week
prior to the election.9
To Braden's dismay, the Peronistas won a decisive victory. Washington's blatant attempt to influence the outcome of the presidential contest had
no doubt helped, rather than hindered, Peron. Indeed, the outcome of the
election, described by many Argentineans as the freest since 1916, constituted
a repudiation of the Hull-Braden policy of revolutionary democracy and
undercut the State Department's prime rationale for coercion of Argentina.
At this point, Braden faced a choice of policies. The United States could
acquiesce in its defeat gracefully, recognize the Peron regime as the legally
constituted government, and proceed with the conclusion of a hemispheric
mutual-defense pact, or it could, using the threat of Argentine expansion as
a pretext, continue to try to isolate Argentina within the hemisphere. To the
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alarm of the Latin American republics and of various influential groups in
the United States, Braden chose the latter course. Washington once again
postponed the foreign ministers' meeting which had been scheduled for 1946
in Bogota, and throughout the rest of the year called upon Buenos Aires to
fulfill its commitments under the Act of Chapultepec.10
Just as in the spring of 1945, Peron, who had decided on a policy of
reconciliation with the United States after his triumph in February, used
the carrot and the stick in an effort to force Washington to end its coercive
policies. On June 16 he opened diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union;
By the end of the year he had nationalized several American-owned firms
and was actively seeking to draw neighboring states into Argentina's economic sphere. At the same time he professed a desire for friendship with
Washington and declared that in any future war, Argentina would be bound
to fight with the United States and the rest of the American republics.11
Aiding Peron were the same forces and groups that had come forth in
1944-45 to press for an Argentine-American rapprochement. In the first
place, there was no less a demand for Argentine food and fiber in Europe
in 1946 than there had been in 1945. Indeed, the winter of 1946 was the
worst that Europe had experienced in a generation. This, coupled with the
economic chaos caused by World War II, made starvation a very real possibility in both occupied and nonoccupied areas, and caused those American
policy-makers who were concerned primarily with the European situation to
press for a normalization of relations with Argentina. Secondly, American
exporters were just as anxious to sell Argentina the tires, tools, rolling stock,
and heavy machinery that she so desperately needed as they had been in
1945. If Braden continued with his vendetta, American exporters believed
that they would find the open door in Argentina shut firmly in their faces.
In addition there were those, like Connally and Vandenberg, who believed
that the United States had to be able to count on solid hemispheric support
in the growing Soviet-American confrontation. Detente with Argentina,
they believed, would restore inter-American solidarity, which in turn would
protect the New World from Communist penetration. Many Latin American
governments were themselves concerned about the threat of Soviet expansion, and they, no less than Connally and Vandenberg, viewed Washington's
isolation of Argentina as an invitation to extrahemispheric intervention.
Moreover, latinos had, since 1944, looked forward to the creation of a collective-security organization that would not only protect the Americas from
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any extrahemispheric threat but would also take the lead in solving socioeconomic problems south of the Rio Grande.12
By early 1947 the Truman administration, which had become increasingly sensitive to criticism of Braden's hard-line policies, particularly by
those who charged that these policies were hindering America's efforts to
resist Soviet expansion, was ready to end the feud with Argentina and return
once again to the principles of nonintervention and noninterference. When
Gen. George C. Marshall, representing a group that had consistently urged
cooperation rather than confrontation with Argentina, replaced Byrnes as
secretary of state, the way was open for Braden's ouster and for detente with
Buenos Aires. After a series of friendly gestures toward the Peron government, President Truman announced on June 3 that no obstacle remained to
discussion looking toward the treaty of mutual assistance contemplated by
the Treaty of Chapultepec.13 Shortly thereafter Braden resigned. His replacement as assistant secretary was Norman Armour, who subsequently
presided not only over normalization of relations with Argentina but over
negotiation of the Pact of Rio in the fall of 1947. That agreement ended
America's eleven-year campaign to erect a collective-security system that
would include all the states of the hemisphere.14

In 1933 a small group of Latin American specialists within the State
Department, building on initiatives begun by the Coolidge and Hoover
administrations, set about to undo the damage to United States-Latin American relations that had been done by a generation of military and economic
intervention into the affairs of various Central and South American republics. Invoking the principles of nonintervention and noninterference, they
dismantled North America's system of protectorates south of the Rio Grande
and refused to coerce Latin governments that threatened United States
businesses with nationalization. Over a period of time the Latin Americanists within the State Department were able to dispel much of the mistrust
and resentment that had characterized latino attitudes toward the United
States since the turn of the century and, with varying degrees of success, to
establish new relationships based on respect and mutuality of interest.
In part, the durability of the Good Neighbor Policy had depended upon
the willingness of all American republics to join with the United States in
resisting attempts by extrahemispheric sources to intervene in New World
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affairs and upon continuity within the United States foreign-policy establishment. During World War II, neither prerequisite was satisfied. Argentina
chose to pursue a neutralist course, and the Latin American policy of the
United States became the subject of a bitter bureaucratic struggle within the
Roosevelt administration. Consequently, the principles of nonintervention
and noninterference, together with "absolute respect for the sovereignty of all
states," ceased to be the guideposts of Washington's hemispheric policy.
As has been noted, Argentina's decision to remain aloof from the struggle against the Axis was a product of Argentine geography, economics,
culture, politics, and diplomatic tradition as well as of contemporary developments such as the Depression and the intensification of Argentine nationalism. Despite Argentina's political instability and despite intense pressure
from the Allied community, Argentine attitudes toward World War II
remained fairly constant from 1941 through 1945. The real variable in
Argentine-American relations, and the key to understanding Washington's
response to Argentine neutrality, was competition for control of policy between various individuals and agencies within the Roosevelt foreign-policy
establishment.
The weeks immediately following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
witnessed an intense struggle within the State Department between two rival
groups of diplomats for control of policy. The Welles Latin Americanists
and the Hull internationalists, representing two different viewpoints on
hemispheric affairs, fought both prior to and during the Rio Conference to
have their policy recommendations endorsed by the chief executive. Because
of direct access to the White House, exclusive control over certain vital
information, proximity to the negotiating process, and a variety of other
factors, the Latin Americanists succeeded in excluding their rivals from the
decision-making process and, as a result, gained control over not only
Argentine but also hemispheric policy.
The subtle coercive techniques pursued by the Latin Americanists
throughout the remainder of 1942 were a reflection of their commitment to
the Good Neighbor Policy (i.e., nonintervention, consultation, and overt
respect for the sovereignty of each American state) and of pressure from the
internationalists, the Treasury Department, and the Board of Economic
Warfare. In order to advance a particular concept of the national interest, to
wage economic warfare against the Axis more effectively, and to augment
their power within the New Deal bureaucracy, the Treasury Department,
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under Morgenthau and White, and the Board of Economic Warfare, led by
Wallace and Perkins, pressed the State Department for a hard-line posture
toward Argentina. Pressure from these two sources drove the Latin Americanists and the internationalists into a momentary alliance during which
Hull joined with the undersecretary in defending the Latin Americanists'
policy of selective discrimination. The end result, however, was to undermine the Welles group and pave the way for the ascendancy of the internationalists within the State Department.
Welles's defection to the hard-liners in the fall of 1942, based in no small
part on his desire to remain the arbiter of hemispheric policy, left the Latin
Americanists leaderless and devoid of a conduit to the White House. Consequently, their power within the foreign-policy establishment gradually
diminished until the summer of 1944, when Duggan and Bonsal were forced
out of the State Department. The undersecretary's adoption of a hard-line
attitude and the subsequent decline of the Latin Americanists destroyed the
bureaucratic balance of power within the State Department and allowed
Hull and his subordinates to dominate hemispheric policy throughout most
of 1943 and all of 1944. As a result, the Wilsonian assumptions about the
role of the United States in Latin America that underlay Hull's and Long's
philosophy regarding foreign affairs began to come to the fore. After the
revolution of June 1943, democratization of the Argentine political system
became as important a goal to American policy-makers as elimination of the
ties between Buenos Aires and the Axis capitals. Ironically, only continuing
pressure from the Treasury Department and the Foreign Economic Administration, the successor agency to BEW, served to ameliorate (in the economic
sphere at least) United States policy toward Argentina.
From mid 1943 until December 1944 the State Department employed
every conceivable type of diplomatic weapon against Argentina in an attempt
to compel it to abandon neutrality and return to constitutional government.
Gradually these tactics-which included invoking the rest of the Latin
American community against Argentina, upsetting the military balance of
power in South America, contributing to the downfall of the Ramfrez
government, and, finally, instituting a policy of unilateral nonrecognitioncreated a reaction against the hard-liners within the foreign-policy establishment, the American business community, and the Inter-American System.
It was these factors, together with Roosevelt's decision to reorganize
and streamline the State Department by installing new leadership, that made
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possible a reversal of policy toward Argentina. The shake-up in the State
Department in late 1944 introduced two additional groups of policy-makers
into the Argentine-American equation. A new coterie of internationalists,
headed by Edward Stettinius, Jr., and Leo Pasvolsky, assumed overall control of the State Department and devoted their efforts to implementing
America's United Nations policy. At the same time, a new aggregation of
Latin Americanists, headed by Nelson Rockefeller and his former subordinates in the Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, took charge of
hemispheric matters. Sensitive to the demands of United States traders and
investors who were then insisting on an end to coercion of Argentina, and
at the same time convinced that the Good Neighbor Policy offered the best
approach to safeguarding North America's strategic and economic interests
south of the Rio Grande, the neo-Latin Americanists engineered a complete
rapprochement with Argentina. The internationalists cooperated in the first
phase of detente in order to gain general support among the Latin American
republics for the United Nations concept and, during the second, to avoid
an open split between East and West that might have destroyed the UNCIO
at its inception.
As the principal participants in the decision-making process struggled
to advance a concept of the national interest, to fulfill organizational goals,
and to enhance their personal power, their efforts were dramatically affected
by coalitions with other nations, agencies, and interest groups. For instance,
the Argentine military profited from the fact that the Latin Americanists
succeeded in controlling policy within the United States foreign-affairs establishment in 1942 and again in 1945. Neutrality, which was so important
to the army's organizational goals of survival and aggrandizement, was a
result, in part, of Washington's commitment to respect for the juridical
equality of all states and for hemispheric solidarity. In turn, the United
States' commitment to those principles was an outgrowth of the Latin
Americanists' bureaucratic victory. There was, moreover, a tacit pact between Whitehall and the original group of Latin Americanists. This alliance
at times became explicit, as in 1943, when Bonsal and Duggan joined with
the British Foreign Office in attempting to restrain Hull and Long over the
Transradio affair. The intimate relationship between the Justistas and Radicals on the one hand and the American embassy on the other clearly affected
Armour's policy recommendations and, thus, United States policy toward
Argentina. Finally, the fact that several leading Latin American nations and
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the Rockefeller Latin Americanists formed a coalition in the spring of 1945
had much to do with the seating of Argentina at San Francisco.
Something remains to be said about the policies themselves, the options
that were thrust up through the bureaucratic structure to the chief decisionmakers for their approval. In designing policy alternatives, officials are evermindful of the interests of their organization and of their personal power
position, but for the substance of their recommendations they must draw on
an aggregation of assumptions about the nature of the international community and the role that America should play in it. Consciously or unconsciously, virtually all of the diplomats and bureaucrats in charge of the
"Argentine problem" during World War II relied on the Wilsonian tradition for their attitudes on foreign affairs. For those who chose to reject
isolationism, there was hardly any other alternative.
Indeed, America's posture toward Argentina from 1942 through 1945
may be viewed as a conflict between two disparate strains contained in the
Wilsonian philosophy. A determination to create an international community of sovereign nations pledged to observe in their dealings with each
other the principles of self-determination and noncoercion is, of course, the
best-known theme in the "New Diplomacy."15 As Robert Divine has shown
in The Triumph of Internationalism, the Roosevelt administration and a
majority of Americans acknowledged the interdependence of nations during
World War II and deliberately embraced world cooperation as an alternative to nationalism, expansionism, and war. This concept of community,
clearly embodied in the Welles-Rockefeller approach to inter-American matters and in the Stettinius-Pasvolsky view of international affairs, prevailed
in Argentine-American policy throughout much of 1942 and then again
during the first half of 1945. The other theme in the Wilsonian approach is
the belief that it is the duty of the United States to promote the spread of
democratic institutions and processes and to use its might to compel other
governments to pursue an enlightened course both in domestic and international affairs. This aspect of Wilsonianism, which was so apparent in the
statements and policies of the Hull internationalists toward Argentina after
June 1943, emerged triumphant when the Latin Americanists were eliminated from the decision-making process. Actually, Hull, Long, and their
subordinates were committed to both goals. They believed, however, like
Wilson, that not only were the two objectives compatible but that the de-
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mocratization of the political systems of the nation-states of the world would
facilitate the establishment of a viable collective-security organization.
As Laurence Duggan perceived all along, the two primary objectives of
Wilsonian foreign policy are contradictory and at times mutually exclusive.
America's attempts to export democracy have almost inevitably led to intervention in the affairs of other states, and as in late 1944, when the Hull
group fought against the holding of an inter-American conference on the
grounds that it might lead to the legitimization of the Farrell-Peron regime,
they have undermined attempts to create an international concert of powers.
Recognition of this contradiction is essential to an understanding of the
diplomatic conflicts of the period. The Good Neighbor Policy, which was
tested to the breaking point in Argentine-American relations during World
War II, emerged as, among other things, an explicit rejection of revolutionary democracy and a reaffirmation of Wilsonian internationalism.
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For detailed background information on the Argentine economy and United
States-Argentine economic relations from 1939 through 1945 see "Trade Agreement between Argentina and the United States" (December 1941) and "Argentine Trade in 1942" (July 1942), in the Bulletin of the Pan American Union.
On the crucial meat question, E. Louise Peffer, "Cordell Hull's Argentine Policy
and Britain's Meat Supply," Inter-American Economic Affairs (Autumn, 1956),
is quite useful. This piece neglects, however, wider British economic interests in
Argentina and the factors behind Hull's economic policy.
One of the few scholarly works dealing with the American republics and
the United Nations is John A. Houston's Latin America in the United Nations
(New York, 1956). This work details Latin America's objectives and attitudes at
the San Francisco Conference and after. In addition, a number of analyses published at the time helped to clarify Latin America's position at the close of the
war. Among the best are Samuel Guy Inman, "Some Latin American Views on
Post-War Reconstruction," Foreign Policy Reports (15 March 1944); and William Fox, "The Super Powers at San Francisco," Review of Politics (January
1946).
For an excellent analysis of decision-making in diplomacy see Graham T.
Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston, 1971). Also helpful are "American Political
and Bureaucratic Decision-Making," in Richard M. Pfeffer, ed., No More Vietnams? (New York, 1968); and Richard J. Barnet, Roots of War (New York,
1972). Barnet is particularly adept at identifying the various kinds of interest
groups that have affected policy formulation during the twentieth century. For
Franklin Roosevelt's unique approach to administration and decision-making see
Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York, 1960); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt, vol. 2, The Coming of the New Deal (Boston,
1959); and two books by James MacGregor Burns: Roosevelt: The Lion
and the Fox (New York, 1956) and Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom (New
York, 1970).
As far as postwar planning within the Roosevelt and Truman administrations
is concerned, the two most helpful studies were John Lewis Gaddis, The United
States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York, 1972); and
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Thomas M. Campbell, Masquerade Peace: America's UN Policy, 1944-1945
(Tallahassee, Fla., 1973).

MEMOIRS AND PUBLISHED DIARIES
The two volumes of The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, 1948) provide detailed accounts of specific events relating to the Argentine question. Hull's
recollections are not always invalidated by the numerous axes he had to grind.
This source is invaluable for Hull's attitudes and rationalizations during the
Argentine affair. Sumner Welles has written two books, The Time For Decision
(New York and London, 1944) and Seven Decisions That Shaped History (New
York, 1950, 1951), which are simultaneously commentaries on American foreign
policy during the New Deal period and indirect accounts of the undersecretary's
years in the State Department. As unbiased guides to an understanding of the
sources of American policy, they leave much to be desired. Hull's role, for
example, is almost completely neglected. Dean Acheson, in Present at the Creation (New York, 1969), alludes to the infighting in the State Department during Hull's tenure as secretary of state, while The Americas: The Search for
Hemispheric Security (New York, 1949), by Lawrence Duggan, discusses United
States-Argentine policy from the point of view of one who violently disagreed
with Hull's get-tough policy. For an account of the Welles-Hull dispute from
the perspective of a Hull supporter see Fred L. Israel, ed., The War Diary of
Breckinridge Long (Lincoln, Nebr., 1966). The roles played by Henry Morgenthau and the Treasury Department in the formulation of Argentine policy is
delineated in John Morton Blum, ed., From the Morgenthau Diaries, 3 vols.
(Boston, 1959-1967). Blum's equally superb The Price of Vision: The Diary of
Henry A. Wallace, 1942-1946 (Boston, 1973) outlines the position taken by
Henry Wallace and the Board of Economic Warfare toward both Argentina and
various bureaucratic rivals. These two books are invaluable for understanding
interpersonal and interagency conflicts in the upper echelons of the federal bureaucracy during World War II. For a description of the scandal that helped
to bring about Sumner Welles's downfall see Orville H. Bullitt, ed., For the
President: Personal and Secret (Boston, 1972). A helpful Argentine memoir is
Nicolas Repetto's Mi paso por la poUtica (Buenos Aires, 1957). See Tom Connally, My Name Is Tom Connally (New York, 1954), and Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston, 1952), for the
views of two of the principal participants in the San Francisco Conference.
President Truman's Memoirs (New York, 1955-56) include a brief rationale for
his approval of the seating of the Argentine delegation at the UNCIO. The
recollections of the British ambassador to Argentina, Sir David Kelly, The Ruling
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Few (London, 1952), constitute an invaluable description of Argentine society
and politics, and of Anglo-American policy as seen from the British point of view.

PERIODICALS
In attempting to gauge the temper of American public op1mon toward
Argentina and its impact on United States policy, I selected a group of newspapers and journals that was small enough in number to permit in-depth investigation but large enough to allow for geographical and philosophical differences.
The New York Times and the New York Herald Tribune both provided useful
detailed coverage of the Argentine-American feud, while the Times editorialized
frequently on relations between the two countries from a moderately liberal point
of view. Two pro-New Deal papers that were continually concerned with developments in Argentina were the St. Louis Post-Dispatch and the Washington
Post. After the Stettinius-Rockefeller group succeeded to power in the State
Department, the Post-Dispatch reluctantly stuck with the administration, while
the Post became vehemently critical of United States policy. The American Left
is represented in this work chiefly by the Nation and the New Republic, both
ardent advocates of friendship with Russia and staunch foes of Argentina's various wartime governments. The Chicago Tribune, the Los Angeles Times, and
the Saturday Evening Post speak for those Americans who admired the Liberty
League, opposed the New Deal, and abhored the Soviet Union. These oracles
tended to be more understanding of the policies, both domestic and foreign, that
were pursued by Argentina during World War II. Business Week, the Wall
Street Journal, the Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Barron's, the American
Exporter, and Export Trade and Shipper proved to be valuable sources of information on the state of the Argentine economy and trade relations between
Argentina and the United Nations. They were, as well, excellent spokesmen for
the American business and financial community.
This study does not pretend to include an in-depth analysis of either Argentine or Latin American public opinion. Selected editorials from La Naci6n,
Noticias Grdficas, and La Hora-all of Buenos Aires-were used to indicate popular revulsion at certain policies pursued by the United States. El Mercurio of
Santiago, El Popular of Mexico City, 0 Globo of Rio de Janeiro, and La Noche
of La Paz, among others, were cited to show that in 1944-45, various Latin
American nations took essentially similar positions on the rehabilitation of Argentina, postwar planning, and the future of the Good Neighbor Policy.

OFFICIAL AND SEMIOFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS
Like all studies dealing with twentieth-century American foreign policy, this
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project began with the Department of State's Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1940-1945. These volumes contain telegrams, memoranda, and dispatches
selected from the files of relevant governmental agencies and presidential libraries. The documents furnish a basic narrative of Argentine-American relations
for the period under investigation. For insights into the motives and goals of the
policy-makers, particularly where interpersonal and interagency rivalries are concerned, the scholar must look elsewhere. The Department of State Bulletin,
published by the State Department, and Documents on American Foreign Relations, published by the World Peace Foundation, furnished the texts of important
statements, press releases, and speeches on Argentina during the war years. External Research Papers, studies of specific diplomatic problems by State Department analysts which were published by the department, were useful for background data. For a semiofficial but surprisingly impartial narrative of events
relating to the Argentine affair see the Foreign Policy Bulletin, published by the
Foreign Policy Association. Foreign Policy Reports, published by the same group,
contains a series of articles on Argentine-American wartime relations by various
members of the foreign-policy establishment. For a verbatim account of all official
meetings held at the San Francisco Conference see Documents of the U.N.C.1.O.,
San Francisco, 1945 (London and New York, 1945), published by the United
Nations Information Organization. "Relations of the Caribbean Defense Command with Argentina," an unpublished compilation by the Historical Section of
the Caribbean Defense Command, includes intelligence reports on developments
within Argentina, a description of CDC actions toward various Argentina wartime governments, and an explanation of the motives underlying those actions.
Although it did produce a few letters and speeches on legislative attitudes toward
the Argentine problem, the Congressional Record proved to be a remarkably
barren source for this study.

UNPUBLISHED SOURCES
The two sources that are basic to understanding both the decision-making
process and Argentine-American wartime relations are the State Department decimal files and lot files on Latin America housed in the National Archives in
Washington, D.C. The decimal file consists of incoming and outgoing diplomatic
communiques, letters from public officials and private citizens, foreign press clippings, and intelligence reports. The lot files contain copies of intradepartmental
memoranda concerning Argentina, arranged by date. This source was particularly
helpful in enabling me to trace the continuing debate on policy formulation and
to define the various cliques that developed within the department.
The archives also contain the records of other agencies with input into the
decision-making process. The General Records of the Office of Strategic Services
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are massive. OSS officers submitted literally thousands of reports on Argentine
affairs and Axis activities within Argentina to the State Department and other
government agencies. By cross checking with the records of other agencies and
with the private papers of the key participants, I was able to discover which
organizations and individuals had access to OSS reports and which reports were
most influential in shaping their policy recommendations. The General Records
of the Department of the Treasury were not at all helpful, primarily because
nearly all significant memoranda had been removed from the material turned
over to the archives and had been retained by the department. Treasury Department officials proved to be most uncooperative about allowing me access to these
records. Fortunately, Henry Morgenthau made copies of virtually all inter- and
extra-office memoranda and took them with him when he left. The General
Records of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which are lodged in the military division of the archives, were useful in determining the military's attitude toward
Argentina. Also administered by the National Archives but housed in the Federal
Records Center at Suitland, Maryland, are the general Records of the Foreign
Economic Administration and the General Records of the Office of Coordinator
of Inter-American Affairs. The FEA files contain memos that indicate the attitude of the agency's leadership toward Argentina and, to a certain extent, the
considerations that helped to shape these attitudes. There is also valuable information on the conflict in Buenos Aires between representatives of the FEA and
officials of the United States embassy. The coordinator's files were helpful primarily in defining the views and motives of the coordinator, Nelson Rockefeller.
These records contain detailed information on the activities of the OCIAA committees in each Latin American country. Because of Argentina's challenge to
United States policy and the significance of that challenge to the bureaucratic
struggle in Washington, however, the local committee in Argentina did not possess enough clout to influence United States policy. Moreover, to my disappointment, I discovered few comments by OCIAA field officers on the evolution of
United States policy toward Argentina and the assumptions that underlay it.
In the Library of Congress the pertinent private collections to see are the
papers of Cordell Hull, Breckinridge Long, and Leo Pasvolsky. The Hull Papers,
although disappointing, contain information on the secretary's attempts to coerce
various Latin American states into supporting United States policy toward Argentina during 1944. Long's correspondence supplied additional data on the
Hull-Welles dispute. As special advisor to the State Department, Leo Pasvolsky
played a significant role in the development of United States policy for the
Chapultepec and San Francisco conferences. His papers were especially helpful
in shedding light on the postwar planning process within the State Department
during 1944 and 1945.
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The Diaries and Papers of Henry Stimson are located in Sterling Library,
Yale University. The letters, notes, and transcripts of telephone conversations
that are contained in this well indexed collection clearly reveal the secretary of
war's views on Argentina, hemispheric security, the Monroe Doctrine, and the
Good Neighbor Policy.
The papers of Edward Stettinius, Jr., at the University of Virginia contain
750,000 items relating in one way or another to the secretary of state's public
life. The vast majority of letters and memos deal with trivial matters, and as of
1974 the collection was virtually unorganized. There are, nonetheless, several
memos in the Stettinius Papers that are essential to an understanding of his
relationships to FDR, Nelson Rockefeller, and the decision-making process. They
also provide several valuable insights into the reasoning behind the State Department's decision in 1945 to reverse its policy toward Argentina.
Although much of the material in the diaries of Henry A. Wallace has been
duplicated in Blum's Price of Vision, this collection at the University of Iowa
contains vital information on the Board of Economic Warfare and its head, Milo
Perkins. In addition, Wallace's notebooks include memos and transcripts that
help to clarify the vice-president's views on postwar planning and Argentina;
particularly useful are the not always uncritical comments of Wallace's and
Perkin's subordinates on the motives and goals of their superiors.
The papers of Harry S. Truman were disappointing. The Argentine folder
adds little to existing knowledge on the president's role in the decision to admit
Argentina to the United Nations in 1945. The collection does, however, contain
a sizable body of material dealing with popular reaction to the admission of
Argentina and to the Argentine-American rapprochement in general.
The Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park includes the papers of a
number of individuals who were intimately associated with the making of hemispheric policy during World War II. Perhaps the least helpful were the papers
of the president. The President's Secretary's File and the Map Room File yielded
material pertaining to United States policy during both the Rio Conference and
the Bolivian Coup. Perhaps the single most valuable collection was the diary
and papers of Henry Morgenthau, Jr. The diary detailed the Treasury Department's position on the Argentine question; the motives of Morgenthau and his
chief assistant, Harry Dexter White; and the Treasury Department's relationship
with other governmental agencies. The Presidential Diaries, which are records of
Morgenthau's meetings with FDR, did more to clarify both the president's attitude toward Argentina and the struggle within his administration for control of
Argentine policy than did any other single source that I consulted. In the Papers
of Harry Hopkins there is a good bit of material on the Argentine question as
discussed at the London, Moscow, and Yalta conferences. Most valuable was a
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collection of letters, telegrams, and reports in the Hopkins Papers entitled "FBI
Reports on Argentina." J. Edgar Hoover periodically supplied Roosevelt and
Hopkins with intelligence on developments in Argentina that were replete with
his own personal observations. Evidently, the White House relied on this source
more heavily than on any other. The diaries of Adolf Berle were a gold mine of
information with regard to the evolution of hemispheric policy as a whole during
World War II, the emergence of various cliques within the State Department,
and the Warren mission in 1945.
There were, of course, unpublished sources that I did not consult but that
might seem pertinent to scholars interested in the field-the papers of Spruille
Braden, United States ambassador to Argentina from 1945 to 1946, and George
Messersmith, ambassador to Mexico and later to Argentina, for example. During
the latter stages of my research I rarely encountered a letter or memo that I had
not previously seen. The papers of all of the principal participants, with the
exception of Sumner Welles, whose papers are still closed to the public, have been
consulted; I simply saw no need to seek additional comments by those who were
not directly involved.
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The Good Neighbor Policy was tested to the breaking point by Argentina-U.S. relations
during World War II. In part, its durability had depended both upon the willingness
of all American republics to join with the United States in resisting attempts by
European powers to intervene in New World affairs and upon continuity within the
United States foreign-policy establishment. During World War II, neither prerequisite
was satisfied, Argentina chose to pursue a neutralist course, and the Latin American
policy of the United States became the subject of a bitter bureaucratic struggle within
the Roosevelt administration. Consequently, the principles of nonintervention and
noninterference, together with "absolute respect for the sovereignty of all states,"
ceased to be the guideposts of Washington's hemispheric policy.
In this study, Randall Bennett Woods argues persuasively that Washington's
response to Argentine neutrality was b ased more on internal differences-individual
rivalries and power struggles between competing bureaucratic empires-than on
external issues or economic motives. He explains how bureaucratic infighting within
the U.S. government, entirely irrelevant to the issues involved, shaped important
national policy toward Argentina.
Using agency memoranda, State Department records, notes on conversations and
interviews, memoirs, and personal archives of the participants, Woods looks closely at
the rivalries that swayed the course of Argentine-American relations. He describes the
personal motives and goals of men such as Sumner Welles, Cordell Hull, Henry
Morgenthau, Harry Dexter White, Henry A. Wallace, and Milo Perkins. He describes
the power struggles between the State Department, the Treasury Department, the
Board of Economic Welfare, the Caribbean Defense Command, and other agencies.
In addition, Woods discusses the careers and views of Juan Peron and Nelson
Rockefeller-for American policy contributed in no small way to Peron's rise, and
Rockefeller was the man d1iefly responsible for the U.S. rapprochement with Argentina
in 1944-1945. Woods also gives special attention to the impact of the Wilsonian
tradition-especially its contradictions-on policy formation.
"Woods gives meaning to an always complex, sometimes tortuous subj ect, and has
accomplished the task without resort to ideology or polemic."
Journal of American History
Randall Bennett Woods is distinguished professor of history at the University of
Arkansas, where he has also served as associate dean, interim dean, and dean of
Fulbright College of Arts and Sciences. He is the author of seven books, including
Fulbright: A Biography, which was nominated for both the Pulitzer Prize and the
National Book Award and which won the Ferrell and Ledbetter Prizes.
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